Concentration inequalities and laws of large numbers under epistemic and regular irrelevance

This paper presents concentration inequalities and laws of large numbers under weak assumptions of irrelevance that are expressed using lower and upper expectations. The results build upon De Cooman and Miranda`s recent inequalities and laws of large numbers. The proofs indicate connections between the theory of martingales and concepts of epistemic and regular irrelevance. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The study of public administration in India, the Philippines, Canada and Australia: the universal struggle against epistemic colonization, and toward critical assimilation

The study of public administration has been characterized as a strong international focus, as both governments and scholars have sought to learn from the experience of other societies. While in a perfect world, one would expect a sort of pragmatic universalism, instead, many scholars tend to bring lessons from one country, or from a single cultural reality. This modest contribution lies in showing a series of national experiences rarely brought to the discourse about public administration in Brazil: Canada, Australia, India and the Philippines. Special emphasis will be given to the following: the origins and the development of public administration; the influence of ideology; and the complex tension between global theory and local practices.

Discourse, knowledge, power and politics: towards critical epistemic discourse analysis

Although both are fundamental terms in the humanities and social sciences, discourse and knowledge have seldom been explicitly related, and even less so in critical discourse studies. After a brief summary of what we know about these relationships in linguistics, psychology, epistemology and the social sciences, with special emphasis on the role of knowledge in the formation of mental models as a basis for discourse, I examine in more detail how a critical study of discourse and knowledge may be articulated in critical discourse studies. Thus, several areas of critical epistemic discourse analysis are identified, and then applied in a study of Tony Blair’s Iraq speech on March 18, 2003, in which he sought to legitimatize his decision to go to war in Iraq with George Bush. The analysis shows the various modes of how knowledge is managed and manipulated of all levels of discourse of this speech.

Ignorance and Indifference: Epistemic Indefinites in Slovak

This thesis investigates epistemic indefinites (EIs), elements noteworthy for their grammaticalized ignorance implicature, i.e. inability to provide further information about the identity of the expression's referent. This work contributes to the effort of finding a unified account of the cross-linguistic repertoire of EIs. It comprises a corpus survey and a semantic analysis of Slovak voľa- and -si, EI items not studied until now. First, the following hypothesis was tested: the semantic/syntactic functions expressed by an indefinite will fall into contiguous areas on an implicational map (Haspelmath 1997). The results of the corpus analysis revealed that the map does not entirely capture the Slovak EIs' functional distribution and interpretations. Secondly, the semantic analysis was developed within the alternatives-and-exhaustification framework (Chierchia 2013). I show that some of the EIs' behavior can be explained as a consequence of an assumed sensitivity to parameters proposed by Chierchia. I situate voľa- and -si with respect to the framework’s typology and offer a critical assessment of this theoretical perspective.

Consistency from the perspective of an experimental systems approach to the sciences and their epistemic objects

It is generally accepted that the development of the modern sciences is rooted in experiment. Yet for a long time, experimentation did not occupy a prominent role, neither in philosophy nor in history of science. With the 'practical turn' in studying the sciences and their history, this has begun to change. This paper is concerned with systems and cultures of experimentation and the consistencies that are generated within such systems and cultures. The first part of the paper exposes the forms of historical and structural coherence that characterize the experimental exploration of epistemic objects. In the second part, a particular experimental culture in the life sciences is briefly described as an example. A survey will be given of what it means and what it takes to analyze biological functions in the test tube.

Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus

Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.

An Epistemic Argument in Support of Liberal Neutrality

My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contextual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a specific set of beliefs ought to be. In certain exceptional contexts –where the seriousness of harm in case of mistake and the level of an agent’s responsibility for the outcome of his action are specially high– a very small probability of making a mistake should be recognized as a good reason to avoid to act based on beliefs that we nonetheless affirm with a high degree of confidence and that actually justify our action in other contexts. The further steps of the argument consist in probing 1) that the fundamental state’s policies are such a case of exceptional context, 2) that perfectionist policies are the type of actions we should avoid, and 3) that policies that satisfy neutral standards of justification are not affected by the reasons which lead to reject perfectionist policies.

Epistemic deontologism and the voluntarist strategy against doxastic involuntarism

According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it. However, this view faces an important objection according to which we cannot have such epistemic obligations since our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. One possible strategy against this argument is to show that we do have voluntary control over some of our beliefs, and that we therefore have epistemic obligations. This is what I call the voluntarist strategy. I examine it and argue that it is not promising. I show how the voluntarist attempts of Carl Ginet and Brian Weatherson fail, and conclude that it would be more fruitful for deontologists to look for a different strategy.

The Role of Epistemic Monitoring in Language Comprehension

In der psycholinguistischen Forschung ist die Annahme weitverbreitet, dass die Bewertung von Informationen hinsichtlich ihres Wahrheitsgehaltes oder ihrer Plausibilität (epistemische Validierung; Richter, Schroeder & Wöhrmann, 2009) ein strategischer, optionaler und dem Verstehen nachgeschalteter Prozess ist (z.B. Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Krull & Malone, 1990; Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 1993; Herbert & Kübler, 2011). Eine zunehmende Anzahl an Studien stellt dieses Zwei-Stufen-Modell von Verstehen und Validieren jedoch direkt oder indirekt in Frage. Insbesondere Befunde zu Stroop-artigen Stimulus-Antwort-Kompatibilitätseffekten, die auftreten, wenn positive und negative Antworten orthogonal zum aufgaben-irrelevanten Wahrheitsgehalt von Sätzen abgegeben werden müssen (z.B. eine positive Antwort nach dem Lesen eines falschen Satzes oder eine negative Antwort nach dem Lesen eines wahren Satzes; epistemischer Stroop-Effekt, Richter et al., 2009), sprechen dafür, dass Leser/innen schon beim Verstehen eine nicht-strategische Überprüfung der Validität von Informationen vornehmen. Ausgehend von diesen Befunden war das Ziel dieser Dissertation eine weiterführende Überprüfung der Annahme, dass Verstehen einen nicht-strategischen, routinisierten, wissensbasierten Validierungsprozesses (epistemisches Monitoring; Richter et al., 2009) beinhaltet. Zu diesem Zweck wurden drei empirische Studien mit unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten durchgeführt. Studie 1 diente der Untersuchung der Fragestellung, ob sich Belege für epistemisches Monitoring auch bei Informationen finden lassen, die nicht eindeutig wahr oder falsch, sondern lediglich mehr oder weniger plausibel sind. Mithilfe des epistemischen Stroop-Paradigmas von Richter et al. (2009) konnte ein Kompatibilitätseffekt von aufgaben-irrelevanter Plausibilität auf die Latenzen positiver und negativer Antworten in zwei unterschiedlichen experimentellen Aufgaben nachgewiesen werden, welcher dafür spricht, dass epistemisches Monitoring auch graduelle Unterschiede in der Übereinstimmung von Informationen mit dem Weltwissen berücksichtigt. Darüber hinaus belegen die Ergebnisse, dass der epistemische Stroop-Effekt tatsächlich auf Plausibilität und nicht etwa auf der unterschiedlichen Vorhersagbarkeit von plausiblen und unplausiblen Informationen beruht. Das Ziel von Studie 2 war die Prüfung der Hypothese, dass epistemisches Monitoring keinen evaluativen Mindset erfordert. Im Gegensatz zu den Befunden anderer Autoren (Wiswede, Koranyi, Müller, Langner, & Rothermund, 2013) zeigte sich in dieser Studie ein Kompatibilitätseffekt des aufgaben-irrelevanten Wahrheitsgehaltes auf die Antwortlatenzen in einer vollständig nicht-evaluativen Aufgabe. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass epistemisches Monitoring nicht von einem evaluativen Mindset, möglicherweise aber von der Tiefe der Verarbeitung abhängig ist. Studie 3 beleuchtete das Verhältnis von Verstehen und Validieren anhand einer Untersuchung der Online-Effekte von Plausibilität und Vorhersagbarkeit auf Augenbewegungen beim Lesen kurzer Texte. Zusätzlich wurde die potentielle Modulierung dieser Effeke durch epistemische Marker, die die Sicherheit von Informationen anzeigen (z.B. sicherlich oder vielleicht), untersucht. Entsprechend der Annahme eines schnellen und nicht-strategischen epistemischen Monitoring-Prozesses zeigten sich interaktive Effekte von Plausibilität und dem Vorhandensein epistemischer Marker auf Indikatoren früher Verstehensprozesse. Dies spricht dafür, dass die kommunizierte Sicherheit von Informationen durch den Monitoring-Prozess berücksichtigt wird. Insgesamt sprechen die Befunde gegen eine Konzeptualisierung von Verstehen und Validieren als nicht-überlappenden Stufen der Informationsverarbeitung. Vielmehr scheint eine Bewertung des Wahrheitsgehalts oder der Plausibilität basierend auf dem Weltwissen – zumindest in gewissem Ausmaß – eine obligatorische und nicht-strategische Komponente des Sprachverstehens zu sein. Die Bedeutung der Befunde für aktuelle Modelle des Sprachverstehens und Empfehlungen für die weiterführende Forschung zum Vehältnis von Verstehen und Validieren werden aufgezeigt.

Knowledge practices in design: The role of visual representations as 'epistemic objects'

We use a detailed study of the knowledge work around visual representations to draw attention to the multidimensional nature of `objects'. Objects are variously described in the literatures as relatively stable or in flux; as abstract or concrete; and as used within or across practices. We clarify these dimensions, drawing on and extending the literature on boundary objects, and connecting it with work on epistemic and technical objects. In particular, we highlight the epistemic role of objects, using our observations of knowledge work on an architectural design project to show how, in this setting, visual representations are characterized by a `lack' or incompleteness that precipitates unfolding. The conceptual design of a building involves a wide range of technical, social and aesthetic forms of knowledge that need to be developed and aligned. We explore how visual representations are used, and how these are meaningful to different stakeholders, eliciting their distinct contributions. As the project evolves and the drawings change, new issues and needs for knowledge work arise. These objects have an `unfolding ontology' and are constantly in flux, rather than fully formed. We discuss the implications for wider understandings of objects in organizations and for how knowledge work is achieved in practice.