The cost of carbon : capital market effects of the proposed emission trading scheme (ETS)

In March 2008, the Australian Government announced its intention to introduce a national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), now expected to start in 2015. This impending development provides an ideal setting to investigate the impact an ETS in Australia will have on the market valuation of Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) firms. This is the first empirical study into the pricing effects of the ETS in Australia. Primarily, we hypothesize that firm value will be negatively related to a firm's carbon intensity profile. That is, there will be a greater impact on firm value for high carbon emitters in the period prior (2007) to the introduction of the ETS, whether for reasons relating to the existence of unbooked liabilities associated with future compliance and/or abatement costs, or for reasons relating to reduced future earnings. Using a sample of 58 Australian listed firms (constrained by the current availability of emissions data) which comprise larger, more profitable and less risky listed Australian firms, we first undertake an event study focusing on five distinct information events argued to impact the probability of the proposed ETS being enacted. Here, we find direct evidence that the capital market is indeed pricing the proposed ETS. Second, using a modified version of the Ohlson (1995) valuation model, we undertake a valuation analysis designed not only to complement the event study results, but more importantly to provide insights into the capital market's assessment of the magnitude of the economic impact of the proposed ETS as reflected in market capitalization. Here, our results show that the market assesses the most carbon intensive sample firms a market value decrement relative to other sample firms of between 7% and 10% of market capitalization. Further, based on the carbon emission profile of the sample firms we imply a ‘future carbon permit price’ of between AUD$17 per tonne and AUD$26 per tonne of carbon dioxide emitted. This study is more precise than industry reports, which set a carbon price of between AUD$15 to AUD$74 per tonne.

Terminating links between emission trading programs

© 2015 Elsevier Inc.Links between emission trading programs are not immutable, as highlighted by New Jersey's exit from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in 2011. This raises the question of what to do with existing permits that are banked for future use-choices that have consequences for market behavior in advance of, or upon speculation about, delinking. We consider two delinking policies. One differentiates banked permits by origin, the other treats banked permits the same. We describe the price behavior and relative cost-effectiveness of each policy. Treating permits differently generally leads to higher costs, and may lead to price divergence, even with only speculation about delinking.

It is premature to include non-CO2 effects of aviation in emission trading schemes

The recent G8 Gleneagles climate statement signed on 8 July 2005 specifically mentions a determination to lessen the impact of aviation on climate [Gleneagles, 2005. The Gleneagles communique: climate change, energy and sustainable development. http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gleneagles_Communique.pdf]. In January 2005 the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) commenced operation as the largest multi-country, multi-sector ETS in the world, albeit currently limited only to CO2 emissions. At present the scheme makes no provision for aircraft emissions. However, the UK Government would like to see aircraft included in the ETS and plans to use its Presidencies of both the EU and G8 in 2005 to implement these schemes within the EU and perhaps internationally. Non-CO2 effects have been included in some policy-orientated studies of the impact of aviation but we argue that the inclusion of such effects in any such ETS scheme is premature; we specifically argue that use of the Radiative Forcing Index for comparing emissions from different sources is inappropriate and that there is currently no metric for such a purpose that is likely to enable their inclusion in the near future. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The Emission Trading Scheme reform: will the Commission's proposal save the system? EPC Policy Brief, 29 May 2015

The European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), proposed by the Commission in 2001, entered into force in 2005. It was the flagship instrument of an ambitious policy aiming to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses in the EU by making emission allowances a freely tradable ‘financial commodity’. However, in recent years, the cracks in the system have begun to show as the price of these CO2 emission allowances has dropped. In this Policy Brief, Jørgen Knud Henningsen argues that the envisaged ETS reform may not be enough to address the system’s shortcomings, and that there should be a more open discussion about its potential if it is to contribute to the EU’s goal of a largely de-carbonised economy by 2050.

The financial and environmental performance of firms exposed to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

This thesis is an empirical-based study of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and its implications in terms of corporate environmental and financial performance. The novelty of this study includes the extended scope of the data coverage, as most previous studies have examined only the power sector. The use of verified emissions data of ETS-regulated firms as the environmental compliance measure and as the potential differentiating criteria that concern the valuation of EU ETS-exposed firms in the stock market is also an original aspect of this study. The study begins in Chapter 2 by introducing the background information on the emission trading system (ETS), which focuses on (i) the adoption of ETS as an environmental management instrument and (ii) the adoption of ETS by the European Union as one of its central climate policies. Chapter 3 surveys four databases that provide carbon emissions data in order to determine the most suitable source of the data to be used in the later empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter, which is also Chapter 4 of this thesis, investigates the determinants of the emissions compliance performance of the EU ETS-exposed firms through constructing the best possible performance ratio from verified emissions data and self-configuring models for a panel regression analysis. Chapter 5 examines the impacts on the EU ETS-exposed firms in terms of their equity valuation with customised portfolios and multi-factor market models. The research design takes into account the emissions allowance (EUA) price as an additional factor, as it has the most direct association with the EU ETS to control for the exposure. The final empirical Chapter 6 takes the investigation one step further, by specifically testing the degree of ETS exposure facing different sectors with sector-based portfolios and an extended multi-factor market model. The findings from the emissions performance ratio analysis show that the business model of firms significantly influences emissions compliance, as the capital intensity has a positive association with the increasing emissions-to-emissions cap ratio. Furthermore, different sectors show different degrees of sensitivity towards the determining factors. The production factor influences the performance ratio of the Utilities sector, but not the Energy or Materials sectors. The results show that the capital intensity has a more profound influence on the utilities sector than on the materials sector. With regard to the financial performance impact, ETS-exposed firms as aggregate portfolios experienced a substantial underperformance during the 2001–2004 period, but not in the operating period of 2005–2011. The results of the sector-based portfolios show again the differentiating effect of the EU ETS on sectors, as one sector is priced indifferently against its benchmark, three sectors see a constant underperformance, and three sectors have altered outcomes.

Market Efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: An outlook for the third trading period. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 20/March 2011

Is the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) ready for the challenge of cutting emissions by 20 %? This paper tries to provide an answer to this question by studying the efficiency of the scheme, both in the secondary and in the primary markets for allowances. On the one hand, this paper draws conclusions from the operation of the scheme so far. For this purpose, it studies a wide variety of market data using economic and econometric techniques. On the other hand, building on this evidence, this paper presents and evaluates some of the changes introduced in the scheme for the third trading period.

Essays on emissions trading markets

This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.

Essays on Emissions Trading Markets

This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.

Towards a model of the institutional logics of climate change

The proliferation of innovative schemes to address climate change at international, national and local levels signals a fundamental shift in the priority and role of the natural environment to society, organizations and individuals. This shift in shared priorities invites academics and practitioners to consider the role of institutions in shaping and constraining responses to climate change at multiple levels of organisations and society. Institutional theory provides an approach to conceptualising and addressing climate change challenges by focusing on the central logics that guide society, organizations and individuals and their material and symbolic relationship to the environment. For example, framing a response to climate change in the form of an emission trading scheme evidences a practice informed by a capitalist market logic (Friedland and Alford 1991). However, not all responses need necessarily align with a market logic. Indeed, Thornton (2004) identifies six broad societal sectors each with its own logic (markets, corporations, professions, states, families, religions). Hence, understanding the logics that underpin successful –and unsuccessful– climate change initiatives contributes to revealing how institutions shape and constrain practices, and provides valuable insights for policy makers and organizations. This paper develops models and propositions to consider the construction of, and challenges to, climate change initiatives based on institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). We propose that the challenge of understanding and explaining how climate change initiatives are successfully adopted be examined in terms of their institutional logics, and how these logics evolve over time. To achieve this, a multi-level framework of analysis that encompasses society, organizations and individuals is necessary (Friedland and Alford 1991). However, to date most extant studies of institutional logics have tended to emphasize one level over the others (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 104). In addition, existing studies related to climate change initiatives have largely been descriptive (e.g. Braun 2008) or prescriptive (e.g. Boiral 2006) in terms of the suitability of particular practices. This paper contributes to the literature on logics by examining multiple levels: the proliferation of the climate change agenda provides a site in which to study how institutional logics are played out across multiple, yet embedded levels within society through institutional forums in which change takes place. Secondly, the paper specifically examines how institutional logics provide society with organising principles –material practices and symbolic constructions– which enable and constrain their actions and help define their motives and identity. Based on this model, we develop a series of propositions of the conditions required for the successful introduction of climate change initiatives. The paper proceeds as follows. We present a review of literature related to institutional logics and develop a generic model of the process of the operation of institutional logics. We then consider how this is applied to key initiatives related to climate change. Finally, we develop a series of propositions which might guide insights into the successful implementation of climate change practices.

Risks of Carbon Fraud

Carbon credit markets are in the early stages of development and media headlines such as these illustrate emerging levels of concern and foreboding over the potential for fraudulent crime within these markets. Australian companies are continuing to venture into the largely unregulated voluntary carbon credit market to offset their emissions and / or give their customers the opportunity to be ‘carbon neutral’. Accordingly, the voluntary market has seen a proliferation of carbon brokers that offer tailored offset carbon products according to need and taste. With the instigation of the Australian compliance market and with pressure increasing for political responses to combat climate change, we would expect Australian companies to experience greater exposure to carbon products in both compliance and voluntary markets. This paper examines the risks of carbon fraud in these markets by reviewing cases of actual fraud and analysing and identifying contexts where risks of carbon fraud are most likely.

Prices versus quantities versus bankable quantities

Quantity-based regulation with banking allows regulated firms to shift obligations across time in response to periods of unexpectedly high or low marginal costs. Despite its wide prevalence in existing and proposed emission trading programs, banking has received limited attention in past welfare analyses of policy choice under uncertainty. We address this gap with a model of banking behavior that captures two key constraints: uncertainty about the future from the firm's perspective and a limit on negative bank values (e.g. borrowing). We show conditions where banking provisions reduce price volatility and lower expected costs compared to quantity policies without banking. For plausible parameter values related to U.S. climate change policy, we find that bankable quantities produce behavior quite similar to price policies for about two decades and, during this period, improve welfare by about a $1 billion per year over fixed quantities. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

Abatement and Allocation in the Pilot Phase of the EU ETS

We use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and over-allocation that took place across European countries during the pilot phase (2005–2007) of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Using a dynamic panel data model, we estimate the counter factual (business-as-usual) emissions scenario for EU member states. Comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions, we find that both over-allocation and abatement occurred, along with under-allocation and emissions inflation. Over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over-allocation of approximately 280 million EUAs and total abatement of 247 Mt CO2. However, we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 73 Mt CO2 also occurred, possibly due to uncertainty about future policy design features.