The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.

Central bank independence and its relationship to inflation

Includes bibliography

Essays on macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy rules

Economic and Monetary Union can be characterised as a complicated set of legislation and institutions governing monetary and fiscal responsibilities. The measures of fiscal responsibility are to be guided by the Stability and Growth Pact, which sets rules for fiscal policy and makes a discretionary fiscal policy virtually impossible. To analyse the effects of the fiscal and monetary policy mix, we modified the New Keynesian framework to allow for supply effects of fiscal policy. We show that defining a supply-side channel for fiscal policy using an endogenous output gap changes the stabilising properties of monetary policy rules. The stability conditions are affected by fiscal policy, so that the dichotomy between active (passive) monetary policy and passive (active) fiscal policy as stabilising regimes does not hold, and it is possible to have an active monetary - active fiscal policy regime consistent with dynamical stability of the economy. We show that, if we take supply-side effects into ac-count, we get more persistent inflation and output reactions. We also show that the dichotomy does not hold for a variety of different fiscal policy rules based on government debt and budget deficit, using the tax smoothing hypothesis and formulating the tax rules as difference equations. The debt rule with active monetary policy results in indeterminacy, while the deficit rule produces a determinate solution with active monetary policy, even with active fiscal policy. The combination of fiscal requirements in a rule results in cyclical responses to shocks. The amplitude of the cycle is larger with more weight on debt than on deficit. Combining optimised monetary policy with fiscal policy rules means that, under a discretionary monetary policy, the fiscal policy regime affects the size of the inflation bias. We also show that commitment to an optimal monetary policy not only corrects the inflation bias but also increases the persistence of output reactions. With fiscal policy rules based on the deficit we can retain the tax smoothing hypothesis also in a sticky price model.

Time Variation in an Optimal Asymmetric Preference Monetary Policy Model

This paper considers a time varying parameter extension of the Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) model to explore whether some of the variation in parameter estimates seen in the literature could arise from this source. A time varying value for the unemployment volatility parameter can be motivated through several means including variation in the slope of the Phillips curve or variation in the preferences of the monetary authority.We show that allowing time variation for the coefficient on the unemployment volatility parameter improves the model fit and it helps to provide an explanation of inflation bias based on asymmetric central banker preferences, which is consistent across subsamples.

A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

Welfare costs of inflation when interest-bearing deposits are disregarded: a calculation of the bias

Most estimates of the welfare costs of in ation are devised considering only noninterest- bearing assets, ignoring that since the 80s technological innovations and new regulations have increased the liquidity of interest-bearing deposits. We investigate the resulting bias. Suscient and necessary conditions on its sign are presented, along with closed-form expressions for its magnitude. Two examples dealing with bidimensional bilogarithmic money demands show that disregarding interest-bearing monies may lead to a non-negligible overestimation of the welfare costs of in ation. An intuitive explanation is that such assets may partially make up for the decreased demand of noninterest-bearing assets due to higher in ation.

Media bias and central bank response. Evidence from the nominal exchange rate behavior in Colombia

Since 1991 Colombia has had a market-determined Peso - US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate (NER), after more than 20 years of controlled and multiple exchange rates. The behavior (revaluation / devaluation) of the NER is constantly reported in news, editorials and op-eds of major newspapers of the nation with particular attention to revaluation. The uneven reporting of revaluation episodes can be explained by the existence of an interest group particulary affected by revaluation, looking to increase awareness and sympathy for help from public institutions. Using the number of news and op-eds from a major Colombian newspaper, it is shown that there is an over-reporting of revaluation episodes in contrast to devaluation ones. Secondly, using text analysis upon the content of the news, it is also shown that the words devaluation and revaluation are far apart in the distribution of words within the news; and revaluation is highly correlated with words related to: public institutions, exporters and the need of assistance. Finally it is also shown that the probability of the central bank buying US dollars to lessen revaluation effects increases with the number of news; even though the central bank allegedly intervenes in the exchange rate market only to tame volatility or accumulate international reserves.

Inflationary bias and state owned financial institutions

This article explains why the existence of state owned financial institutions makes it more difficult for a country to balance its budget. We show that states can use their financiaI institutions to transfer their deficits to the federal govemment. As a result, there is a bias towards Iarge deficits and high inflation rates. Our model also predicts that state owned financiaI institutions should underperform the market, mainly because they concentrate their portfolios on non-performing loans to their own shareholders, that is, the states. Brazil and Argentina are two countries with a history of high inflation that confirm our predictions .

Measurements of income inequality: a critique. Inflation and income inequality: a link through the job- search process

In this paper I claim that, in a long-run perspective, measurements of income inequality, under any of the usual inequality measures used in the literature, are upward biased. The reason is that such measurements are cross-sectional by nature and, therefore, do not take into consideration the turnover in the job market which, in the long run, equalizes within-group (e.g., same-education groups) inequalities. Using a job-search model, I show how to derive the within-group invariant-distribution Gini coefficient of income inequality, how to calculate the size of the bias and how to organize the data in arder to solve the problem. Two examples are provided to illustrate the argument.

Laboratory and full-scale parametric studies of the rolling resistance of radial- and bias-ply heavy service truck tires. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Heavy Duty Vehicle Research, Washington, D.C.

Correcting for bias when estimating the cost of hospital-acquired infection : an analysis of lower respiratory tract infections in non-surgical patients

Hospital acquired infections (HAI) are costly but many are avoidable. Evaluating prevention programmes requires data on their costs and benefits. Estimating the actual costs of HAI (a measure of the cost savings due to prevention) is difficult as HAI changes cost by extending patient length of stay, yet, length of stay is a major risk factor for HAI. This endogeneity bias can confound attempts to measure accurately the cost of HAI. We propose a two-stage instrumental variables estimation strategy that explicitly controls for the endogeneity between risk of HAI and length of stay. We find that a 10% reduction in ex ante risk of HAI results in an expected savings of £693 ($US 984).