Notas sobre o esquematismo na Crítica da Razão Pura de Kant

Trata-se de uma abordagem introdutória à doutrina do esquematismo, segundo o contexto de seu surgimento na Crítica da Razão Pura.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

The Lived Experience of Nursing Students With Formative Assessment Formally Embedded in Clinical Courses: A Transcendental Phenomenological Study

The potential of formative assessment (FA) for informing learning in classroom-based nursing courses is clearly established in the literature; however, research on FA in clinical courses remains scarce. This inquiry explored the lived experience of nursing students using transcendental phenomenology and described the phenomenon of being assessed in clinical courses. The research question guiding the study was: How is the phenomenon of assessment experienced by nursing students when FA is formally embedded in clinical courses? Inherent in this question were the following issues: (a) the meaning of clinical experiences for nursing students, (b) the meaning of being assessed through FA, and (c) what it is like to be assessed when FA is formally embedded within clinical experiences. The noematic themes that illuminated the whatness of the participants’ experience were (a) enabled cognitive activity, (b) useful feedback, (c) freedom to be, (d) enhanced focus, (e) stress moderator, and (f) respectful mentorship. The noetic themes associated with how the phenomenon was experienced were related to bodyhood, temporality, spatiality, and relationship to others. The results suggest a fundamental paradigm shift from traditional nursing education to a more pervasive integration of FA in clinical courses so that students have time to learn before being graded on their practice. Furthermore, this inquiry and the literature consulted provide evidence that using cognitive science theory to inform and reform clinical nursing education is a timely option to address the repeated calls from nursing leaders to modernize nursing education. This inquiry contributes to reduce our reliance on assumptions derived from research on FA in nursing classrooms and provides evidence based on the reality of using formative assessment in clinical courses. Recommendations for future research are presented.

Certain problems concerning polynomials and transcendental entire functions of exponential type

Soit $\displaystyle P(z):=\sum_{\nu=0}^na_\nu z^{\nu}$ un polynôme de degré $n$ et $\displaystyle M:=\sup_{|z|=1}|P(z)|.$ Sans aucne restriction suplémentaire, on sait que $|P'(z)|\leq Mn$ pour $|z|\leq 1$ (inégalité de Bernstein). Si nous supposons maintenant que les zéros du polynôme $P$ sont à l'extérieur du cercle $|z|=k,$ quelle amélioration peut-on apporter à l'inégalité de Bernstein? Il est déjà connu [{\bf \ref{Mal1}}] que dans le cas où $k\geq 1$ on a $$(*) \qquad |P'(z)|\leq \frac{n}{1+k}M \qquad (|z|\leq 1),$$ qu'en est-il pour le cas où $k < 1$? Quelle est l'inégalité analogue à $(*)$ pour une fonction entière de type exponentiel $\tau ?$ D'autre part, si on suppose que $P$ a tous ses zéros dans $|z|\geq k \, \, (k\geq 1),$ quelle est l'estimation de $|P'(z)|$ sur le cercle unité, en terme des quatre premiers termes de son développement en série entière autour de l'origine. Cette thèse constitue une contribution à la théorie analytique des polynômes à la lumière de ces questions.

Tempus Post Mortem?* Adaptação portuguesa da transcendental-future time perspective scale (TFTPS)

Integrado no conceito mais geral da perspetiva temporal, o futuro transcendental tem sido conceptualizado como uma dimensão que abrange as crenças sobre o futuro a partir da morte imaginada do corpo físico até ao infinito. A transcendental-future time perspective scale (TFTPS) é uma escala unidimensional composta por 10 itens que avalia as cognições relacionadas com este espaço temporal. O objetivo deste estudo é apresentar a adaptação à língua e cultura portuguesa desta escala, assim como a sua estrutura fatorial e características psicométricas numa amostra de 346 participantes com idades compreendidas entre os 17 e os 54 anos (M = 19.87, DP = 4.27). Os resultados encontrados através da análise fatorial exploratória validaram a unidimensionalidade da escala (65.94 % de variância total explicada, α = 0.87).

Los 'estudios nocturnos' : transcendental obra social-docente.

Repaso de toda la legislación y reglamentación en torno a la extensión de la enseñanza media y los estudios nocturnos, desde la Ley de Ordenación de la Enseñanza Media de 26 de febrero de 1953, donde se inicia el proceso con la extensión de la enseñanza primaria a toda la población.

Transcendental Brauer groups of products of CM elliptic curves

Let L be a number field and let E/L be an elliptic curve with complex multiplication by the ring of integers O_K of an imaginary quadratic field K. We use class field theory and results of Skorobogatov and Zarhin to compute the transcendental part of the Brauer group of the abelian surface ExE. The results for the odd order torsion also apply to the Brauer group of the K3 surface Kum(ExE). We describe explicitly the elliptic curves E/Q with complex multiplication by O_K such that the Brauer group of ExE contains a transcendental element of odd order. We show that such an element gives rise to a Brauer-Manin obstruction to weak approximation on Kum(ExE), while there is no obstruction coming from the algebraic part of the Brauer group.

Growth of transcendental meditation: a sociological study

Sociology, in concerning itself with methodology and cultural determinism,may have overlooked the value of human experience in determining social action. We feel that the structural-functionalist point of view is not mutually exclusive with that of symbolic interaction theory. The field of collective behavior has not adequately explained a certain incidence of human activity called Transcendental Meditation. This paper will define Transcendental Meditation in sociological terms and explore its growth in terms of structural-functionalism,as well as in terms of the symbol-making faculty of human experience. In the first chapter, the author will state his biases and background as well as the problem and purpose of the paper. In the second chapter, Transcendental Meditation will be defined through an explanation of its concepts in sociological terms. A view of the TM program will also be reported. Following this in the third chapter, the origins of TM will be discussed~showing its basis to be in a tradition of Indian gurus and following its development in the United states until the present. The history of TM will proceed through biography of leading figures, with special mention of innovations in the TM institution of teaching and events in the growth of the 'movement' of TOO that are of key importance. Having set down the history of TM, in the fourth chapter we will discuss TM in terms of various sociological models. We will try to identify TM as either a social movement; a charismatic organization or a bureaucracy. In the fifth chapter we will look more closely at the structure of the organization that teaches TM in regard to its own functioning; that is, compliance, communication, socialization and recruitment, and also in regard to its relationship with national institutions, such as military, industry, religion, and government. Finally, we will explore TM in terms of individual and group goals and offer an explanation defining the growth of TM. Throughout-the paper, sociological perspectives will be applied to phenomena that exist in the society today. It is not within the scope of this paper to verify all the sociological implications and appraisals offered. It is hoped that this will not invalidate the ensuing discussion. It is also hoped that this paper will expand the horizons of sociology and offer some direction in future studies of collective behavior. If this is accomplished, the author will be gratified and indebted to his teachers. If not the author takes full responsibility. This paper is dedicated therefore to Mr. Birge, Mr Morrione, Mr. Geib as well as to my parents who have encouraged me, my friends whom I have interviewed, and to His Holiness, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi whose teaching has uplifted hundred of thousands of people in the world and may bring about the development of new thresholds of peace and prosperity for mankind.

Kant, or the crack in the universal : Slavoj Zizek's politicising the transcendental turn

This paper examines Slavoj Zizek’s reading of Immanuel Kant. Its undergirding argument is that Zizek’s work as a whole- up to and including his politically radical statements, which have become more and more prominent since 1997- is conceivable as a project in the rereading of the Kantian ‘Copernican Revolution’ via Lacanian psychoanalysis. Critics now agree that Zizek’s orienting aim is to write a philosophy of politics, as more recent texts, like The Ticklish Subject make clear. (Kay, 2003; Sharpe, 2004; Dean 2006) If Zizek’s philosophy is ultimately a philosophy of politics, however, Zizek’s political philosophy is grounded in a wider post or ‘neo’-Kantian philosophy of subjectivity.
The essay has three major parts. Part I gives Zizek’s reading of Kant on the subject of apperception. Part II recounts Zizek’s pivotal reading of Kant on the sublime, which he ties closely to the problematics of the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the first Critique. Part III then examines Zizek’s conception of subjectivity in terms of the faculties (and especially the faculty of imagination) that Kant argues are involved in the transcendental constitution of objects in the first half of The Critique of Pure Reason.
In the Conclusion, the force of the paper’s subtitle—‘Politicising the Transcendental Turn’—will become manifest. I lay out three principles of Zizek’s ‘neoKantian/Hegelian’ ontology. These also make clear how his philosophy of political agency is grounded in this apparently suprapolitical or solely philosophical reading of Kant.

Transcendental arguments about other minds and intersubjectivity

This article describes some of the main arguments for the existence of other minds, and intersubjectivity more generally, that depend upon a transcendental justification. This means that our focus will be largely on ‘continental’ philosophy, not only because of the abiding interest in this tradition in thematising intersubjectivity, but also because transcendental reasoning is close to ubiquitous in continental philosophy. Neither point holds for analytic philosophy. As such, this essay will introduce some of the important contributions of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Karl-Otto Apel, all of whom use transcendental reasoning as a key part of their analyses of intersubjectivity, and we also consider the work of Peter Strawson who does likewise in the analytic tradition.

Transcendental Priority and Deleuzian Normativity. A reply to James Williams

I am grateful that someone whose work I greatly admire could be the philosopher to so eloquently and succinctly cut to the heart of the problem that I posed in the previous issue of Deleuze Studies. James Williams' critical reply leaves me, prima facie, confronted by a stark alternative: either I have misunderstood Deleuze, or I have illustrated problems and lacunae in Deleuze. I will suggest, however, that this is a false alternative, and that Williams' and my divergent accounts of The Logic of Sense – and even Deleuze's oeuvre as a whole – is better understood as a situation of ‘both/and’ rather than ‘either/or’, and hence that my interpretation of Deleuze isn't wrong, but necessarily iconoclastic.