Financial intermediation in a model of growth through creative destruction

This paper presents an endogenous growth model in which the research activity is financed by intermediaries that are able to reduce the incidence of researcher's moral hazard. It is shown that financial activity is growth promoting because it increases research productivity. It is also found that a subsidy to the financial sector may have larger growth effects than a direct subsidy to research. Moreover, due to the presence of moral hazard, increasing the subsidy rate to R\&D may reduce the growth rate. I show that there exists a negative relation between the financing of innovation and the process of capital accumulation. Concerning welfare, the presence of two externalities of opposite sign steaming from financial activity may cause that the no-tax equilibrium provides an inefficient level of financial services. Thus, policies oriented to balance the effects of the two externalities will be welfare improving.

Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Nonmonotone Participation in Optional Intermediation

In many decentralised markets, the traders who benefit most from an exchange do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily afford them. At the same time, employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who benefit little from trade. Together, these decisions amount to non-monotone participation choices in intermediation: only traders of middle “type” employ intermediaries, while the rest, the high and the low types, prefer to search for a trading partner directly. We provide a theoretical foundation for this, hitherto unexplained, phenomenon. We build a dynamic matching model, where a trader’s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her type. We also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of non-monotone equilibria.

Corruption and Financial Intermediation in a Panel of Regions: Cross-Border Effects of Corruption

The importance of financial market reforms in combating corruption has been highlighted in the theoretical literature but has not been systemically tested empirically. In this study we provide a first pass at testing this relationship using both linear and nonmonotonic forms of the relationship between corruption and financial intermediation. Our study finds a negative and statistically significant impact of financial intermediation on corruption. Specifically, the results imply that a one standard deviation increase in financial intermediation is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of the standard deviation in the corruption index and this relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification changes, including: (i) different sets of control variables; (ii) different econometrics techniques; (iii) different sample sizes; (iv) alternative corruption indices; (v) removal of outliers; (vi) different sets of panels; and (vii) allowing for cross country interdependence, contagion effects, of corruption.

Misallocation of capital in a model of endogenous financial intermediation and insurance

In this paper we analyze productivity and welfare losses from capital misallocation in a general equilibrium model of occupational choice and endogenous financial intermediation. We study the effects of borrowing and lending, insurance, and risk sharing on the optimal allocation of resources. We find that financial markets together with general equilibrium effects have large impact on entrepreneurs' entry and firm-size decisions. Efficiency gains are increasing in the quality of financial markets, particularly in their ability to alleviate a financing constraint by providing insurance against idiosyncratic risk.

A dilution cost approach to financial intermediation and securities markets

This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance,with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, Bankdebt and Bond financing may all co-exist in equilibrium. The paperemphasizes the relationship Banking aspect of financial intermediation:firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks aregood at helping them through times of financial distress. The debtrestructuring service that banks may offer, however, is costly. Therefore,the firms which do not expect to be financially distressed prefer toobtain a cheaper market source of funding through bond or equity issues.This explains why bank lending and bond financing may co-exist inequilibrium. The reason why firms or banks also issue equity in our modelis simply to avoid bankruptcy. Banks have the additional motive that theyneed to satisfy minimum capital adequacy requeriments. Several types ofequilibria are possible, one of which has all the main characteristics ofa "credit crunch". This multiplicity implies that the channels of monetarypolicy may depend on the type of equilibrium that prevails, leadingsometimes to support a "credit view" and other times the classical "moneyview".

Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.

Wealth, financial intermediation and growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development on economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with thelevel of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries; and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a model to account for these wealth effects. The model is a overlapping generations growth model where financial intermediaries implement liquidity risk sharing among depositors. We show that at early stages of economic development, a bank can increase welfare of its depositors only at the cost of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed certain wealth threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. As wealth increases, banks offer improving liquidity insurance, and higher growth; however, for high levels of wealth, growth generated byfinancial intermediation declines as the economy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.

Trends in Financial Intermediation by the Banking System in Kerala

The study documents the long-term trends in financial intermediation by the principal player in Kerala’s credit system i.e., banking. The process of financial intermediation by the banking system, involving mobilization of deposits from savers and disbursal of credit to investors, is considered to be crucial in the process of economic development. The objective of the study is to explore the interrelationship between financial intermediation and economic growth in Kerala. In order to pursue this objective, the study examine, the trends in intermediation by the banking system in Kerala over a long period, the trend and pattern of bank deposits and credit in the State and Kerala’s economic growth, the trend in the growth and performance of financial intermediaries like the All India Financial Institutions, the links between banking and economic variables, and the difference in the growth trends of banking and economic variables between Kerala and India and the probable reasons for the difference

Money distribution with intermediation

This pap er analyzes the distribution of money holdings in a commo dity money search-based mo del with intermediation. Intro ducing heterogeneity of costs to the Kiyotaki e Wright ( 1989 ) mo del, Cavalcanti e Puzzello ( 2010) gives rise to a non-degenerated distribution of money. We extend further this mo del intro ducing intermediation in the trading pro cess. We show that the distribution of money matters for savings decisions. This gives rises to a xed p oint problem for the saving function that di cults nding the optimal solution. Through some examples, we show that this friction shrinks the distribution of money. In contrast to the Cavalcanti e Puzzello ( 2010 ) mo del, the optimal solution may not present the entire surplus going to the consumer. At the end of the pap er, we present a strong result, for a su cient large numb er of intermediaries the distribution of money is degenerated.

Intermediación financiera en América Latina = Financial intermediation in Latin America

Incluye Bibliografía

Labour intermediation services: lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes bibliography