Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker notion, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probabilities p = (pi)i2I or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a constrained correlated equilibrium of a doubled game satisfying certain p-belief constraints and characterize the topological structure of the resulting set of p-rational outcomes. We establish continuity in the parameters p and show that, for p su ciently close to one, the p-rational outcomes are close to the correlated equilibria and, with high probability, supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend Aumann and Dreze's [4] theorem on rational expectations of interim types to the broader p-rational belief systems, and also discuss the case of non-common priors.

Towards a game theoretic authorisation model

Authorised users (insiders) are behind the majority of security incidents with high financial impacts. Because authorisation is the process of controlling users’ access to resources, improving authorisation techniques may mitigate the insider threat. Current approaches to authorisation suffer from the assumption that users will (can) not depart from the expected behaviour implicit in the authorisation policy. In reality however, users can and do depart from the canonical behaviour. This paper argues that the conflict of interest between insiders and authorisation mechanisms is analogous to the subset of problems formally studied in the field of game theory. It proposes a game theoretic authorisation model that can ensure users’ potential misuse of a resource is explicitly considered while making an authorisation decision. The resulting authorisation model is dynamic in the sense that its access decisions vary according to the changes in explicit factors that influence the cost of misuse for both the authorisation mechanism and the insider.

Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.

Effect of Selfish Node Behavior on Efficient Topology Design

The problem of topology control is to assign per-node transmission power such that the resulting topology is energy efficient and satisfies certain global properties such as connectivity. The conventional approach to achieve these objectives is based on the fundamental assumption that nodes are socially responsible. We examine the following question: if nodes behave in a selfish manner, how does it impact the overall connectivity and energy consumption in the resulting topologies? We pose the above problem as a noncooperative game and use game-theoretic analysis to address it. We study Nash equilibrium properties of the topology control game and evaluate the efficiency of the induced topology when nodes employ a greedy best response algorithm. We show that even when the nodes have complete information about the network, the steady-state topologies are suboptimal. We propose a modified algorithm based on a better response dynamic and show that this algorithm is guaranteed to converge to energy-efficient and connected topologies. Moreover, the node transmit power levels are more evenly distributed, and the network performance is comparable to that obtained from centralized algorithms.

Nonatomic games on Loeb spaces

In the setting of noncooperative game theory, strategic negligibility of individual agents, or diffuseness of information, has been modeled as a nonatomic measure space, typically the unit interval endowed with Lebesgue measure. However, recent work has shown that with uncountable action sets, for example the unit interval, there do not exist pure-strategy Nash equilibria in such nonatomic games. In this brief announcement, we show that there is a perfectly satisfactory existence theory for nonatomic games provided this nonatomicity is formulated on the basis of a particular class of measure spaces, hyperfinite Loeb spaces. We also emphasize other desirable properties of games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces, and present a synthetic treatment, embracing both large games as well as those with incomplete information.

Essays on the Economics of Networks Under Incomplete Information

Social networks constitute a major channel for the diffusion of information and the formation of attitudes in a society. Introducing a dynamic model of social learning, the first part of this thesis studies the emergence of socially influential individuals and groups, and identifies the characteristics that make them influential. The second part uses a Bayesian network game to analyse the role of social interaction and conformism in the making of decisions whose returns or costs are ex ante uncertain.

Uplink Power Control and Base Station Association in Multichannel Cellular Networks

A combined base station association and power control problem is studied for the uplink of multichannel multicell cellular networks, in which each channel is used by exactly one cell (i.e., base station). A distributed association and power update algorithm is proposed and shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game. We consider network models with discrete mobiles (yielding an atomic congestion game), as well as a continuum of mobiles (yielding a population game). We find that the equilibria need not be Pareto efficient, nor need they be system optimal. To address the lack of system optimality, we propose pricing mechanisms. It is shown that these mechanisms can be implemented in a distributed fashion.

Nonneutral network and the role of bargaining power in side payments

Representatives of several Internet access providers have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the �network neutrality� principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the internaut�s behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the content providers, and the monetary flow that involves the internauts, the ISP and content provider, and in particular, the content provider�s revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibrium; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the service and content providers determine how much they will charge the internauts) with a cooperative one - the content provider and the service provider bargain with each other over payments to one another. We include in our model a possible asymmetric bargaining power which is represented by a parameter (that varies between zero to one). We then extend our model to study the case of several content providers. We also provide a very brief study of the equilibria that arise when one of the content providers enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP.

Regulation of Off-Network Pricing in a Nonneutral Network

Representatives of several Internet service providers (ISPs) have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers (CPs) pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the ``network neutrality'' principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this article is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the users' behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the CPs, and, the monetary flow that involves the content users, the ISP and CP, and, in pUrticular, the CP's revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibria; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the ISPs and CPs determine how much they will charge the users) with a ``cooperative'' one on how the CP and the ISP share the payments. We include in our model a possible asymmetric weighting parameter (that varies between zero to one). We also study equilibria that arise when one of the CPs colludes with the TSP. We also study two dynamic game models as well as the convergence of prices to the equilibrium values.

Aplicación móvil para el acceso a juego de naipes sobre el desarrollo humano

Este Proyecto Fin de Carrera (PFC) tiene como objetivo el análisis, diseño e implementación de un videojuego móvil multijugador, con un enfoque educativo, para la sensibilización sobre el Índice de Desarrollo Humano (IDH). El sistema resultante se ha desarrollado para la Plataforma Android, utilizando el Framework AndEngine, que utiliza aceleración hardware de la GPU para garantizar un buen rendimiento en terminales de gama baja, de modo que pueda utilizarse en un amplio número de terminales móviles disponibles en el mercado. La aplicación se presenta como un juego de cartas con los diferentes países y sus datos humanitarios, los jugadores deben conocer el peso de los índices de desarrollo (esperanza de vida, renta, educación) de los países en comparación con los países de los otros jugadores. El sistema de juego premia a los jugadores con mayores conocimientos sobre los datos humanos de los diferentes países del mundo, de ese modo los mejores jugadores serán los que tengan más conocimientos de estos datos. El juego permite jugar partidas en solitario utilizando jugadores manejados por la CPU, o multijugador mediante WIFI o 3G. La actualización de la información y de los datos de las partidas se realiza a través de la comunicación con un servidor web ya implementado de forma complementaria a la realización de este proyecto. El sistema ha sido integrado y validado satisfactoriamente con diferentes terminales móviles y usuarios de diferente perfil de edad y uso. El videojuego se puede descargar de la página web creada en un proyecto complementario a éste (pendiente de publicación web), y ya se encuentra también disponible en Google Play. https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=xnetcom.pro.cartas&hl=es_419 ABSTRACT. This Project End of Career (PFC) takes as an aim the analysis, design and implementation of a multiplayer mobile videogame, with an educational approach, for the awareness on the Human Development Index (HDI). The resultant system has been developed for the Platform Android, using the AndEngine Framework, which uses hardware acceleration of the GPU to ensure a good performance on low-end terminals, so that it can be used in a wide range of mobile handsets available in the market. The application is presented as a card game with the different countries and his humanitarian information, the players must know the weight of the indexes of development (life expectancy, revenue, education) of the countries in comparison with the countries of other players. The game system rewards players with more knowledge on human information of different countries, thus the best players will be those with more knowledge of these information. The game allows to play items in solitarily using players handled by the CPU, or multiplayer by means of WIFI or 3G. The update of the information and data of the online games is done through communication with a web server implemented as a complement to the realization of this project. The system has been built and successfully validated with different mobile terminals and users of different age and usage profile. The game can be downloaded from the website created in a complementary project to this (web publication pending), and is now also available on Google Play https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=xnetcom.pro.cartas&hl=es_419

Distributed cognitive radio systems with temperature-interference constraints and overlay scheme

Cognitive radio represents a promising paradigm to further increase transmission rates in wireless networks, as well as to facilitate the deployment of self-organized networks such as femtocells. Within this framework, secondary users (SU) may exploit the channel under the premise to maintain the quality of service (QoS) on primary users (PU) above a certain level. To achieve this goal, we present a noncooperative game where SU maximize their transmission rates, and may act as well as relays of the PU in order to hold their perceived QoS above the given threshold. In the paper, we analyze the properties of the game within the theory of variational inequalities, and provide an algorithm that converges to one Nash Equilibrium of the game. Finally, we present some simulations and compare the algorithm with another method that does not consider SU acting as relays.

Formalizing operator task analysis

Human operators are unique in their decision making capability, judgment and nondeterminism. Their sense of judgment, unpredictable decision procedures, susceptibility to environmental elements can cause them to erroneously execute a given task description to operate a computer system. Usually, a computer system is protected against some erroneous human behaviors by having necessary safeguard mechanisms in place. But some erroneous human operator behaviors can lead to severe or even fatal consequences especially in safety critical systems. A generalized methodology that can allow modeling and analyzing the interactions between computer systems and human operators where the operators are allowed to deviate from their prescribed behaviors will provide a formal understanding of the robustness of a computer system against possible aberrant behaviors by its human operators. We provide several methodology for assisting in modeling and analyzing human behaviors exhibited while operating computer systems. Every human operator is usually given a specific recommended set of guidelines for operating a system. We first present process algebraic methodology for modeling and verifying recommended human task execution behavior. We present how one can perform runtime monitoring of a computer system being operated by a human operator for checking violation of temporal safety properties. We consider the concept of a protection envelope giving a wider class of behaviors than those strictly prescribed by a human task that can be tolerated by a system. We then provide a framework for determining whether a computer system can maintain its guarantees if the human operators operate within their protection envelopes. This framework also helps to determine the robustness of the computer system under weakening of the protection envelopes. In this regard, we present a tool called Tutela that assists in implementing the framework. We then examine the ability of a system to remain safe under broad classes of variations of the prescribed human task. We develop a framework for addressing two issues. The first issue is: given a human task specification and a protection envelope, will the protection envelope properties still hold under standard erroneous executions of that task by the human operators? In other words how robust is the protection envelope? The second issue is: in the absence of a protection envelope, can we approximate a protection envelope encompassing those standard erroneous human behaviors that can be safely endured by the system? We present an extension of Tutela that implements this framework. The two frameworks mentioned above use Concurrent Game Structures (CGS) as models for both computer systems and their human operators. However, there are some shortcomings of this formalism for our uses. We add incomplete information concepts in CGSs to achieve better modularity for the players. We introduce nondeterminism in both the transition system and strategies of players and in the modeling of human operators and computer systems. Nondeterministic action strategies for players in \emph{i}ncomplete information \emph{N}ondeterministic CGS (iNCGS) is a more precise formalism for modeling human behaviors exhibited while operating a computer system. We show how we can reason about a human behavior satisfying a guarantee by providing a semantics of Alternating Time Temporal Logic based on iNCGS player strategies. In a nutshell this dissertation provides formal methodology for modeling and analyzing system robustness against both expected and erroneous human operator behaviors.

Experimental implementation of a three qubit quantum game with corrupt source using nuclear magnetic resonance quantum information processor

In a three player quantum `Dilemma' game each player takes independent decisions to maximize his/her individual gain. The optimal strategy in the quantum version of this game has a higher payoff compared to its classical counterpart. However, this advantage is lost if the initial qubits provided to the players are from a noisy source. We have experimentally implemented the three player quantum version of the `Dilemma' game as described by Johnson, [N.F. Johnson, Phys. Rev. A 63 (2001) 020302(R)] using nuclear magnetic resonance quantum information processor and have experimentally verified that the payoff of the quantum game for various levels of corruption matches the theoretical payoff. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.