Production under uncertainty and choice under uncertainty in the emergence of generalized expected utility theory

This paper presents a personal view of the interaction between the analysis of choice under uncertainty and the analysis of production under uncertainty. Interest in the foundations of the theory of choice under uncertainty was stimulated by applications of expected utility theory such as the Sandmo model of production under uncertainty. This interest led to the development of generalized models including rank-dependent expected utility theory. In turn, the development of generalized expected utility models raised the question of whether such models could be used in the analysis of applied problems such as those involving production under uncertainty. Finally, the revival of the state-contingent approach led to the recognition of a fundamental duality between choice problems and production problems.

Background risk in generalized expected utility theory

In this paper, it is shown that, for a wide range of risk-averse generalized expected utility preferences, independent risks are complementary, contrary to the results for expected utility preferences satisfying conditions such as proper and standard risk aversion.

Educational Expansion and Persistent Inequalities of Education: Utilizing the Subjective Expected Utility Theory to Explain the Increasing Participation Rates in Upper Secondary School in the Federal Republic Of Germany

This investigation attempts to answer the question why more and more parents have chosen the Gymnasium for their children's secondary school education in post‐war West Germany. Based on the theory of subjective expected utility, the crucial mechanisms of parental educational decisions have been emphasized. From this perspective it is assumed that increasing educational motivation coupled with changes in the subjective evaluation of the cost–benefit of education were important conditions for an increasing participation in upper secondary schools. These were, however, in turn, the result of educational expansion. The empirical analyses for three time‐periods in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s confirm these assumptions to a large degree. Additionally, empirical evidence was found to suggest that in addition to the intentions of parents and the educational career of their children, structural moments of educational expansion and their own inertia played an important role in the pupils' transition from one educational level to the next. Finally, evidence was found that persistent class‐specific educational inequality stems from a constant balance in the relative cost–benefit advantages between social classes as well as from an increasing difference of primary origin effect between social classes in the realization of their educational choice.

Conditional Expected Utility

Let 'epsilon' be a class of event. Conditionally Expected Utility decision makers are decision makers whose conditional preferences ≿E, E є 'epsilon', satisfy the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU). We extend the notion of unconditional preference that is conditionally EU to unconditional preferences that are not necessarily SEU. We give a representation theorem for a class of such preferences, and show that they are Invariant Bi-separable in the sense of Ghirardato et al.[7]. Then, we consider the special case where the unconditional preference is itself SEU, and compare our results with those of Fishburn [6].

Resolving inconsistencies in utility measurement under risk: Tests of generalizations of expected utility

This paper explores biases in the elicitation of utilities under risk and the contribution that generalizations of expected utility can make to the resolution of these biases. We used five methods to measure utilities under risk and found clear violations of expected utility. Of the theories studies, prospect theory was most consistent with our data. The main improvement of prospect theory over expected utility was in comparisons between a riskless and a risky prospect(riskless-risk methods). We observed no improvement over expected utility in comparisons between two risky prospects (risk-risk methods). An explanation why we found no improvement of prospect theory over expected utility in risk-risk methods may be that there was less overweighting of small probabilities in our study than has commonly been observed.

Risk premiums and benefit measures for generalized-expected-utility theories

Standard tools for the analysis of economic problems involving uncertainty, including risk premiums, certainty equivalents and the notions of absolute and relative risk aversion, are developed without making specific assumptions on functional form beyond the basic requirements of monotonicity, transitivity, continuity, and the presumption that individuals prefer certainty to risk. Individuals are not required to display probabilistic sophistication. The approach relies on the distance and benefit functions to characterize preferences relative to a given state-contingent vector of outcomes. The distance and benefit functions are used to derive absolute and relative risk premiums and to characterize preferences exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). A generalization of the notion of Schur-concavity is presented. If preferences are generalized Schur concave, the absolute and relative risk premiums are generalized Schur convex, and the certainty equivalents are generalized Schur concave.

Testing the descriptive performance of the rank-dependent utility in the domain of health profiles

Expected utility theory (EUT) has been challenged as a descriptive theoryin many contexts. The medical decision analysis context is not an exception.Several researchers have suggested that rank dependent utility theory (RDUT)may accurately describe how people evaluate alternative medical treatments.Recent research in this domain has addressed a relevant feature of RDU models-probability weighting-but to date no direct test of this theoryhas been made. This paper provides a test of the main axiomatic differencebetween EUT and RDUT when health profiles are used as outcomes of riskytreatments. Overall, EU best described the data. However, evidence on theediting and cancellation operation hypothesized in Prospect Theory andCumulative Prospect Theory was apparent in our study. we found that RDUoutperformed EU in the presentation of the risky treatment pairs in whichthe common outcome was not obvious. The influence of framing effects onthe performance of RDU and their importance as a topic for future researchis discussed.

Expected utility without full transitivity

We generalize the classical expected-utility criterion by weakening transitivity to Suzumura consistency. In the absence of full transitivity, reflexivity and completeness no longer follow as a consequence of the system of axioms employed and a richer class of rankings of probability distributions results. This class is characterized by means of standard expected-utility axioms in addition to Suzumura consistency. An important feature of some members of our new class is that they allow us to soften the negative impact of wellknown paradoxes without abandoning the expected-utility framework altogether.

The Problem with Utility: Towards a Non-Consequentialist / Utility Theory Synthesis

I develop the argument that our current decision-making framework, utility theory, when used by itself, is 1) descriptively incomplete, 2) theoretically flawed, and 2) ethically questionable. In response, I offer an exploratory framework that incorporates both consequentialist and non-consequentialist motivations. Adding a commitment function provides a synthesis which remedies the problems associated with the sole use of utility theory. Finally, I show how philosophers Immanuel Kant, W.D. Ross, and Martin Buber provide an ethical basis for the framework.

Analyzing evacuation decisions using multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT)

Emergency managers are faced with critical evacuation decisions. These decisions must balance conflicting objectives as well as high levels of uncertainty. Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) provides a framework through which objective trade-offs can be analyzed to make optimal evacuation decisions. This paper is the result of data gathered during the European Commission Project, Evacuation Responsiveness by Government Organizations (ERGO) and outlines a preliminary decision model for the evacuation decision. The illustrative model identifies levels of risk at which point evacuation actions should be taken by emergency managers in a storm surge scenario with forecasts at 12 and 9 hour intervals. The results illustrate how differences in forecast precision affect the optimal evacuation decision. Additional uses for this decision model are also discussed along with improvements to the model through future ERGO data-gathering.

Life-cycle preferences over consumption and health: when is cost-effectiveness analysis equivalent to cost-benefit analysis?

This paper studies life-cycle preferences over consumption and health status. We show that cost-effectiveness analysis is consistent with cost-benefit analysis if the Lifetime utility function is additive over time, multiplicative in the utility of consumption and the utility of health status, and if the utility of consumption is constant over time. We derive the conditions under which the lifetime utility function takes this form, both under expected utility theory and under rank-dependent utility theory, which is currently the most important nonexpected utility theory. If cost-effectiveness analysis is consistent with cost-benefit analysis, it is possible to derive tractable expressions for the willingness to pay for quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs). The willingness to pay for QALYs depends on wealth, remaining life expectancy, health status, and the possibilities for intertemporal substitution of consumption. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Crime and punishment: Further results

I consider a general specification of criminals' objective functionand argue that, when the general non-expected utility theory issubstituted for the traditional expected utility theory, thehigh-fine-low-probability result (Becker, 1968) only holds underspecific and strong restrictions.

Averting risk in the face of large losses: Bernoulli vs. Tversky and Kahneman

We experimentally question the assertion of Prospect Theory that people display risk attraction in choices involving high-probability losses. Indeed, our experimental participants tend to avoid fair risks for large (up to ? 90), high-probability (80%) losses. Our research hinges on a novel experimental method designed to alleviate the house-money bias that pervades experiments with real (not hypothetical) loses.Our results vindicate Daniel Bernoulli?s view that risk aversion is the dominant attitude,But, contrary to the Bernoulli-inspired canonical expected utility theory, we do find frequent risk attraction for small amounts of money at stake.In any event, we attempt neither to test expected utility versus nonexpected utility theories, nor to contribute to the important literature that estimates value and weighting functions. The question that we ask is more basic, namely: do people display risk aversion when facing large losses, or large gains? And, at the risk of oversimplifying, our answer is yes.

A teoria da perspectiva e as mudanças de preferência no mainstream: um prospecto Lakatoseano

The theory of the perspective and the changes of preference in the mainstream: a Lakatosean prospect. For many decades over the 20th Century, the mainstream of economics adopted a normative and axiomatic theory of individual behavior in which maximizing procedures were carried out by rationally unbounded agents. This status has been challenged on many grounds and alternative views from fields like psychology have found a way into the core of economics research frontier. Prospect theory, developed by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky since the 1970s, has provided a more empirical, inductive and descriptive theory of decision making. It has made significant inroads into mainstream microeconomics, shaking the habits of some of its practitioners. This paper first takes stock of its main developments and then uses a Lakatosian framework to draw out its negative and positive heuristics. In what follows, its heuristics are compared to those of traditional rational decision-making theories. The differences between them are highlighted, pointing to changes in the mainstream of the profession and to new opportunities for research.