Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring


Autoria(s): Di Giorgio, Giorgio
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa

Data(s)

15/09/2005

Resumo

This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10230/517

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a>

Palavras-Chave #Finance and Accounting #financial intermediation #costly state verification #constrained pareto optimality
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper