South Africa and the global game:football, apartheid and beyond

Firmly situating South African teams, players, and associations in the international framework in which they have to compete, South Africa and the Global Game: Football, Apartheid, and Beyond presents an interdisciplinary analysis of how and why South Africa underwent a remarkable transformation from a pariah in world sport to the first African host of a World Cup in 2010. Written by an eminent team of scholars, this special issue and book aims to examine the importance of football in South African society, revealing how the black oppression transformed a colonial game into a force for political, cultural and social liberation. It explores how the hosting of the 2010 World Cup aims to enhance the prestige of the post-apartheid nation, to generate economic growth and stimulate Pan-African pride. Among the themes dealt with are race and racism, class and gender dynamics, social identities, mass media and culture, and globalization. This collection of original and insightful essays will appeal to specialists in African Studies, Cultural Studies, and Sport Studies, as well as to non-specialist readers seeking to inform themselves ahead of the 2010 World Cup. This book was published as a special issue of Soccer and Society. 1. Introduction Peter Alegi and Chris Bolsmann Part 1: Past is Prologue – History of Football in South Africa 2. Football as Code: The Social Diffusion of ‘Soccer’ in South Africa Lloyd Hill 3. White Football in South Africa: Empire, Apartheid and Change, 1892 – 1977 Chris Bolsmann 4. A Biography of Darius Dhlomo: Transnational Footballer in the Era of Apartheid Peter Alegi 5. Women and Gender in South African Soccer Cynthia Fabrizio Pelak Part 2: Football Culture after Apartheid: Local and Transnational Dynamics 6. "You Must Support Chiefs: Pirates Already Have Two White Fans!" Race and Racial Discourse in South African Football Fandom Marc Fletcher 7. "It wasn’t that I did not like South African Football": Media, History, and Biography Sean Jacobs 8. Soccer in a Rugby Town: Restructuring Football in Stellenbosch Sylvain Cubizolles 9. Differing Trajectories: Football Development and Patterns of Player Migration in South Africa and Ghana Paul Darby and Eirik Solberg Part 3: The 2010 World Cup: Challenges and Opportunities 10. Football's Tsars: Proprietorship, Corporatism and Politics in the 2010 FIFA World Cup Scarlett Cornelissen 11. Sports as Cultural Diplomacy: The 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa’s Foreign Policy Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu 12. World Cup 2010: Africa’s Turn or the Turn on Africa? Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed 13. The 2010 FIFA World Cup: Critical Voices From Below Percy Ngonyama.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Inovação como fator de competitividade da cadeia de valor da moda

Tese de Doutoramento em Engenharia Têxtil

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

La pelota no se mancha: Un estudio histórico sobre el desarrollo y la política en FIFA

Esta investigación se centra en la Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) como organización política. Intenta responder dos interrogantes primordiales: 1) ¿cómo la FIFA ha constituido el poder que tiene actualmente y, así, hacerse del monopolio indiscutido del fútbol? Y 2) ¿cómo ha cambiado en el tiempo la política interna de FIFA y su vínculo con la política internacional? Para lograr esto, se realiza un estudio histórico, basado principalmente en documentos, que intenta caracterizar y analizar los cambios de la organización en el tiempo. Se enfatizan las últimas dos presidencias de FIFA, de João Havelange y Joseph Blatter, como casos de estudio.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

Innovations in the video game industry: changing global markets

The paper examines the video game industry in the perspective of being the paradigm of innovation in digital media and content. In particular, it analyses the response to two main factors that have impacted this industry over the last decade. First, it tracks the evolution of its global market and its emerging geography with the rise of Asia. Second, within this global landscape the paper explores how the changes derived from mobile and on-line gaming enabled major transformations of this industry. From here, some conclusions on the lessons from the evolution of this sector for the whole media and content industries are presented.

Paper Tiger or Game-Changer? Challenges of and Opportunities for EU Engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers (BRIGG) 1/2015.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) started work on 1 January 2015. Considered as Russia’s response to the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), it has been almost ignored in Brussels. However, with the Ukraine crisis and the deteriorating relations with Moscow, some European leaders have begun to reconsider Putin’s proposal for a region-to-region engagement. This paper tries to analyse under which conditions this could represent a long-term solution for a new European order. First, it is argued that the EEU is still far from being a credible international interlocutor. Second, Russia’s commitment to international trade rules and liberalization is questioned, whereas its geopolitical objectives seem predominant. EU engagement with the EEU in Ukraine would mean, in the short term, legitimizing Russia’s vision of a ‘bipolar Europe’ divided in spheres of influence. In the long run, prospects for inter-regional cooperation remain open, but the way to go is long and full of obstacles.

The game of leapfrog and the Internet: Developing countries and the information-divide

Recent rapid advances in communication technology have changed global structural patterns and produced new concepts and poles of dynamism in international relations. One such technology, which is increasingly causing a mixed reaction across international boundaries, is that of the Internet. For the first time in history the emergence of the Internet has produced an anarchic power that is capable of influencing individuals, societies and governments on a scale previously unimaginable.

Multi-strand narrative structures: a filmic game of multiple players

Session 7: Playing with Roles, images and improvising New States of Awareness, 3rd Global Conference, 1st November – 3rd November, 2014, Prague, Czech Republic.

Social rationality and scales of action: inter-ethnic relations in cockfighting and game-fishing, Raiatea, French Polynesia

This article challenges the notion of economic rationality as a criterion for explaining ethnic boundary maintenance. It offers an ethnographic analysis of inter-ethnic relations in the context of games (cockfights and game-fishing contests) in the island of Raiatea (French Polynesia). Although all players engage in the same basic gambling practices, money is differentially scaled and mobilized by the Tahitian and Chinese participants. Building on recent pragmatic approaches to rationality, it is shown that the players' rationalities differ not from the point of view of economic maximization, but only in so far as they participate in social relations at different scales.

Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing

We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about the game. In fact, players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs and, in a variant of the strategy, players need not even know that their payoffs are determined through other players' actions. The procedure works for general finite games and is based on appropriate modifications of a simple stochastic learningrule introduced by Foster and Young.

The Quest for Hegemony Among Countries and Global Pollution

This paper builds on the assumption that countries behave in such a way as to improve, via their economic strength, the probability that they will attain the hegemonic position on the world stage. The quest for hegemony is modeled as a game, with countries being differentiated initially only by some endowment which yields a pollution free flow of income. A country's level of pollution is assumed directly related to its economic strength, as measured by its level of production. Two types of countries are distinguished: richly-endowed countries, for whom the return on their endowment is greater than the return they can expect from winning the hegemony race, and poorly-endowed countries, who can expect a greater return from winning the race than from their endowment. We show that in a symmetric world of poorly-endowed countries the equilibrium level of emissions is larger than in a symmetric world of richly-endowed countries: the former, being less well endowed to begin with, try harder to win the race. In the asymmetric world composed of both types of countries, the poorly-endowed countries will be polluting more than the richly endowed countries. Numerical simulations show that if the number of richly-endowed countries is increased keeping the total number of countries constant, the equilibrium level of global emissions will decrease; if the lot of the poorly-endowed countries is increased by increasing their initial endowment keeping that of the richly-endowed countries constant, global pollution will decrease; increasing the endowments of each type of countries in the same proportion, and hence increasing the average endowment in that proportion, will decrease global pollution; redistributing from the richly-endowed in favor of the poorly-endowed while keeping the average endowment constant will in general result in an increase in the equilibrium level of global pollution.

La régulation du commerce électronique global

Le déroulement du commerce électronique sur un marché global suscite de nombreux questionnements juridiques. D'une part, le droit est conçu à l'échelle nationale en fonction d'un milieu social tributaire de son histoire et de sa culture et d'autre part, le commerce électronique global présente des caractéristiques très singulières : dématérialisation, ubiquité et dimension transfrontalière. Or, une telle confrontation est susceptible de menacer la sécurité juridique des parties dans leurs transactions commerciales en ligne mais aussi la confiance nécessaire à leur développement. Les territoires nationaux, en limitant le pouvoir d’action effectif des États, pose un problème d’échelle : réglementer un phénomène global confronté à des souverainetés territoriales multiples. L’encadrement normatif du commerce électronique global se développe désormais, en partie, à un niveau extra étatique, confirmant l’érosion du monopole des États dans la régulation des rapports juridiques globalisés. La normativité devient le résultat d’un jeu normatif ouvert non seulement quant aux acteurs de la régulation, mais également quant à la qualification des normes impliquées dans cette régulation. Prenant la mesure de la complexité croissante de la normativité, les États interviennent pour tenter de concilier les pratiques nouvelles avec la règle de droit dans une logique de définition des règles du jeu et d’harmonisation du comportement des acteurs économiques. Les systèmes de droit nationaux apprennent à interagir avec des normes multiples de sources différentes. Cette évolution reflète l’articulation des dynamiques de mutation de la normativité avec le phénomène de globalisation du commerce électronique.