Degree in Social Work Incentive Scheme 2006 (PDF 45 KB)

Student Bursaries Incentive Scheme

Financial distress as a collapse of incentive scheme

This paper explaina why workers lack motivation near bankruptcy, why they tend to leave companies in financiai distreas, and why thoae who remam require higher compensation. Theae indirect costa of financiai diatresa adie becauae the optimal combination of debt and incentive achem.ea, deaigned to minimize agency costa, ends up underpaying managers when there ia a bankruptcy threat. The paper a1so providea new empirica1 implications on the intera.ction between financiai reatructuring and changea in managerial compensation. Theae predictions are supported by the findings of Gilson and Vetsuypens (1992).

Payone : incentive for epidemic protocol-based anonymity system

Anonymity systems maintain the anonymity of communicating nodes by camouflaging them, either with peer nodes generating dummy traffic or with peer nodes participating in the actual communication process. The probability of any adversary breaking down the anonymity of the communicating nodes is inversely proportional to the number of peer nodes participating in the network. Hence to maintain the anonymity of the communicating nodes, a large number of peer nodes are needed. Lack of peer availability weakens the anonymity of any large scale anonymity system. This work proposes PayOne, an incentive based scheme for promoting peer availability. PayOne aims to increase the peer availability by encouraging nodes to participate in the anonymity system by awarding them with incentives and thereby promoting the anonymity strength. Existing incentive schemes are designed for single path based approaches. There is no incentive scheme for multipath based or epidemic based anonymity systems. This work has been specifically designed for epidemic protocols and has been implemented over MuON, one of the latest entries to the area of multicasting based anonymity systems. MuON is a peer-to-peer based anonymity system which uses epidemic protocol for data dissemination. Existing incentive schemes involve paying every intermediate node that is involved in the communication between the initiator and the receiver. These schemes are not appropriate for epidemic based anonymity systems due to the incurred overhead. PayOne differs from the existing schemes because it involves paying a single intermediate node that participates in the network. The intermediate node can be any random node that participates in the communication and does not necessarily need to lie in the communication path between the initiator and the receiver. The light-weight characteristics of PayOne make it viable for large-scale epidemic based anonymity systems.

Incentives and promotion in wage hierarchies

Most of the large firms organization schemes consist in hierarchical structures of tiers with different wage levels. Traditionally the existence of this kind of organizations has been associated to the separation of productive and managerial or supervision tasks and to differences in the skills of the workers. However, many firms now employ workers with similar skills, and then the hierarchical structure can be related to an incentive scheme to ensure that workers supply effort. The model we present investigates how firm owners should determine the optimal wage distribution in order to maximize profits.

Incentives and promotion in wage hierarchies

Most of the large firms organization schemes consist in hierarchical structures of tiers with different wage levels. Traditionally the existence of this kind of organizations has been associated to the separation of productive and managerial or supervision tasks and to differences in the skills of the workers. However, many firms now employ workers with similar skills, and then the hierarchical structure can be related to an incentive scheme to ensure that workers supply effort. The model we present investigates how firm owners should determine the optimal wage distribution in order to maximize profits.

Regulation of Electricity Transmission and Distribution in Russia

The regulation of electricity transmission and distribution business is an essential issue for any electricity market; it is widely introduced in developed electricity markets of Great Britain, Scandinavian countries and United States of America and other. Those markets which were liberalized recently also need well planned regulation model to be chosen and implemented. In open electricity markets the sectors of electricity distribution and transmission remain monopolies, so called "natural monopolies", as introducing the competition into these sectors in most cases appears to be inefficient. Thatis why regulation becomes very important as its main tasks are: to set reasonable tariffs for customers, to ensure non-discriminating process of electricity transmission and distribution, at the same time to provide distribution companies with incentives to operate efficiently and the owners of the companies with reasonable profits as well; the problem of power quality should be solved at the same time. It should be mentioned also, that there is no incentive scheme which will be suitable for any conditions, that is why it is essential to study differentregulation models in order to form the best one for concrete situation. The aim of this Master's Thesis is to give an overview over theregulation of electricity transmission and distribution in Russia. First, the general information about theory of regulation of natural monopolies will be described; the situation in Russian network business and the importance of regulation process for it will be discussed next. Then there is a detailed description ofexisting regulatory system and the process of tariff calculation with an example. And finally, in the work there is a brief analysis of problems of present scheme of regulation, an attempt to predict the following development of regulationin Russia and the perspectives and risks connected to regulation which could face the companies that try to enter Russian electricity market (such as FORTUM OY).

Myyntiprosessin kehittäminen logistiikkapalveluyrityksessä

Tämä diplomityö on toteutettu HUB logistics Oy:lle ja se keskittyy yrityksen myyntiprosessin kehittämiseen. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää millaisilla myynnin johtamisen keinoilla ja myyntiprosessin vaiheilla voidaan tehokkaasti toteuttaa yrityksen myyntiä. Tutkimus keskittyy myynnin suunnitteluun, tavoit- teiden asettamiseen ja niiden mittaamiseen sekä seurantaan. Tutkimuksessa huomioidaan myyntiorganisaation rakenne sekä myyntiprosessin eri vaiheet. Näiden näkökulmien lisäksi tärkeänä teemana on myös lean-ajattelun hyödyn- täminen myyntiprosessin kehittämisessä. Kohdeyrityksestä on kerätty tietoa toteuttamalla haastatteluita myyntiorganisaatiossa mukana oleville henkilöille. Tutkimuksen tuloksena saatiin, että myyntiprosessin toiminnalla ja tehokkuu- della on merkittävä rooli koko yrityksen toiminnan kannalta. Myynnin käytän- nön tekeminen on sidottu vahvasti yrityksen strategisiin tavoitteisiin ja niiden tulokset vaikuttavat tavoitteiden onnistumiseen. Myyntiprosessi on raskas ja vaatii usein paljon resursseja. Resurssien tehokkaalla käytöllä ja prosessin vai- heita parantamalla voidaan saavuttaa mittavia säästöjä. Toisaalta vähintään yhtä tärkeää on ymmärtää myyntiprosessin sisältämät hukat. Niiden poistamisella ja keskittymisellä asiakkaalle luotavaan arvoon saadaan jatkuvan kehittämisen kautta yhä sujuvampi ja tehokkaampi myyntiprosessi yrityksen käyttöön.

Tasapaino taloudellisessa tulospalkkiojärjestelmässä: Kaksi näkökulmaa – Case Gigantti Oy

Tutkielmassa perehdytään tapaustutkimuksen muodossa Gigantti Oy:n Contact Center -liiketoimintayksikön tulospalkkiojärjestelmään tilikaudella 2014-2015. Palkitseminen on kaksisuuntainen prosessi, jonka takia hyvin toimivan tulospalkkiojärjestelmän tulee olla tasapainossa niin yritysjohdon, kuin henkilöstönkin näkökulmista tarkasteltuna. Laadullinen tutkimus pohjautuu työssä esitettyihin teorioihin, joiden pohjalta yksikössä suoritettiin henkilöstökysely kuvaamaan aihetta kokemuksen näkökulmasta, sekä haastattelu yksikön johtajan kanssa, kuvaten suunnittelun näkökulmaa.

Intention-based economic theories of reciprocity

In recent years, several experiments have shown individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behaviour in anonymous one-shot interactions. As reciprocity has been shown to be relevant in several economic fields, there have also been several attempts to model reciprocal bahaviour. I review the intention-based models of reciprocity and present an example of teacher management in the public sector in which the government offers an incentive scheme to implement a program. The incentive scheme has a prisoner´s dilemma structure. In both simultaneous and sequential games, equilibrium results may differ from those predicted by standard theory.

Motivational factors impacting the productivity of construction master craftsmen in Kuwait

In today's global economic conditions, improving the productivity of the construction industry is becoming more pressing than ever. Several factors impact the efficiency of construction operatives, but motivation is among the most important. Since low productivity is one of the significant challenges facing the construction industry in the State of Kuwait, the objective of this case study is to identify, explore, and rank the relative importance of the factors perceived to impact the motivational level of master craftsmen involved in primary construction trades. To achieve this objective, a structured questionnaire survey comprising 23 factors, which were shortlisted based on relevant previous research on motivation, the input of local industry experts, and numerous interviews with skilled operatives, was distributed to a large number of master craftsmen. Using the “Relative Importance Index” technique, the following prominent factors are identified: (1) payment delay; (2) rework; (3) lack of a financial incentive scheme; (4) the extent of change orders during execution; (5) incompetent supervisors; (6) delays in responding to Requests For Information (RFI); (7) overcrowding and operatives interface; (8) unrealistic scheduling and performance expectation; (9) shortage of materials on site; and (10) drawings quality level. The findings can be used to provide industry practitioners with guidance for focusing, acting upon, and controlling the critical factors influencing the performance of master craftsmen, hence, assist in achieving an efficient utilization of the workforce, and a reasonable level of competitiveness and cost effective operation.

From commitment to non-commitment: allowing type dynamic in Laffont and Tirole's regulation model

This paper investigates the introduction of type dynamic in the La ont and Tirole's regulation model. The regulator and the rm are engaged in a two period relationship governed by short-term contracts, where, the regulator observes cost but cannot distinguish how much of the cost is due to e ort on cost reduction or e ciency of rm's technology, named type. There is asymmetric information about the rm's type. Our model is developed in a framework in which the regulator learns with rm's choice in the rst period and uses that information to design the best second period incentive scheme. The regulator is aware of the possibility of changes in types and takes that into account. We show how type dynamic builds a bridge between com- mitment and non-commitment situations. In particular, the possibility of changing types mitigates the \ratchet e ect". We show that for small degree of type dynamic the equilibrium shows separation and the welfare achived is close to his upper bound (given by the commitment allocation).

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.