Entrepreneurial opportunities, implicit contracts and market making for complex consumer goods

This article extends the theory of entrepreneurial opportunity exploitation, outlining how under certain conditions, opportunity exploitation is dependent on market making innovations. Where adverse selection and moral hazard characterize markets, consumers are likely to withdraw regardless of product quality. In order to overcome consumer resistance, entrepreneurs must signal credible commitments. But because consumers purchase without fully specifying requirements, entrepreneurs' commitments take the partial form of implicit contracts, creating strong mutual commitments to repeated transactions. These commitments enable novel markets to function, but introduce additional costs. This article illustrates the theory with the historic case of Singer in sewing machines

Invisible ties : implicit contracting and its implications for the agency relationship in corporate governance research

Research that applies agency theory to boards of directors suffers from being quite narrow as it does not recognize the true legal relationships between directors, managers and shareholders. Instead, the board of directors is best conceptualized as the principal, management as agents and stockholders’ relationships as a mix of legal and implicit contracts. We propose a recast agency relationship and develop a contingency approach that proposes (1) how a corporation’s goals vary with a board’s implicit contracting and (2) a reconceptualization of the agency problem facing boards.

Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different points during the tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current earnings. Using data on individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the 1985-1994 period, we find that both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are significantly correlated with current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor market. Estimated elasticities vary between 9 and 15 percent for the elasticity of earnings with respect to current unemployment rates, and between 6 and 10 percent with respect to unemployment rates at the start of current firm tenure. Moreover, whereas local unemployment rates determine levels of earnings, national rates influence contemporaneous variations in earnings. We interpret this result as evidence that German unions do, in fact, bargain over wages and employment, but that models of individualistic contracts, such as the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we find evidence that contracts differ across firm size and worker type. Workers of large firms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any other type of firm, indicating the importance of internal job markets.

Determinantes de los contratos implícitos y explícitos en la contratación gerencial

Este artículo resalta la importancia de los determinantes en la existencia de contratos explícitos e implícitos en la contratación de gerentes, no considerados en el estudio previo de Gillan et. al. Se muestra como la asimetría de información, el contexto institucional y el poder con que la firma y el gerente enfrentan el acuerdo laboral influyen de manera directa el tipo de contrato. Se concluye planteando como argumento central que existen dos clases de determinantes: los de influencia y los de mediación. Los de mediación cobran sentido cuando están explícitamente relacionados con los de influencia. Los de influencia se combinan entre si en una situación dada y ejercen influencia sobre los de mediación. Estos últimos son los que determinan la propensión hacia el tipo de contrato, y son tres: El valor esperado de la pérdida ante la probabilidad de incumplimiento, el poder con que gerente y firma enfrentan el acuerdo y la posibilidad de comportamiento oportunista, los demás son clasificados como de influencia. Este argumento es contrastado mediante el uso de la técnica de análisis estructural.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Accountability and Value for Money: A Framework for Exploring the Relationship in Private Finance Initiative Contracts

There is an implicit assumption in the UK Treasury’s publications on public-private partnerships (PPP) – also more commonly known in the United Kingdom as private finance initiative (PFI) - that accountability and value for money (VFM) are related concepts. While recent academic studies on PPP/PFI (from now on as PFI) have focused on VFM, there is a notable absence of studies exploring the ‘presumed’ relationships between accountability and VFM. Drawing on Dubnick’s (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991, 1993; Dubnick, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2005; Dubnick and Justice, 2002) framework for accountability and PFI literature, we develop a research framework for exploring potential relationships between accountability and VFM in PFI projects by proposing alternative accountability cultures, processes and mechanisms for PFI. The PFI accountability model is then exposed to four criteria - warrantability, tractability, measurability and feasibility. Our preliminary interviews provide us guidance in identifying some of the cultures, processes and mechanisms indicated in our model which should enable future researchers to test not only the UK Government’s claimed relationships between accountability and VFM using more specific PFI empirical data, but also a potential relationship between accountability and performance in general.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

Implicit difference approximation for the time fractional diffusion equation

In this paper, we consider a time fractional diffusion equation on a finite domain. The equation is obtained from the standard diffusion equation by replacing the first-order time derivative by a fractional derivative (of order $0<\alpha<1$ ). We propose a computationally effective implicit difference approximation to solve the time fractional diffusion equation. Stability and convergence of the method are discussed. We prove that the implicit difference approximation (IDA) is unconditionally stable, and the IDA is convergent with $O(\tau+h^2)$, where $\tau$ and $h$ are time and space steps, respectively. Some numerical examples are presented to show the application of the present technique.

Catching up with consumer realities: the need for legislation prohibiting unfair terms in consumer contracts

In the policy debate about the need for legislation to prohibit the use of unfair terms in consumer contracts, substantive unfairness is often distinguished from procedural unfairness. Current consumer protection laws appear to offer the potential for relief on substantive unfairness grounds alone. However, a review of cases involving credit contracts shows this potential is rarely realised. This reluctance to provide relief for substantive injustice reflects a preoccupation with freedom and certainty of contract, the notions underpinning classical contract theories. As a class, consumers are vulnerable in the marketplace, and they do need protection from substantively unfair terms. A new framework for regulating consumer contracts is needed, one that relies less on classical contract theories and takes the reality of consumer contracting and consumer behavior as its starting point. Unfair contract terms legislation will be a step on the path towards this new framework.

Can governments use their construction contracts to improve training outcomes?

This paper explores the likely efficacy of government agencies using their contracting relationships with private firms to affect training outcomes in the construction industry. Specifically, it reports on the results of a study of two training policies of theWestern Australian government. Empirical data is drawn from the government’s Tender Registration System between 1997 and 2006. The main finding of the quantitative analysis is that in the absence of strong industry commitment to policy objectives, the contracting approach is likely to result in high levels of avoidance activity and generate very few benefits. The results of a qualitative investigation also support these findings.