The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Speech on executive powers, delivered in the House of Representatives, Dec. 19, 1837.

Caption title.

The semi-presidential system of Cape Verde: the relationship between the executive and the legislative powers = O sistema semi-presidencialista caboverdiano: a relação entre os poderes executivo e legislativo

e article analyses the relationship established between the executive and legislative powers in the Cape Verdean government system where researchers seek to understand it, taking into account their theoretical and constitutional setting practice. It should be noted the prominence of the debate and studies undertaken to understand how the scienti c academy seeks to eradicate this problem. Two issues are relevant in this debate: the rst reporting to the theoretical and constitutional con guration of Cape Verdean government system and the other to its policy and legislative practice. Keywords: Cape Verde. Semi-presidential System. Systems of Government. Legislative and Executive Powers.

O Sistema Semi-Presidencialista Cabo-verdiano: A Relação entre os Poderes Executivo e Legislativo

O artigo procura analisar a relação que se estabelece entre o poder executivo e legislativo no sistema de governo cabo-verdiano, onde Investigadores buscam compreendê-lo, tendo em conta a sua configuração prática, teórica e constitucional. Há que realçar a proeminência do debate e dos estudos realizados no sentido de compreender como é que a academia científica procura debelar esta problemática. Duas questões são pertinentes neste debate: a primeira refere-se à configuração teórico-constitucional do sistema de governo cabo-verdiano e a outra à prática política e legislativa.

O judiciário e a governança democrática dos recursos hídricos na região metropolitana: uma abordagem a partir do caso Matanza-Riachuelo

A previsão constitucional de competência concorrente dos entes políticos para a promoção de políticas públicas nas regiões metropolitanas abre caminho para que no caso de omissão dos poderes legislativos e executivos a questão seja judicializada. O Judiciário, como guardião dos direitos fundamentais e dos princípios democráticos, tem legitimidade para impor a cooperação entre os entes políticos a fim de que seja prestado um serviço publico eficiente e igualitário para todos os cidadãos. Essa atuação, contudo, está limitada aos princípios constitucionais e à vontade popular, além da existência de capacidade institucional e atenção aos efeitos sistêmicos. É apresentado o caso Matanza Riachuelo, em que o Judiciário condenou os entes políticos a promoverem, entre outras medidas, um plano estratégico comum. Ao final, apresenta-se uma visão crítica da atuação do Judiciário na execução desse julgado.

Democracia Possível: espaços institucionais, participação social e cultura política

The present study aims at making a theoretically reflection about the reconstruction process of democracy that can be observed in the country since the opening political process, which took place with the Geisel´s government in 1974, passing through the first civil president, in 1985, the Constitution process, in 1986, and finally the Constitution promulgation in 1988. It interests to this study analyses the premise that the 1988 Constitution inaugurates the moment in which democracy starts to be reconstructed in the country, and that this reconstruction is made in such a brand new way, once it included the possibility of participation of the civil society in the deliberation of the public politics, what became possible with the creation of new spaces of a gestion shared by the three executive powers: federal; states; municipalities, and with the civil society, in the councils created in those spheres. In this way, this work wishes to focus the opening process to the civil society participation, wich became possible with the creation of the city councils of public politics. It´s about investigating the form in wich the relations set up in these hibrid spaces could be considered democratic, inclusive and promoters of effective participation, checking up tendencies, giving emphasis to regularities and some specifities encountered in the forms of participation, which have been observed in those councils. In order to comprehend the democratic process in construction in the country, the analysis of the relations established by the civil society and the local executive power in the obligatory municipal councils is taken as object of study, passing by the tensions wich evolves institutions and political practices, permeated by the local political culture. It starts from a briefly review of works already made on the subject

A liberdade de imprensa vista pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal: análise da ADPF n. 130

The present study aims to present and analyze the ruling of the Brazilian Supreme Court in ADPF 130 (Concentrated constitutional review action, Fundamental Precept Infringement, Argüição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental), proposed by Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), which contests the compatibility of statute 5.250/67 with the Federal Constitution of 1988. This work considers that the judicial ruling is different than the approach taken by the Legislative and Executive powers, arguing that there is, in the Judiciary, a peculiar way for ruling, surrounded by mysteries, rites, secrets, pomp and circunstances unintelligible to layman. To reach the proposed goal, Justice Carlos Brito´s report and opinion on ADPF 130 are analyzed. The choice of giving special attention to this opinion, which favors the declaration of unconstitutionality of the 5.250/67 statute, is justified in that it represents agreement with the allegation of disrespect to the constitutional text, as suggested by the Partido Democrático Trabalhista. The arguments put forth by the presiding Justice on his ruling will also be the object of consideration, as well as some possible consequences of the ruling.

Società di capitali amministratrici di società di persone

The present work focuses on a specific aspect of the general issue concerning the possible consequences of the reform of business corporations (“società di capitali”) on the discipline of partnerships (“società di persone”). After the reform of business law enacted with legislative decree n. 6/2003, the majority of the literature, in the light of the provisions of art. 2361 co. 2 civil code and art. 111-duodecies of the regulatory provisions (“disposizioni di attuazione”) of the civil code itself, maintains the possibility for a business corporation to be executive of a partnership. As a matter of fact, whenever all the members of a partnership are actually business corporations, it shall be possible that either one of the latter becomes the executive, either such role is played by a third party, i. e. a non-partner. After displaying the possible advantages and disadvantages stemming from a business corporation managing a partnership, the analysis investigates the legal feasibility of the case in point. First of all, the reasons supporting the theory under which a legal person cannot be manager of a partnership are examined in depth; an overview of the principal EU Member States’ legal systems and of the discipline of the European Economic Interest Grouping and of European Corporate is then provider for. At the outset of such analysis, the author asserts the legal possibility for a legal person to act as manager of a corporation, including a partnership. Afterwards, the investigation covers the issue of the executive-member in the partnerships. Initially, an overview of the literature concerning the legal nature of the management is offered; then, the three different categories of partnership are analyzed, in order to understand whether such legal persons can be managed by a third party (i.e. a non-member). On the basis of the existing strict connection between executive powers and unlimited liability, the author concludes that only the members shall be manager of the partnerships. Another chapter of the thesis is centred, from the one hand, on the textual data that, after the reform of 2003, support the aforesaid conclusion; from the other hand, on the peculiar features of the corporate business that is executive of a partnership. In particular, the attention is focused on the necessity or on the mere opportunity of an article of association explicitly providing that a corporate business can be executive of the partnership; on the practical ways by which the former shall manage the latter (especially on the necessity of nominating a permanent representative of the legal person and on the possibility to designate the procurators to this end); on the disclosure obligations applicable to the case in point.

On Political Union in Europe: The changing landscape of decisionmaking and political accountability. CEPS Essay No. 4, 21 February 2013

This essay discusses how recent developments have modified the existing allocation of tasks between the EU and national levels and the legitimising mechanisms in decision-making by the EU institutions. It examines in turn the increasing differentiation emerging in member states’ participation in EU policies and institutions, the changing configuration of executive powers and its relationship to the community method, the criteria governing the transfer of economic powers from the member states to the Union and the emerging democratic accountability and legitimising mechanisms before both the European and the national parliaments. Some main implications for the future of European institutions are summarised in the conclusions.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal como agente tecnocrático no exercício da jurisdição constitucional na solução de casos complexos : análise das ações diretas de inconstitucionalidade nº 3937/SP e nº 3357/RS

Many changes have taken place in contemporary society causing impacts in its different sectors, making it much more complex and insecure than in past times. The alteration on the decision-making system of the Brazilian society is among the main changes today. The post-modern context contributed to the occurrence of the transfer of state power of the Legislative and Executive Powers to the Judiciary Power, specifically to the Federal Court of Justice, leading to an expansion on the actuation range of this institution mainly through the exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction. This has caused a crisis of legitimacy in society once the Court will now decide the political and social fundamental issues. In this scenario, the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality n° 3937/SP and n° 3357/RS are highlighted and both are being tried by the Supreme Court. Such emphasis is given, since it is a matter of high complexity and social repercussion that will be decided by a legal institution and not a political one. Thus, this work aims to analyze the role of the Supreme Court in the context of contemporary society on the trial of complex and controversial cases, particularly on the trial of Direct Action of Unconstitutionality n° 3937/SP and n° 3357/RS. This study has noticed that due to the post-modern context the majority of the Supreme Court Ministers tend to base their votes in constitutional principles and no longer limit themselves to a formal review of the constitutionality of laws, which indicates a substantialist approach. Moreover, it can be noticed the deliberative potential of the Court as well as the influence of the post-modern features, such as risk, uncertainty and insecurity on the elaboration of the Minister‟s votes. Therefore, sometimes, such as the case in study, the Supreme Court has acted as a technocratic agent in Brazilian society once fundamental political and social decisions for society especially when it comes to complex and controversial cases are being taken by the Supreme Court, which is composed by “Law technicians” and such decisions are mainly based in technical data and scientific studies. For the accomplishment of this work, it has been adopted the inductive approach and monographic procedure method and the bibliographical and documentary research technique.

Conflictos entre el pueblo y las autoridades. Bubenreuth: un ejemplo actual en Baviera

The sovereign of a democratic state is „the people“. However, they transfer their voices to a few political party representatives in order to make them exercise legislative and executive powers in the name of “the people”. In different European countries, this model of representative democracy is marked by elements of direct democracy. In Switzerland, for example, there are frequent plebiscites on a number of issues and in France, the President of the Republic is elected directly. In Germany, the constitution calls for a “Volksabstimmung”, or a referendum at the federal level, a “Volksentscheid” or plebiscite at the federal state level and a “Bürgerentscheid” at the city level. But in small municipalities where everyone knows each other and people talk, a different form of direct democracy continues on. In the case of Bubenreuth, where I have lived for more than 30 years, the community dared to raise its voice against the mayor and against town councillors to have them revoke the application of a legal but unjust regulation, or for them to at least mitigate the effects.

Cities and villages. : A compilation of general laws of the state of Illinois, governing and regualting the powers and duties and the exercise therof by cities and villages, with explanatory annotations digesting the decions of the Supreme and Appellate courts to date and with numerous practical and approved precedents and forms, useful in carrying on the details of executive and legislative business. /

Mode of access: Internet.

Executive Order Number Twelve, September 1972

Authorize and direct the transfer of powers providing for the maintenance of the State Capital grounds, equipment, etc., as given to the Department of Buildings & Grounds to the General Services Department.

Executive Order Number Six, January 1972

Executive Orders from Governor Ray. Authorize and direct the transfer of powers, duites, etc. as given to the Printing Board of General Services Department