Relationship banking: does it lower information asymmetry or increase lender monopoly power?

A literatura teórica sobre economia bancária aponta que o relacionamento duradouro entre um emprestador e uma firma tomadora pode revelar informações sobre a qualidade de crédito da firma. Entretanto, trabalhos teóricos preveem diferentes resultados do efeito do relacionamento bancário sobre a taxa de juros e volume ofertado do empréstimo. De acordo com Diamond (1991) e outros, se o relacionamento bancário for revelar a todos os credores a qualidade de crédito da firma, espera-se como efeitos o aumento do volume dos empréstimos e redução na taxa de juros. Por outro lado, se o relacionamento bancário revelar as informações de crédito da firma apenas para o fornecedor principal, então se pode não ter os efeitos de aumento do volume e redução na taxa de juros. Este trabalho demonstra empiricamente quais são os efeitos das informações públicas e privadas geradas pelo relacionamento bancário no montante do empréstimo e na taxa de juros cobrada pelas instituições financeiras para as firmas. Usamos como medida de informação pública o tempo de relacionamento entre o banco e tomador, que pode ser encontrado em bureaux externos como Serasa Experian e Serviço Central de Proteção ao Crédito (SCPC) ou no Sistema de Informação do Banco Central (SISBACEN). Usamos como modelo de informação privada medidas que indicam o pagamento do débito em atraso por parte do tomador, o qual é de conhecimento apenas de cada credor. De acordo com a teoria, espera-se que a informação pública de tempo de relacionamento bancário indicará a qualidade do credor e resultará em maior volume de empréstimo e taxa de juros menores. As informações privadas sobre pagamentos em atraso, por ser exclusiva do credor principal, não terão efeitos sobre o montante do empréstimo e sobre a taxa de juros. No teste empírico, foram analisados dois mil setecentos e oitenta e cinco empréstimos do produto capital de giro concedidos a cinquenta e três empresas, fornecidos por uma instituição financeira do Estado do Espírito Santo. Utilizando o modelo econométrico dados em painel com efeito fixo de firma, encontramos que o tempo de relacionamento bancário é positivamente correlacionado ao valor do principal do empréstimo e é negativamente correlacionado ao spread bancário. Ambos os efeitos são estatisticamente significantes ao nível de 5,00%. Resultados similares ao encontrado por Berger e Udell (1995). Os resultados mostram que um relacionamento duradouro entre firmas e instituições financeiras reduz a assimetria de informação, gerando benefícios para as firmas. Para testar o feito da informação privada, foram utilizadas informações de atraso das firmas com a instituição financeira. Esses dados foram usados internamente, não divulgados em bureaux de crédito. As variáveis testadas foram número de parcelas pagas em atraso no mês anterior, a soma das parcelas pagas em atraso, flag se já efetuou pagamento em atraso e meses desde o último pagamento em atraso. Não têm efeito as informações privadas sobre o spread e o valor do principal do empréstimo. Resultados similares aos encontrados por Sharpe (1990).

The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

La preuve et la conservation de l'écrit dans la société de l'information

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit (L.L.M.)"

La preuve et la conservation de l'écrit dans la société de l'information

Il est devenu commun de dire que notre société se transforme inexorablement en une société dite de « l'information ». Cette transformation se caractérise entre autres par une utilisation accrue des technologies de l’information afin de communiquer, d’échanger ou de transiger. Les supports traditionnels de communication (tel que le papier) cèdent progressivement leur place à de nouveaux supports technologiques favorisant l’efficacité et la rapidité des échanges, et par la même occasion le développement du commerce électronique. Qu’on le souhaite ou non, un constat s’impose : la montée en puissance des réseaux virtuels a eu raison du monopole du papier. Sur le plan juridique, cette nouvelle réalité bouleverse aussi considérablement les règles de droit civil largement pensées et ancrées dans un contexte papier. L’avènement de la numérisation et du phénomène de la dématérialisation des supports ont effectivement soulevé plusieurs questions d’ordre juridique tout à fait nouvelles que nous pourrions résumer de la manière suivante : Quels sont les rapports entre l’écrit et son support autre que le papier? Quelles sont les caractéristiques de l’écrit faisant appel aux technologies de l’information? Ce type d’écrit peut-il être admis en tant que moyen de preuve? Si oui, quelle sera sa force probante? Ce type d’écrit doit-il être conservé? Le présent mémoire vise précisément à identifier certains éléments de réponses à ces diverses questions en étudiant spécifiquement les cadres juridiques français et québécois. Ce mémoire traite d’une part des enjeux liés à l’évolution et au rôle de l’écrit face à l’avènement des technologies de l’information et d’autre part du cadre juridique de la preuve et de la conservation de l’écrit dans la société de l’information.

Asymmetric information, credit market condition, and entrepreneurial finance

The issue of imperfect information plays a much more important role in financing “informationally opaque” small businesses than in financing large companies.1 This chapter examines the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: the effects of relationship lending and the impacts of credit market concentration on entrepreneurial financial behavior. These two perspectives are strongly linked to each other via the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance. Existing literature has recognized the important role played by relationship lending in alleviating the problem of asymmetric information. However, mixed empirical results have been reported. For example, it has been found that the development of relationship lending can improve the availability of finance for small businesses borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and reduce the costs of finance (Berger and Udell, 1995). Meanwhile, with monopoly power, banks may extract rents, in terms of charging higher-than-market interest rates, from small businesscustomers who have very concentrated banking relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2001). In addition, both favorable and unfavorable effects of credit market concentration on financing small businesses have been acknowledged. Small business borrowers may have to pay a higher-than-market price on loans (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) and are more likely to be financially constrained (Cetorelli, 2004) than in competitive markets. On the other hand, empirical studies have shown that market concentration create a strong motive for lenders to invest in private information from small business customers, and therefore a concentrated market is more efficient in terms of private information acquisition (Han et al., 2009b). The objective of this chapter is to investigate, by reviewing existing literature, the role played by relationship lending and the effects of market concentration on financing entrepreneurial businesses that are supposed to be informationally opaque. In the first section we review literature on the important role played by asymmetric information in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: asymmetric information and relationship lending, and the theoretical modeling of asymmetric information. Then we examine the relationship between capital market conditions and entrepreneurial finance and attempt to answer two questions: Why is the capital market condition important for entrepreneurial finance? and What are the effects of capital market conditions on entrepreneurial financial behavior in terms of discouraged borrowers, cash holding, and the availability and costs of finance?

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

Transmission Of Intra-cellular Genetic Information: A System Proposal.

One of the great challenges of the scientific community on theories of genetic information, genetic communication and genetic coding is to determine a mathematical structure related to DNA sequences. In this paper we propose a model of an intra-cellular transmission system of genetic information similar to a model of a power and bandwidth efficient digital communication system in order to identify a mathematical structure in DNA sequences where such sequences are biologically relevant. The model of a transmission system of genetic information is concerned with the identification, reproduction and mathematical classification of the nucleotide sequence of single stranded DNA by the genetic encoder. Hence, a genetic encoder is devised where labelings and cyclic codes are established. The establishment of the algebraic structure of the corresponding codes alphabets, mappings, labelings, primitive polynomials (p(x)) and code generator polynomials (g(x)) are quite important in characterizing error-correcting codes subclasses of G-linear codes. These latter codes are useful for the identification, reproduction and mathematical classification of DNA sequences. The characterization of this model may contribute to the development of a methodology that can be applied in mutational analysis and polymorphisms, production of new drugs and genetic improvement, among other things, resulting in the reduction of time and laboratory costs.

[evaluation Of Data On Live Birth Certificates From The Information System On Live Births (sinasc) In Campinas, São Paulo, 2009].

To assess the completeness and reliability of the Information System on Live Births (Sinasc) data. A cross-sectional analysis of the reliability and completeness of Sinasc's data was performed using a sample of Live Birth Certificate (LBC) from 2009, related to births from Campinas, Southeast Brazil. For data analysis, hospitals were grouped according to category of service (Unified National Health System, private or both), 600 LBCs were randomly selected and the data were collected in LBC-copies through mothers and newborns' hospital records and by telephone interviews. The completeness of LBCs was evaluated, calculating the percentage of blank fields, and the LBCs agreement comparing the originals with the copies was evaluated by Kappa and intraclass correlation coefficients. The percentage of completeness of LBCs ranged from 99.8%-100%. For the most items, the agreement was excellent. However, the agreement was acceptable for marital status, maternal education and newborn infants' race/color, low for prenatal visits and presence of birth defects, and very low for the number of deceased children. The results showed that the municipality Sinasc is reliable for most of the studied variables. Investments in training of the professionals are suggested in an attempt to improve system capacity to support planning and implementation of health activities for the benefit of maternal and child population.

Geographical Distribution Of The Association Between El Niño South Oscillation And Dengue Fever In The Americas: A Continental Analysis Using Geographical Information System-based Techniques.

El Niño South Oscillation (ENSO) is one climatic phenomenon related to the inter-annual variability of global meteorological patterns influencing sea surface temperature and rainfall variability. It influences human health indirectly through extreme temperature and moisture conditions that may accelerate the spread of some vector-borne viral diseases, like dengue fever (DF). This work examines the spatial distribution of association between ENSO and DF in the countries of the Americas during 1995-2004, which includes the 1997-1998 El Niño, one of the most important climatic events of 20(th) century. Data regarding the South Oscillation index (SOI), indicating El Niño-La Niña activity, were obtained from Australian Bureau of Meteorology. The annual DF incidence (AIy) by country was computed using Pan-American Health Association data. SOI and AIy values were standardised as deviations from the mean and plotted in bars-line graphics. The regression coefficient values between SOI and AIy (rSOI,AI) were calculated and spatially interpolated by an inverse distance weighted algorithm. The results indicate that among the five years registering high number of cases (1998, 2002, 2001, 2003 and 1997), four had El Niño activity. In the southern hemisphere, the annual spatial weighted mean centre of epidemics moved southward, from 6° 31' S in 1995 to 21° 12' S in 1999 and the rSOI,AI values were negative in Cuba, Belize, Guyana and Costa Rica, indicating a synchrony between higher DF incidence rates and a higher El Niño activity. The rSOI,AI map allows visualisation of a graded surface with higher values of ENSO-DF associations for Mexico, Central America, northern Caribbean islands and the extreme north-northwest of South America.

[access To Information About How To Prevent Oral Problems Among School Children In The Public School Network].

The scope of this study is to identify the prevalence of access to information about how to prevent oral problems among schoolchildren in the public school network, as well as the factors associated with such access. This is a cross-sectional and analytical study conducted among 12-year-old schoolchildren in a Brazilian municipality with a large population. The examinations were performed by 24 trained dentists and calibrated with the aid of 24 recorders. Data collection occurred in 36 public schools selected from the 89 public schools of the city. Descriptive, univariate and multiple analyses were conducted. Of the 2510 schoolchildren included in the study, 2211 reported having received information about how to prevent oral problems. Access to such information was greater among those who used private dental services; and lower among those who used the service for treatment, who evaluated the service as regular or bad/awful. The latter use toothbrush only or toothbrush and tongue scrubbing as a means of oral hygiene and who reported not being satisfied with the appearance of their teeth. The conclusion drawn is that the majority of schoolchildren had access to information about how to prevent oral problems, though access was associated with the characteristics of health services, health behavior and outcomes.