Board attributes that increase firm risk - evidence from the UK

Purpose – The aim of the paper is to identify the board attributes that significantly increase firm risk. The study aims to find if board size, percentage of non-executive directors, women on the board, a powerful CEO, equity ownership amongst executive board directors and institutional investor ownership, are associated with firm risk. This is the first study that examines which board attributes increase firm risk using a UK based sample. Design/methodology/approach – This empirical study collected secondary data from Bloomberg and Morningstar databases. The data sample is an unbalanced panel of 260 companies’ secondary data on FTSE 350 index in the UK, from 2005 to 2010. The data was statistically analysed using STATA. Findings – The study establishes the board attributes that were significantly related to firm risk. The results show that a board which can increase firm risk is one that is small in size,has high equity ownership amongst executive board directors and has high institutional investor ownership. Research limitations/implications – The governance culture and regulatory system in the UK is different from other countries. Since the data is a UK based sample, the results can lack generalisability. Practical implications – The results are useful for investors who invest in large firms, to have the knowledge about the board attributes that can increase firm risk. Regulators can also use the results to strengthen regulatory guidelines. Originality/value – This study fills the gap in knowledge in UK governance literature on the board attributes that can increase firm risk.

An Analysis of the Association Between Firm Risk, Executive Share Options and Accounting Performance: Some Australian Evidence

This paper examines whether the financial performance of the firm is associated with the risk-taking propensity of executives, which is inferred from the structure of their share option portfolio. The objective of this paper is to determine if executives have greater risk bearing preferences when they have more share options than shares in their firm. In turn, executives' risk-taking preferences suggest that these decision-makers adopt value-increasing strategies. The results of this study support this notion. The results of the study of 182 Australian firms demonstrate that the negative relationship between firm risk and firm performance is weaker when executives hold a higher proportion of share options than shares in their investment in the firm. These results hold implications for executives' compensation contracts. That is, executives who share in their firms' risk via share options are more likely to undertake risky activities with high-expected performance outcome.

Contracting-agency analysis of the association between firm risk, investment opportunity set, corporate governance and firm performance

Tests the efficiency of corporate controls (board monitoring and incentive contracts) for growth or risk firms. By exploring the implications of controls and studying their interactive effects on firm performance, this study demonstrates how and why different firms use corporate governance controls to align managers' and shareholders' interests.

Are firms hedging or speculating? The relationship between financial derivatives and firm risk

The focus of this article is an investigation of the relationship between the use of financial derivatives and firm risk using a sample of Australian firms. Our results suggest that this relationship is nonlinear in nature. Specifically, the use of financial derivatives is associated with a risk reduction for moderate derivative users. Derivative usage among extensive derivative users, on the other hand, appears to lead to an increase in firm risk. Nevertheless, compared to firms that do not make use of derivatives, there is no evidence that extensive derivative users are exposed to a risk level in excess of that of nonderivative users. The results are, therefore, indicative of a hedging motive behind the use of financial derivatives.

Essays on Stock Option Compensation and the Role of Incentives and Risk (summary section only)

Managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity has increased rapidly around the world. Early empirical research showed that pay-for-performance sensitivity resulting from stock ownership and stock options appeared to be quite low during the 1970s and early 1980s in the U.S. However, recent empirical research from the U.S. shows an enormous increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity. The global trend has also reached Finland, where stock options have become a major ingredient of executive compensation. The fact that stock options seem to be an appealing form of remuneration from a theoretical point of view combined with the observation that the use of this compensation form has increased significantly during the recent years, implies that research on the dynamics of stock option compensation is highly relevant for the academic community, as well as for practitioners and regulators. The research questions of the thesis are analyzed in four separate essays. The first essay examines whether stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms are consistent with predictions from principal-agent theory. The second essay explores one of the major puzzles in the compensation literature by studying determinants of stock option contract design. In theory, optimal contract design should vary according to firm characteristics. However, in the U.S., variation in contract design seems to be surprisingly low, a phenomenon generally attributed to tax and accounting considerations. In Finland, however, firms are not subject to stringent contracting restrictions, and the variation in contract design tends, in fact, to be quite substantial. The third essay studies the impact of price- and risk incentives arising from stock option compensation on firm investment. In addition, the essay explores one of the most debated questions in the literature, in particular, the relation between incentives and firm performance. Finally, several strands of literature in both economics and corporate finance hypothesize that economic uncertainty is related to corporate decision-making. Previous research has shown that risk tends to slow down firm investment. In the fourth essay, it is hypothesized that firm risk slows down growth from a more universal perspective. Consistent with this view, it is shown that risk not only tends to slow down firm investment, but also employment growth. Moreover, the essay explores whether the nature of firms’ compensation policies, in particular, whether firms make use of stock option compensation, affects the relation between risk and firm growth. In summary, the four essays contribute to the current understanding of stock options as a form of equity incentives, and how incentives and risk affect corporate decision-making. By this, the thesis promotes the knowledge related to the modern theory of the firm.

The impact of corporate social performance on financial risk and utility: a longitudinal analysis

This study focuses on the wealth-protective effects of socially responsible firm behavior by examining the association between corporate social performance (CSP) and financial risk for an extensive panel data sample of S&P 500 companies between the years 1992 and 2009. In addition, the link between CSP and investor utility is investigated. The main findings are that corporate social responsibility is negatively but weakly related to systematic firm risk and that corporate social irresponsibility is positively and strongly related to financial risk. The fact that both conventional and downside risk measures lead to the same conclusions adds convergent validity to the analysis. However, the risk-return trade-off appears to be such that no clear utility gain or loss can be realized by investing in firms characterized by different levels of social and environmental performance. Overall volatility conditions of the financial markets are shown to play a moderating role in the nature and strength of the CSP-risk relationship.

Monitoring and incentives of executives in risky firms : a test of the association with firm performance

This study investigates the relationship between a firm's risk and the effectiveness of the firm's corporate governance practices. Previous research investigating the relationship between corporate controls and firm performance has been mixed and often weak. Therefore, this study sets out to determine the efficiency of monitoring and incentive contracts given certain characteristics of the firm. That is, the study sets out to determine whether risk firms with higher monitoring and levels of incentives are associated with higher firm performance.
The results of this study of 282 firms demonstrate how the relationship between firm risk and performance is associated with the monitoring and incentive contracts used by these firms. In particular, the results of this study showed that the negative association between risk and firm performance is weakened when firms have stronger monitoring and incentive mechanisms. The particular contribution of this study is to show that the role of corporate governance variables infirm performance should be evaluated in the context of the firm's risk.

Mergers, executive risk reduction and stockholder wealth

Among the possible consequences of agency problems between owners and managers is a tendency by managers to make investment decisions for their firms that are deliberately aimed at reducing firm risk, as a means to control managers' personal wealth risk. The literature has suggested that such behavior may occur to the detriment of shareholder wealth, and that mrgers may be a particular class of investment decisions for which the behavior would be observable. We test these hypotheses empirically, but find no evidence from our merger sample that risk reduction for the aqquiring firm is the typical outcome nor that, when it occurs, it is differentially costly for shareholders.

Who selects the 'right' directors? An examination of the association between board selection, gender diversity and outcomes

Using a sample of companies from the top 500 listed firms in Australia, we investigate whether the presence of a designated nomination committee and female representation on the nomination committee affect board gender diversity. We also examine whether gender diversity on the board affects firm risk and financial performance. We find that board gender diversity is significantly and positively associated with the presence of a designated nomination committee and that female representation on the nomination committee is a significant explanatory factor of increasing board gender diversity following the release of the 2010 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASXCGC) recommendations. Further, our results support the business case for board gender diversity as we find greater gender diversity moderates excessive firm risk which in turn improves firms’ financial performance. Our results are robust after correcting for selection bias and controlling for other board, firm and industry characteristics.

Women in leadership: An analysis of the gender pay gap in ASX-listed firms

This study provides evidence that after several decades of fighting for equal pay for equal work, an unexplained gender pay gap remains amongst senior executives in ASX-listed firms. After controlling for a large suite of personal, occupational and firm observables, we find female senior executives receive, on average, 22.58 percent less in base salary for the period 2002–2013. When executives are awarded performance-based pay, females receive on average 16.47 percent less in cash bonus and 18.21 percent less in long-term incentives than males. The results are robust to using firm fixed effects and propensity-score matching. Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition results show that the mean pay gap cannot be attributed to gender differences in attributes, including job titles. Instead, the results point to differences in returns on firm-specific variables, in particular firm risk.

Stock Option Compensation in Finland: An Analysis of Economic Determinants, Contracting Frequency, and Design

This paper addresses several questions in the compensation literature by examining stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms. First, the results indicate that principal-agent theory succeeds quite well in predicting the use of stock options. Proxies for monitoring costs, growth opportunities, ownership structure, and risk are found to determine the use of incentives consistent with theory. Furthermore, the paper examines whether determinants of stock options targeted to top management differ from determinants of broad-based stock option plans. Some evidence is found that factors driving these two types of incentives differ. Second, the results reveal that systematic risk significantly increases the likelihood that firms adopt stock option plans, whereas total firm risk and unsystematic risk do not seem to affect this decision. Third, the results show that growth opportunities are related to time-dimensional contracting frequency, consistent with the argument that incentive levels deviate more rapidly from optimum in firms with high growth opportunities. Finally, the results suggest that vesting schedules are decreasing in financial leverage, and that contract maturity is decreasing in firm focus. In addition, both vesting schedules and contract maturity tend to be longer in firms involving state ownership.

Shifting the Burden of HIV/AIDS

As the economic burden of HIV/AIDS increases in sub-Saharan Africa, the allocation of the burden among levels and sectors of societies is changing. The private sector has greater scope than government, households, or NGOs to avoid the economic burden of AIDS, and a systematic shifting of the burden away from the private sector is underway. Common practices that shift the AIDS burden from businesses to households and government include pre-employment screening, reduced employee benefits, restructured employment contracts, outsourcing of less skilled jobs, selective retrenchments, and changes in production technologies. In South Africa, more than two thirds of large employers have reduced health care benefits or required larger contributions by employees. Most firms have replaced defined benefit retirement funds, which expose the firm to large annual costs but provide long-term support for families, with defined contribution funds, which eliminate firm risk but provide little to families of younger workers who die of AIDS. Contracting out of previously permanent jobs also shields firms from costs while leaving households and government to care for affected workers and their families. Many of these changes are responses to globalization and would have occurred in the absence of AIDS, but they are devastating for employees with HIV/AIDS. This paper argues that the shifting of the economic burden of AIDS is a predictable response by business to which a thoughtful public policy response is needed. Countries should make explicit decisions about each sector’s responsibilities if a socially desirable allocation is to be achieved.

Divulgación on-line de los códigos de buen gobierno en las IES y su determinación para el posicionamiento en el ranking QS

Dado el interés que se presenta con los temas de gobierno corporativo, este trabajo busca describir si la divulgación on-line de los contenidos de los códigos de buen gobierno, es determinante en el posicionamiento que tienen las Instituciones de Educación Superior (IES) en el ranking QS. Partiendo de una muestra de 20 IES, se recolectaron un conjunto de datos dicotómicos para 30 variables independientes y se relacionaron con la variable dependiente denominada posicionamiento en el ranking. A partir de lo anterior, se elaboró un trabajo descriptivo y correlacional con el fin de probar las hipótesis de investigación. Este estudio reveló que la divulgación on-line de los contenidos de los códigos de buen gobierno en las IES, no es determinante para el posicionamiento en el ranking QS.