Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Employee referrals and the inter-industry wage structure

This paper investigates the role of employee referrals in the labor market.Using an original data set, I find that industries that pay wage premia andhave characteristics associated with high-wage sectors rely mainly on employeereferrals to fill jobs. Moreover, unemployment rates are higher in industries which use employee referrals more extensively. This paper develops an equilibrium matching model which can explain these empirical regularities. Inthis model, the matching process sorts heterogeneous firms and workers into two distinct groups: referrals match "good" jobs to "good" workers, while formalmethods (e.g., newspaper ads and employment agencies) match less-attractive jobs to disadvantaged workers. Thus, well-connected workers who learn quickly aboutjob opportunities use referrals to jump job queues, while those who are less well placed in the labor market search for jobs through formal methods. The split of firms and workers between referrals and formal search is, however, not necessarily efficient. Congestion externalities in referral search imply that unemployment would be closer to the optimal rate if firms and workers 'at themargin' searched formally.

Is the wage curve formal or informal? Evidence for Colombia

Using microdata from the 2002-2006 Colombian Continuous Household Survey, we find an elasticity of individual wages to local unemployment rates of -0.07. However, the elasticity for informal workers is significantly higher, a result which is consistent with efficiency wage theoretical models and relevant for regional labour markets analysis in developing countries.

Is the wage curve formal or informal? Evidence for Colombia

The objective of this paper is to analyse the existente or not of a wage curve in Colombia, paying special attention to the differences between formal and informal workers, an issue that has been systematically ignored in the wage curve literature. The obtained results using microdata from the Colombian Continuous Household Survey (CHS) between 2002 and 2006 show the existence of a wage curve with a negative slope for the Colombian economy. Using information on metropolitan areas, the estimates of the elasticity of individual wages to local unemployment rates was -0.07, a value that is very close to those obtained for other countries. However, the disaggregation of statistical information for formal and informal workers has shown significant differences among both groups of workers. In particular, for the less protected groups of the labour market, informal workers (both men and women), a high negatively sloped wage curve was found. This result is consistent with the conclusions from efficiency wage theoretical models and should be taken into account when analysing the functioning of regional labour markets in developing countries.

The firm size wage premium : a quantile analysis

Empirical evidence shows that larger firms pay higher wages than smaller ones. This wage premium is called the firm size wage effect. The firm size effect on wages may be attributed to many factors, as differentials on productivity, efficiency wage, to prevent union formation, or rent sharing. The present study uses quantile regression to investigate the finn size wage effect. By offering insight into who benefits from the wage premi um, quantile regression helps eliminate and refine possible explanations. Estimated results are consistent with the hypothesis that the higher wages paid by large firms can be explained by the difference in monitoring costs that large firms face. Results also suggest that more highly skilled workers are more often found at larger firms .

Are Shirking and Leisure Substitutable? An Empirical Test of Efficiency Wages Based on Urban Economic Theory

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade-off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the Public Use Microdata sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The empirical results suggest that efficiency wages operate primarily for blue collar workers, i.e. workers who tend to be in occupations that face higher levels of supervision. For this subset of workers, longer commutes imply higher levels of unemployment and higher wages, which are both consistent with shirking and leisure being substitutable.

Slowing Down

We extend the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz to account for the observation that workers’ effort has a tendency to fall when they approach the end of their employment contract. In particular, we find that the efficiency wage increases when the end of term approaches for a given rate of unemployment. We draw implications for the behavior of workers who are approaching retirement, temporary employment contracts, and the advance notice of impending job loss.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Regional Labor Market Disparities

Regionale Arbeitsmärkte unterscheiden sich erheblich hinsichtlich wesentlicher Kennzahlen wie der Arbeitslosenquote, des Lohnniveaus oder der Beschäftigungsentwicklung. Wegen ihrer Persistenz sind diese Unterschiede von hoher Relevanz für die Politik. Die wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Literatur liefert bereits theoretische Modelle für die Analyse regionaler Arbeitsmärkte. In der Regel sind diese Modelle aber nicht dazu geeignet, regionale Arbeitsmarktunterschiede endogen zu erklären. Das bedeutet, dass sich die Unterschiede regionaler Arbeitsmärkte in der Regel nicht aus den Modellzusammenhängen selbst ergeben, sondern „von außen“ eingebracht werden müssen. Die empirische Literatur liefert Hinweise, dass die Unterschiede zwischen regionalen Arbeitsmärkten auf die Höhe der regionalen Arbeitsnachfrage zurückzuführen sind. Die Arbeitsnachfrage wiederum leitet sich aus den Gütermärkten ab: Es hängt von der Entwicklung der regionalen Gütermärkte ab, wie viele Arbeitskräfte benötigt werden. Daraus folgt, dass die Ursachen für Unterschiede regionaler Arbeitsmärkte in den Unterschieden zwischen den regionalen Gütermärkten zu suchen sind. Letztere werden durch die Literatur zur Neuen Ökonomischen Geographie (NÖG) untersucht. Die Literatur zur NÖG erklärt Unterschiede regionaler Gütermärkte, indem sie zentripetale und zentrifugale Kräfte gegenüberstellt. Zentripetale Kräfte sind solche, welche hin zur Agglomeration ökonomischer Aktivität wirken. Im Zentrum dieser Diskussion steht vor allem das Marktpotenzial: Unternehmen siedeln sich bevorzugt an solchen Standorten an, welche nahe an großen Märkten liegen. Erwerbspersonen wiederum bevorzugen solche Regionen, welche ihnen entsprechende Erwerbsaussichten bieten. Beides zusammen bildet einen sich selbst verstärkenden Prozess, der zur Agglomeration ökonomischer Aktivität führt. Dem stehen jedoch zentrifugale Kräfte gegenüber, welche eine gleichmäßigere Verteilung ökonomischer Aktivität bewirken. Diese entstehen beispielsweise durch immobile Produktionsfaktoren oder Ballungskosten wie etwa Umweltverschmutzung, Staus oder hohe Mietpreise. Sind die zentripetalen Kräfte hinreichend stark, so bilden sich Zentren heraus, in denen sich die ökonomische Aktivität konzentriert, während die Peripherie ausdünnt. In welchem Ausmaß dies geschieht, hängt von dem Verhältnis beider Kräfte ab. Üblicherweise konzentriert sich die Literatur zur NÖG auf Unterschiede zwischen regionalen Gütermärkten und geht von der Annahme perfekter Arbeitsmärkte ohne Arbeitslosigkeit aus. Die Entstehung und Persistenz regionaler Arbeitsmarktunterschiede kann die NÖG daher üblicherweise nicht erklären. An dieser Stelle setzt die Dissertation an. Sie erweitert die NÖG um Friktionen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, um die Entstehung und Persistenz regionaler Arbeitsmarktunterschiede zu erklären. Sie greift dazu auf eine empirische Regelmäßigkeit zurück: Zahlreiche Studien belegen einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Lohn und Arbeitslosigkeit. In Regionen, in denen die Arbeitslosigkeit hoch ist, ist das Lohnniveau gering und umgekehrt. Dieser Zusammenhang wird als Lohnkurve bezeichnet. Auf regionaler Ebene lässt sich die Lohnkurve mithilfe der Effizienzlohntheorie erklären, die als theoretische Grundlage in der Dissertation Anwendung findet. Konzentriert sich nun die ökonomische Aktivität aufgrund der zentripetalen Kräfte in einer Region, so ist in diesem Zentrum die Arbeitsnachfrage höher. Damit befindet sich das Zentrum auf einer günstigen Position der Lohnkurve mit geringer Arbeitslosigkeit und hohem Lohnniveau. Umgekehrt findet sich die Peripherie auf einer ungünstigen Position mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit und geringem Lohnniveau wieder. Allerdings kann sich die Lohnkurve in Abhängigkeit des Agglomerationsgrades verschieben. Das komplexe Zusammenspiel der endogenen Agglomeration mit den Arbeitsmarktfriktionen kann dann unterschiedliche Muster regionaler Arbeitsmarktdisparitäten hervorrufen. Die Dissertation zeigt auf, wie im Zusammenspiel der NÖG mit Effizienzlöhnen regionale Arbeitsmarktdisparitäten hervorgerufen werden. Es werden theoretische Modelle formuliert, die diese Interaktionen erklären und welche die bestehende Literatur durch spezifische Beiträge erweitern. Darüber hinaus werden die zentralen Argumente der Theorie einem empirischen Test unterworfen. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass das zentrale Argument – der positive Effekt des Marktpotentials auf die Arbeitsnachfrage – relevant ist. Außerdem werden Politikimplikationen abgeleitet und der weitere Forschungsbedarf aufgezeigt.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.

Three applications of the marginal cost of public funds concept

This paper illustrates the use of the marginal cost of public funds concept in three contexts. First, we extend Parry’s (2003) analysis of the efficiency effects excise taxes in the U.K., primarily by incorporating the distortion caused by imperfect competition in the cigarette market and distinguishing between the MCFs for per unit and ad valorem taxes on cigarettes. Our computations show, contrary to the standard result in the literature, that the per unit tax on cigarettes has a slightly lower MCF than the ad valorem tax on cigarettes. Second, we calculate the MCF for a payroll tax in a labour market with involuntary unemployment, using the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model as our framework. Our computations, based on Canadian labour market data, indicate that incorporating the distortion caused by involuntary unemployment raises the MCF by 25 to 50 percent. Third, we derive expressions for the distributionally-weighted MCFs for the exemption level and the marginal tax rate for a “flat tax”, such as the one that has been adopted by the province of Alberta. This allows us to develop a restricted, but tractable, version of the optimal income tax problem. Computations indicate that the optimal marginal tax rate may be quite high, even with relatively modest pro-poor distributional preferences.

Shirking, Commuting and Labor Market Outcomes

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade-off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the metropolitan sample of the American Housing Survey. No evidence is found to suggest a consistent impact of efficiency wages on the spatial pattern of unemployment or earnings.