Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility (namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.

Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Financial development, financial fragility and growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility(namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.

Neglected risks, financial innovation and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Financial fragility, trade credit and contagion effects during the crisis: a spatial econometric approach to firm-level data

The number of distressed manufacturing firms increased sharply during recessionary phase 2009-13. Financial indebtness traditionally plays a key role in assessing firm solvency but contagion effects that originate from the supply chain are usually neglected in literature. Firm interconnections, captured via the trade credit channel, represent a primary vehicle of individual shocks’ propagation, especially during an economic downturn, when liquidity tensions arise. A representative sample of 11,920 Italian manufacturing firms is considered to model a two-step econometric design, where chain reactions in terms of trade credit accumulation (i.e. default of payments to suppliers) are primarily analyzed by resorting to a spatial autoregressive approach (SAR). Spatial interactions are modeled based on a unique dataset of firm-to-firm transactions registered before the outbreak of the crisis. The second step in instead a binary outcome model where trade credit chains are considered together with data on the bank-firm relationship to assess determinants of distress likelihoods in 2009-13. Results show that outstanding trade debt is affected by the liquidity position of a firm and by positive spatial effects. Trade credit chain reactions are found to exert, in turn, a positive impact on distress likelihoods during the crisis. The latter effect is comparable in magnitude to the one exerted by individual financial rigidity, and stresses the importance to include complex interactions between firms in the analysis of the solvency behavior.

Innovation, competition and financial vulnerability in economic development

The financial sector has been viewed traditionally as either providing the "oil" for the "wheels of commerce" or as a parasite on the real sector of the economy where real productivity gains provide for increasing real wages and per capita incomes. The present paper takes a different route and attempts to an analysis of financial institutions on a par with the production sector of the economy. It also develops a link which amalgamates "the knowledge-based" perspective on firms' operations with Schumpeterian financial leverage to exploit productivity enhancing innovations, and Minsky's tendency towards financial fragility. The analysis also leads to some policy recommendations concerning financial regulation, risk management and financial institution's building.

The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis: how to create a financial crisis by trying to avoid one

This paper attempts to understand the Brazilian financial crisis mainly from an ‘endogenous-failure’ perspective. It argues that the general mechanisms that led to this financial crisis were in essence endogenous to the workings of an economy facing a sudden liberalisation, a surge in capital inflows, ineffective regulation and weak governance. This paper will also argue that within this general framework, there is a very specific ‘Minskyian’ feature to the Brazilian crisis, which made it different from other financial crises both in Latin America and in East Asia: how a particularly radical monetary policy led to a major financial fragility in the financial sector and State finances, and to an unmanageable Ponzi finance in the accounts of the Federal Government.

A reforma do Estado, a emerg??ncia da descentraliza????o e as pol??ticas ambientais

No contexto da reforma do Estado brasileiro, a descentraliza????o das compet??ncias pol??ticas e administrativas na arena ambiental tem se mostrado um processo din??mico. Muitas inst??ncias locais j?? respondem pela quest??o ambiental. No entanto, isso n??o significa mais compet??ncia administrativa, sustentabilidade institucional, tampouco participa????o democr??tica. Dois casos de pol??tica ambiental s??o retratados no texto: o licenciamento industrial pelos munic??pios brasileiros e o a gest??o florestal pelo Estado do Mato Grosso. A descentraliza????o do licenciamento ambiental para o ??mbito municipal ainda parece fr??gil em munic??pios menores, em um processo que parece ser induzido pelo Estado e n??o pelo controle social local. Em rela????o ?? pol??tica florestal, o caso do Mato Grosso ?? emblem??tico. Ele mostra que a coopera????o com o poder p??blico federal e, em determinados momentos, sua coordena????o s??o de suma import??ncia para que as pol??ticas p??blicas ambientais n??o fiquem ?? merc?? de governos estaduais, que podem envies??-las em favor do ???desenvolvimentismo???, nem percam a legitimidade adiante da fragilidade financeira e institucional dos ??rg??os ambientais locais.

A crise financeira de 2008 e seus impactos na economia brasileira: uma análise sob a perspectiva de Minsky

Diante do colapso financeiro de 2008, este trabalho retoma a teoria econômica proposta por Hyman P. Minsky com o objetivo de esclarecer as circunstâncias que propiciaram uma crise financeira tão profunda. A estrutura analítica de Minsky é marcada pela Hipótese da Instabilidade Financeira, a qual aponta para fatores endógenos ao próprio sistema capitalista como o principal causador de instabilidades financeiras. Este processo, caracterizado principalmente por um avanço desfavorável no nível de endividamento dos agentes, constrói um ciclo de estágios que pode se desenvolver para uma crise financeira ou um colapso sistêmico, definidos como “Momento Minsky” e “Colapso Minsky”. Este cenário descrito por Minsky, também analisado à luz de teorias mais recentes como as de Gary A. Dymski e Alessandro Vercelli, é conhecido por “ciclo minskyano”. Ao adotar estes preceitos da análise teórica de Minsky, é possível visualizar como o processo de desregulamentação e fragilização financeira dos Estados Unidos nas décadas de 1980 e 1990 proveram condições para a crise do subprime e, posteriormente, o colapso financeiro de 2008. De maneira similar, é possível observar que a análise teórica de Minsky também é aplicável à crise que afeta a economia brasileira no final de 2008. A fragilização financeira que se inicia no Brasil poucos anos antes da crise, acentuada no setor exportador de commodities, cria a condição para o “momento Minsky brasileiro”, demonstrando que apesar das falhas da análise teórica de Minsky, que supõe uma economia fechada com características da economia estadunidense, é possível visualizar uma relação de causa e efeito da recente crise financeira com a teoria minskyana.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages ofeconomic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.