O abuso de informação privilegiada (insider trading)

In the stock market, information takes on special relevance, due to the market’s permanent updating and the great fluidity of information existent therein. Just as in any other negotiations, the party with the better information has a bargaining advantage, as it is able to make more advantageous business decisions. However, unlike most other markets, the proper functioning of the stock market is greatly dependent on investors’ trust in the market itself. As such, if there are investors who, due to any condition they possess or office they hold, have access to relevant information which is not accessible to the general public, distrust is bred within the market and, consequently, investment is lessened. Thus, there is a need to prevent those who hold privileged information from using it in abusive ways. In Portugal, abuse of privileged information is set out and punished criminally in Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code (‘Código dos Valores Mobiliários’). In this dissertation, I have set out, firstly, to analyze the inherent conditions for there to be a crime of abuse of privileged information; secondly, to analyze two well-known cases, which took place and were decided in other jurisdictions, and attempt to understand how these cases would fall under Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code. Whereas the first case, Chiarella v. United States, was scrutinize under Article 378 of the Portuguese Securities Code, in the second, Lafonta v. AMF, the conclusion arrived at was that the crime taken place was different. This analysis allowed, on one hand, the application to a particular case of prerequisites and concepts which were explained, at a first approach, from a more theoretical perspective; on the other hand, it also allowed the further development of specific aspects of the regime, namely the difference between an insider and a tipee, as well as to more clearly set out the limits to the precise character of the information at hand.

Insider Trading and Real Investment

In this paper I analyze the effects of insider trading on real investmentand the insurance role of financial markets. There is a single entrepreneurwho, at a first stage, chooses the level of investment in a risky business.At the second stage, an asset with random payoff is issued and then the entrepreneurreceives some privileged information on the likely realization of productionreturn. At the third stage, trading occurs on the asset market, where theentrepreneur faces the aggregate demand coming from a continuum of rationaluniformed traders and some noise traders. I compare the equilibrium withinsider trading (when the entrepreneur trades on her inside information in theasset market) with the equilibrium in the same market without insider trading. Ifind that permitting insider trading tends to decrease the level of realinvestment. Moreover, the asset market is thinner and the entrepreneur's netsupply of the asset and the hedge ratio are lower, although the asset priceis more informative and volatile.

The dog that did not bark: Insider trading and crashes

This paper documents that at the individual stock level insiders sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders purchases peak only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric information. We test our hypothesis against competing stories such as patterns of insider trading driven by earnings announcement dates, or insiders timing their trades to evade prosecution. Finally we provide new evidence regarding crashes and the degree of information asymmetry.

Insiders´ views as a predictor of stock performance : can insider trading be used to predict stock performance on the United States stock market?

This thesis studies the possibility of using information on insiders’ transactions to forecast future stock returns after the implementation of Sarbanes Oxley Act in July 2003. Insider transactions between July 2003 and August 2009 are analysed with regression tests to identify the relationships between insiders’ transactions and future stock returns. This analysis is complemented with rudimentary bootstrapping procedures to verify the robustness of the findings. The underlying assumption of the thesis is that insiders constantly receive pieces of information that indicate future performance of the company. They may not be allowed to trade on large and tangible pieces of information but they can trade on accumulation of smaller, intangible pieces of information. Based on the analysis in the thesis insiders’ profits were found not to differ from the returns from broad stock index. However, their individual transactions were found to be linked to future stock returns. The initial model was found to be unstable but some of the predictive power could be sacrificed to achieve greater stability. Even after sacrificing some predictive power the relationship was significant enough to allow external investors to achieve abnormal profits after transaction costs and taxes. The thesis does not go into great detail about timing of transactions. Delay in publishing insiders’ transactions is not taken into account in the calculations and the closed windows are not studied in detail. The potential effects of these phenomena are looked into and they do not cause great changes in the findings. Additionally the remuneration policy of an insider or a company is not taken into account even though it most likely affects the trading patterns of insiders. Even with the limitations the findings offer promising opportunities for investors to improve their investment processes by incorporating additional information from insiders’ transaction into their decisions. The findings also raise questions on how insider trading should be regulated. Insiders achieve greater returns than other investors based on superior information. On the other hand, more efficient information transfer could warrant more lenient regulation. The fact that insiders’ returns are dominated by the large investment stake they maintain all the time in their own companies also speaks for more leniency. As Sarbanes Oxley Act considerably modified the insider trading landscape, this analysis provides information that has not been available before. The thesis also constitutes a thorough analysis of insider trading phenomenon which has previously been somewhat separated into several studies.

Insider trading, investment, and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL

Insider trading e governança corporativa : o perfil e prática dos insiders

O assunto insider trading é bastante polêmico há muito tempo, como, exemplo disto se tem o Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sobre Insider Trading nos Estados Unidos, e a discussão continua nos dias de hoje com casos como da Ambev e da Martha Stewart em 2004. Este trabalho apresenta o levantamento de dados, e inferências sobre as operações realizadas pelos insiders das empresas com ações negociadas na Bovespa, que são classificadas como de governança corporativa diferenciada. Os dados aqui apresentados mostram que os insiders, como definidos pela instrução CVM 358 de 2002, são agentes bastante ativos no mercado de capitais brasileiro. O perfil das operações com títulos transacionados pelos insiders infere que a diretoria vende mais títulos do que compra, ao contrário dos controladores e conselheiros; que os insiders das empresas do nível 1, de menores exigências e restrições de governança, são mais ativos em operações no mercado do que seus pares nas empresas de nível de governança maior. Também foram constatados indícios de operações realizadas pelos insiders que resultaram em retornos excedentes aos esperados estatisticamente significativos.

O insider trading no direito brasileiro

O insider trading é ilícito de elevado potencial danoso, pois impacta não só as pessoas diretamente relacionadas com a operação realizada com a informação privilegiada, mas também o mercado de capitais como um todo, afetando a confiança dos investidores. É importante, portanto, a repressão severa do ilícito nas esferas administrativa, civil e penal, destacando-se o papel regulador da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, enquanto representante da intervenção do poder estatal no âmbito do mercado de capitais. Não obstante, para a responsabilização pelo ilícito do insider trading, deve-se exigir um conjunto probatório robusto, ainda que apenas indiciário. A utilização de uma espécie de muralha segregadora, se minimiza situações de conflito de interesses ao evitar o acesso amplo a informações relevantes não divulgadas ao mercado, não é, por si só, capaz de excluir responsabilidade por eventual insider trading. Importante ter cuidado com construções teóricas, como a da “mente corporativa”, capazes de esvaziar de utilidade barreiras como uma Chinese Wall. Impossível transpor a teoria do domínio do fato à apuração de ilícitos de insider trading.

Sanctions and public enforcement of insider trading laws in Europe

The recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market stability. The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study follows a law and economics approach in identifying how this prohibition should be enforced. More precisely, the study investigates first whether criminal law is necessary under all circumstances to enforce insider trading; second, if it should be introduced at EU level. This study provides evidence of law and economics theoretical logic underlying the legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public enforcement of the insider trading prohibition by identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that effectively induce insider trading deterrence. The analysis further aims to reveal the economic rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal enforcement of insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding to a comparative analysis of the current legislations of height selected Member States. This work also assesses the European Union’s most recent initiative through a critical analysis of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for Market Abuse. Based on the conclusions drawn from its close analysis, the study takes on the challenge of analyzing whether or not the actual European public enforcement of the laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical law and economics recommendations, and how these enforcement practices could be improved.

Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information?

Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information while trading in their company’s stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insider transactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions.

Empresas de controle familiar e informed trading: evidências de short selling no mercado brasileiro?

O objetivo desse trabalho é testar se no mercado brasileiro, empresas familiares são mais suscetíveis a insider trading.Testes feitos no mercado americano evidenciaram efeito do controle familiar no conteúdo informacional embutido em montagem de posições vendidas de companhias abertas. Lá, foram encontrados níveis acima do normal de posições short em companhias de controle familiar principalmente em momentos que antecipavam resultados negativos que iriam ser publicados. Não encontramos evidências claras de que o fato da companhia ter controle familiar poderia levá-la a apresentar ou não insider trading, já que por limitação do modelo não é possível comparar o nível de anormal short para empresas de controle familiar e outras pois essa variável é excluída do modelo. Entretanto, observamos nos modelos em painel fixo com interações que existe diferença do efeito de algumas variáveis de controle para empresas de controle familiar ou não sobre outras variáveis de controle o que poderia mostrar que alguma influência o controle familiar poderia ter sobre o insider trading. Testamos também se empresas de controle estatal apresentavam maior volume médio diário anormal de posições vendidas em momentos que antecediam surpresas de resultado, e também não encontramos evidências claras e diretas que isso acontecia.

Ó sistema capitalista, quanto do teu Portugal são lavagens de capital?

Ouvimos também muitos a falar em branqueamento de capitais, crimes financeiros, abuso de informação, manipulação do mercado, etc.. Salvo o devido respeito, contudo, poucos sabem o quão difícil é a prova destes crimes! Sabiam que p.e. até meados de 2008, crimes como o abuso de informação ou a manipulação do mercado eram insusceptíveis de interferência nas comunicações?! Sabiam que até hoje, o Código dos Valores Mobiliários não prevê a criminalização das pessoas colectivas e, portanto, dos próprios bancos?! Abstract: We hear too many to talk about money laundering, financial crimes, insider trading, market manipulation, etc .. Unless all due respect, however, few know how hard it is to prove that the crimes! Standing knew that by mid-2008, crimes such as dealing or market manipulation were incapable of interference in communications ?! They knew that to date, the Securities Code does not provide for the criminalization of legal persons and therefore the banks themselves ?!

Recensão do livro Abuso de Informação, Manipulação do Mercado § Responsabilidade Penal das Pessoas Colectivas, 4ª Edição Revista e Ampliada, 2015

Os crimes de abuso de informação privilegiada e manipulação do mercado estão em relação com a responsabilidade penal das pessoas colectivas como os bancos e com a chamada globalização. § The crimes of insider trading and market manipulation abuse are in relation to the criminal liability of legal persons such as banks and so-called globalization.