The Pricing of Customized Industrial Products

The main objective of this study was to examine the pricing of customized industrial products in international markets, and to understand what pricing decision making consists of. Another purpose of the study was to identify the main factors that affect the pricing decisions of industrial companies, as well as the different pricing strategies industrial companies may choose when pricing customized products. The research was conducted as a qualitative single case study, and a Finnish industrial company specializing in indoor environment solutions, Halton Marine Oy, was used as the case company in the study. The primary data was collected through semi-structured theme interviews with the key management personnel of the company, and the results were discussed and analyzed in the light of the existing literature. The results of this study indicate that the pricing of customized industrial products consists of several dimensions, and is influenced by a large variety of factors that are both internal and external to the firm. In addition, it was found that the choice of a pricing strategy is largely dependent on the chosen segment, the product category, and the stage in the product life cycle. The results also suggest that customizing companies should consider using the value-based pricing orientation, since customization is closely linked to customer value.

The pricing of industrial services

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The effect of OPEC oil pricing on output, prices, and exchange rates in the United States and other industrial countries /

Mode of access: Internet.

FOOD, FUEL, FORESTS, AND THE PRICING OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Science[DE-FG02-94ER61937]

The rise and fall of piecework–timework wage differentials: market volatility, labor heterogeneity, and output pricing

Based on detailed payroll data of blue collar male and female labor in Britain’s engineering and metal working industrial sectors between the mid-1920s and mid-1960s, we provide empirical evidence in respect of several central themes in the piecework-timework wage literature. The period covers part of the heyday of pieceworking as well as the start of its post-war decline. We show the importance of relative piece rate flexibility during the Great Depression as well as during the build up to WWII and during the war itself. We account for the very significant decline in the differentials after the war. Labor market topics include piecework pay in respect of compensating differentials, labor heterogeneity, and the transaction costs of pricing piecework output.

Is there Descriminatory Mortgage Pricing against Immigrants in the Spanish Lending Market?

In this paper, we investigate whether evidence of discriminatory treatment against immigrants in the Spanish mortgage market exists. More specifically, we test whether, ceteris paribus, immigrant borrowers tend to be charged with higher interest rates on their mortgages than their Spanish born counterparts. To do so, we use a unique dataset on granted mortgages that contains information not only regarding the conditions of the loan but also the socio-economic characteristics of the mortgagors. We observe that immigrants are systematically charged with higher interest rates. We apply the well known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to measure the extent to which this disparate treatment of lenders in mortgage pricing against immigrants is due to discrimination. Our results indicate that approximately two thirds of the gap in the interest rate between Spanish born and immigrant borrowers can be attributed to discriminatory treatment. Key words: Immigration, discrimination, mortgage pricing, housing market. JEL codes: R21, G21, J14

Competitive policy and pricing in business-to-business relationships within the EC market.

Tutkielman tarkoituksena oli tarkastella hinnoittelun ja hinnanalennusten merkitystä toimittaja-asiakassuhteissa yritysmarkkinoilla, sekä sitä kuinka kilpailuoikeus säätelee hinnoittelua. Tutkielman ensisijaisena tavoitteena oli selvittää kuinka alennuspolitiikka tulisi laatia jotta se olisi EY:n kilpailuoikeuden mukaan sallittu. Aluksi hinnoittelupolitiikkaan ja strategiaan vaikuttavia seikkoja tarkasteltiin teoreettisesti ja tämän pohjalta laadittua viitekehystä sovellettiin empiiristä tutkimusta suoritettaessa. Empiirinen tutkimus oli normatiivinen case-tutkimus, jossa tarkasteltiin kahdessa toimittaja-asiakassuhteessa noudatettuja hinnoittelu- ja alennuskäytäntöjä. Aineisto kerättiin haastattelemalla toimittajan myyntihenkilöitä, ja lisänä käytettiin yrityksen sisäistä materiaalia. Analyysin tulokset osoittivat nykyisissä käytännöissä joitakin kilpailuoikeudellisia ristiriitaisuuksia, ja näihin annettiin parannusehdotuksia.

Platform pricing and consumer foresight: The case of airports

Airports have become platforms that derive revenues from both aeronautical and commercial activities. The demand for these services is characterized by a one-way complementarity in that only air travelers can purchase retail goods at the airport terminals. We analyze a model of optimal airport behavior in which this one-way complementarity is subject to consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate in full the ex post retail surplus when purchasing a flight ticket. An airport sets landing fees, and, in addition, also chooses the retail market structure by selecting the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions’ revenues, from which it obtains the largest share of profits. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s choices: the optimal airport policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market, where consumers enjoy a large surplus. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, the airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight. Keywords: two-sided markets, platform pricing, one-way demand complementarity, consumer foresight. JEL classification: L1, L2, L93.

Effects of life cycle profits on the profitability of industrial heavy duty cranes

The goal of the thesis was to investigate how much after-sales profits a crane sale generates over the life cycle of the crane and the effects of these after-sales profits on the overall profitability of the crane. The thesis utilizes theories about life cycle costing from an equipment and service supplier’s point of view. However, instead of costs, the thesis is focused on the life cycle after-sales profits from maintenance services and spare parts provided for the sold crane. The case study approach was chosen and a total of five cranes from three different segments were investigated. An eight-step life cycle profit calculation model was developed in order to analyze the chosen cases’ life cycle profits systematically. The results of the investigation suggest that the life cycle after-sales profits are significant in value. In the case analyses they accounted for between 20% and 44% of the overall life cycle profits of the case cranes. The after-sales profits should be taken into account already in the pricing when offering a crane to a customer.

From industrial economics to digital economics: an introduction to the transition

Includes bibliography

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

Delegation of pricing authority to the sales force:an agency-theoretic perspective of its determinants and impact on performance

In industrial selling situations, the questions of what factors drive pricing authority delegation to salespeople and under what conditions price delegation is beneficial for the firm are often asked. To advance knowledge in this area, we (1) develop and empirically test a framework of important drivers of price delegation based on agency-theoretic research and (2) investigate the impact of price delegation on firm performance, taking into account agency theory variables as potential moderators. The study is based on data from a sample of 181 companies from the industrial machinery and electrical engineering industry in Germany. The results indicate that the degree of pricing delegation increases as information asymmetry between the salesperson and sales manager increases and as it becomes more difficult to monitor salespeople's efforts. Conversely, risk-aversion of salespeople is negatively related to the degree of price delegation. Furthermore, we find a positive effect of price delegation on firm performance, which is amplified when market-related uncertainty is high and when salespeople possess better customer-related information than their managers. Hence, our results clearly show that rigid, “one price fits all” policies are inappropriate in many B2B market situations. Instead, sales managers should grant their salespeople sufficient leeway to adapt prices to changing customer requirements and market conditions, especially in firms that operate in highly uncertain selling environments.