The influence of family ownership on the quality of accounting information

This article explores the quality of accounting information in listed family firms. The authors exploit the features of the Italian equitymarket characterizd by high ownership concentration across all tpes of firms to disentangle the effects of family ownership from other major block holders on the quality of accounting information. The findings document that family firms convey financial information of higher quality compared to the nonfamily peers. Furthermore the authors provide evidence that the determinants of accounting quality differ across family and nonfamily firms.

Dividends and family ownership: evidence from Indonesia

The thesis finds a significant negative association between family ownership and dividend payout in the Indonesian market. . It is revealed that the market does not disregard the existence of family ownership in reacting to dividend announcements. It documents dividend-paying family firms are associated with lower abnormal accruals as as a proxy of earnings management.

'Family' ownership, tunnelling and earnings management:a review of the literature

In this review paper, we bring together a number of aspects of family firms that are ubiquitous in a number of institutional contexts, often as part of larger business groups. We pay particular attention to the mechanisms by which families retain control over firms, and the incentives of the families in control to expropriate other stakeholders by way of tunnelling. We examine the role of earnings management in facilitating tunnelling, and evidence about the incidence of earnings management in family firms. Our review suggests that while the literature on these aspects of family control is rich, the contexts in which the empirical exercises are undertaken are relatively few, and hence there is considerable opportunity to expand it to other contexts, in particular in the form of cross-country comparisons of the relative impact of agency conflicts and institutions on these issues.

Dividends, leverage, and family ownership in the emerging Indonesian market

We examine the roles of dividends and leverage to mitigate agency problems within familyfirms in Indonesia. Using simultaneous equations, we find a significant negative associationbetween family ownership and dividend payout and a two-way negative relation betweendividend payout and leverage. Our analysis reveals that, compared to non-family firms,family firms tend to maintain a lower dividend pay-out and higher leverage. The presenceof large non-family ownership appears to have an impact on determining levels of privatebenefit control. During the Asian and global financial crisis, family firms changed theirdividend pay-out more than non-family firms did.

Disputes over memory ownership: What memories are disputed?

The ownership of memories is sometimes disputed, particularly by twins. Examination of 77 disputed memories, 71 provided by twins, showed that most of the remembered events are negative and that the disputants appear to be self-serving. They claim for themselves memories for achievements and suffered misfortunes but are more likely to give away memories of personal wrongdoing. The research suggests that some of the memories in which we play a leading role might in fact have been the experiences of others.

Impact of board composition and ownership on internationalisation strategy amongst small New Zealand firms

Internationalisation strategies are important for company expansion because New Zealand, with its four million people, has such a small market. Nonetheless, there mayor may not exist ;"agency costs" in the use of Outside Directors. Ownership patterns may also influence Internationalization Strategy. Using Binary Correlation, N-Way Cross-Tabulation, and Principal Component Analysis, we find evidence that Outside Directors have less influence on Internationalisation Strategy than Inside Directors. Family ownership also seems to have a greater association than non-family owned companies. Despite substantial limitations, the methods and models proposed seem to have some utility in examining the association of Internationalisation Strategy with Board Composition and Ownership Patterns.

Market based performance : do ownership structures, or firm policy choice matter?

This study examines whether the structure of share ownership or firm's dividend and debt policies provide explanation for firm performances in Malaysia. Firm performance, measured as Tobin's Q is modelled in a dynamic panel framework to estimate effects of director ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership, and firm's dividend and debt policy. The generalised methods of moments (GMM) method is used to estimated the models for 80 CI components companies listed on Main Board of Malaysia observed from 1999 to 2002. The findings reveal strong evidence of positive impact of firm's dividend and debt policy on firm performance. However, ownership structure seems to be less important for market based performance of Malaysian firms: These results are expected to provide guidelines to the investors regarding the significance of firm dividend policy, leverage policy and market to book value ratio as some of the key sources of value creation for Malaysian listed firms.

The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms

We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.

Audit fees, auditor choice and stakeholder influence: Evidence from a family-firm dominated economy

Despite the dominance of family-owned publicly listed companies in developing economies, prior research has paid relatively little attention to this area and the socio-economic context of these countries has been mostly ignored. This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing empirical evidence of the effects of family control and ownership on audit pricing and auditor choice in a developing economy context. Using 1058 firm-year observations of publicly listed companies in Bangladesh, where family firms are the most dominant form of public companies, we find that in comparison with non-family firms, our sample family firms pay significantly lower audit fees and choose lower quality auditors. However, for export-oriented industries, family firms seem to pay significantly higher audit fees and recruit better quality auditors compared to non-family firms. Collectively, our findings have important implications for audit markets in emerging economies in which the sustainability of family firms is crucial for overall economic development.

Ownership concentration and product innovation in Chinese private SMEs

Product innovation is extremely important to the growth, success, and ultimate survival of firms. Although its unique features in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have gained growing attention in the literature, there is limited knowledge as to how ownership concentration moderates the relationship between product innovation and its determinants. Based upon insights from agency and institutional theories, we examine the moderating effects of ownership concentration on the relationship between product innovation and its key determinants in Chinese SMEs, utilizing a large dataset of 43,728 Chinese firms over the period 2005-2006. We focus on examining the differences between single-owner SMEs, where there is dominant control of one family member, and multiple-owner SMEs, where principal-agent conflicts and principal-principal conflicts are more likely to occur. Our findings indicate that single-owned firms tend to convert research and development into product innovation more efficiently than firms with multiple owners, who are typically better at utilizing external sources of knowledge and human capital.

One size does not fit all: Entrepreneurial families’ reliance on family offices

Family offices are organisations dedicated to the management of entrepreneurial families’ private wealth. Based on agency theory, we analyse types of family offices with regard to the families’ goals and the control mechanisms used to ensure goal achievement. Family-dominant management and private client structures involve stronger emphasis on non-financial goals in single and multi-family offices than in non-family-dominant management and open client structures. Variations in family involvement, ranging from family dominance to the complete absence of family ownership and/or management, and diverse client structures justify the differential reliance on formal and informal control mechanisms.

Ready for a crisis? How supervisory boards affect the formalized crisis procedures of small and medium-sized family firms in Germany

Overcoming a crisis situation in which the socioemotional wealth (SEW) of a family is at risk can be threatened by a lack of formal crisis procedures, which can increase the probability of organizational decline. Thus, not being prepared for a crisis situation may be a critical factor in the long-term survival of family firms. From a corporate governance perspective, supervisory boards may achieve higher levels of crisis readiness. Applying the resourced-based view and SEW theory, we analyze the relationship between family ownership and formalized crisis procedures in 150 small and medium-sized German firms. Our results show that formalized crisis procedures decrease as family ownership increases. Including supervisory boards in our analysis, we find a significant moderating effect of supervisory boards on the relationship between family ownership and formalized crisis procedures. Specifically, our results suggest that family firms with supervisory boards show similar levels of formalized crisis procedures as non-family firms with supervisory boards. In contrast, family firms without supervisory boards exhibit lower levels of formalized crisis procedures compared with non-family firms without supervisory boards. We also discuss managerial implications, limitations, and future research.

An international study on the impact of cultural factors on the prevalence of family-owned firms. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

A key question in international corporate governance is why certain in ownership types are prevalent in different countries around the world (La Prota et al., 1999). In this study, we provide an answer for the prevalence of the family-owned firms in 42 countries by examining key characteristics of culture. We show that family-ownership is positively correlated with power distance (PD), in-group collectivism (CI) and, insignificantly, with uncertainty avoidance (UA). Our study makes a contribution to the field since previous research used religion and language as umbrella constructs for culture, while we pinpoint specific cultural dimensions.

Value Creation in Family Firms: A Model of Fit

We propose a framework describing how family ownership can create or destroy value depending on the goals, resources, and governance of the family firm, which are each influenced by the family owners. Taking a contingency perspective, we suggest that a fit is required for all three elements – family- influenced goals, resources, and governance – for the family firm to flourish over generations. We conclude with a suggested research agenda indicating research opportunities at the nexus of these identified elements. Further we provide some guiding questions for practitioners that might stimulate fruitful discussions among family firm owners and managers about how to realize ‘‘fit.’’

Santini ice creams: Co-Owning a tradition

The case studies the potential partnership between a small family business, rich in tradition, that sells ice cream in the Lisbon area and a recognized Portuguese family who runs a multinational business. The aim of this study is to address students to analyze the evolution of the small company by using the Agency and Resource-Based Theories and to outline a potentially successful co-ownership structure if the agreement were to take place. The particularity of the case regards considering and identifying the main Family Business issues to keep in mind when dealing with these types of firms.