Modern Judicial Reform in El Salvador and Brazil

A comparative assessment of the successes and failures of the judicial reform efforts of El Salvador and Brazil in the 1980’s produces striking results. The reforms varied greatly in scope and were conducted in very different socio-political and economic backgrounds. While El Salvador’s reforms seemed narrow and ill-planned, on paper it appeared that Brazil’s broad reforms would be a successful model for any country with a fledgling democracy. Brazil’s reforms were an exercise in constitutionalism, implementing genuine separation of powers and receiving legislative and executive support. I was very surprised that these different approaches produced strikingly similar negative effects on the people’s assessment of the judiciary. From this outcome I concluded that while judicial reform of a corrupt or inefficient judiciary is an important step in ensuring the rule of law in society, it can not be the vehicle through which democratic reform is implemented. Quite to the contrary, for successful judicial reform to take place there must be considerable penetration of the law in society through enforcement of unbiased legislation, consistency in the laws and their enforcement, and sufficient time for the reform to have an effect on society.

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

Communication and Political Crisis: Media, Politics and Governance in a Globalized Public Sphere

Communication and Political Crisis explores the role of the global media in a period of intensifying geopolitical conflict. Through case studies drawn from domestic and international political crises such as the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, leading media scholar Brian McNair argues that the digitized, globalized public sphere now confronted by all political actors has produced new opportunities for social progress and democratic reform, as well as new channels for state propaganda and terrorist spectaculars such as those performed by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. In this major work, McNair argues that the role of digital communication will be crucial in determining the outcome of pressing global issues such as the future of feminism and gay rights, freedom of speech and media, and democracy itself.

Death or taxes? The political economy of sanitation expenditure in nineteenth-century Britain

This thesis consists of three papers studying the relationship between democratic reform, expenditure on sanitation public goods and mortality in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. During this period decisions over spending on critical public goods such as water supply and sewer systems were made by locally elected town councils, leading to extensive variation in the level of spending across the country. This dissertation uses new historical data to examine the political factors determining that variation, and the consequences for mortality rates.

The first substantive chapter describes the spread of government sanitation expenditure, and analyzes the factors that determined towns' willingness to invest. The results show the importance of towns' financial constraints, both in terms of the available tax base and access to borrowing, in limiting the level of expenditure. This suggests that greater involvement by Westminster could have been very effective in expediting sanitary investment. There is little evidence, however, that democratic reform was an important driver of greater expenditure.

Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of extending voting rights to the poor on government public goods spending. A simple model predicts that the rich and the poor will desire lower levels of public goods expenditure than the middle class, and so extensions of the right to vote to the poor will be associated with lower spending. This prediction is tested using plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of the franchise. The results strongly support the theoretical prediction: expenditure increased following relatively small extensions of the franchise, but fell once more than approximately 50% of the adult male population held the right to vote.

Chapter 4 tests whether the sanitary expenditure was effective in combating the high mortality rates following the Industrial Revolution. The results show that increases in urban expenditure on sanitation-water supply, sewer systems and streets-was extremely effective in reducing mortality from cholera and diarrhea.

Análisis de la influencia del Modelo Socioeconómico Chaebol en la crisis financiera del sudeste asiático de 1997: Tailandia

A partir del fin de la Guerra de Corea los diferentes gobiernos que tomaron el poder permitieron la consolidación de las grandes empresas Chaebol. El análisis social se basa en rescatar principios del confucianismo que pueden verse representados en el sistema corporativo estudiado, entre ellos la piedad filial, la honestidad, la educación. Al analizar los factores confucianos se logra determinar ciertas dinámicas presentes en las empresas Chaebol que muestran similitud con las causas de la Crisis Financiera del Sudeste asiático en 1997 lo que permite crear una relación entre el modelo y la crisis. La sobreinversión, el sobreendeudamiento, la relación entre el gobierno y los Chaebol son un ejemplo de dinámicas resultantes. Al tener a Tailandia como segundo país de referencia fue necesario buscar la existencia de relaciones entre el sistema económico y social tailandés, además de encontrar dinámicas resultantes del modelo corporativo de Tailandia similares a las coreanas para finalizar relacionándolas con la crisis financiera.

Elementos de la reforma constitucional en Colombia y el nuevo marco institucional

El artículo examina el impacto social y político que tuvo lugar con el cambio constitucional ocurrido en Colombia desde la década de los noventa, y resultante del modelo consagrado en la Constitución Política de 1991.Partiendo de ese proceso, el análisis revisa las principales características de la introducción y posterior coexistencia de dos modelos de Estado antagónicos: el Estado Social de Derecho y el Estado Neoliberal, convergentes en el articulado de la Constitución de 1991. Así mismo, se revisan las innovaciones institucionales que ambos modelos le introducen al régimen político colombiano, especialmente en lo atinente a la administración de justicia, la estructura del poder público y la articulación de la participación como eje de la democracia.Simultáneamente, se estudian los elementos característicos de la coexistencia de estos dos modelos mediante el análisis del comportamiento de actores individuales y colectivos y de los hechos políticos concretos que han configurado dicha relación durante la última década del siglo XX, así como su incidencia en la inestabilidad del régimen político colombiano. Finalmente, se consideran las deficiencias en la cultura política y la constante interferencia de los sectores tradicionales y de los actores armados como rasgo estructural que impide concretar las aspiraciones del proyecto de reforma y progresión democráticas contemplado en la Constitución de 1991.-----From a critical perspective, this essay examines the root socioeconomic and political impact of the constitutional change that occurred in Colombia during the decade of the 90s, and the resultant model consecrated in the Political Constitution of 1991.Taking that process as a starting point, the analysis reviews the principal characteristics of the introduction and subsequent coexistence of two antagonistic models of state: The Social State of Right and the Neoliberal State convergent in the articulation of the Constitution of 1991. Also, the article studies the institutional innovations that both models introduce to the Columbian political regime, especially in regards to the justice administration, the structure of public power and the srticulation of participation as the axis of democracy.At the same time, the article reviews the elements that exemplify the coexistence of these two models, by means of analytical pursuit of the behabior of the individual and collective actors and of the concrete political facts that have formed said relation throughout the last decade of the 20th century, as well as its impact on the instability of the Columbian political regime. Finally, the essay considers the deficiencies in the political culture and the constant interference of the traditional sectors and of the armed actors as a characteristically structural obstacle to the achievement of the aspirations of the great project of democratic reform and progress contemplated in the Constitution of 1991.

Movimento estudantil, gestão democrática e autonomia na Universidade

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

O papel da democracia na construção do Estado Palestino e na resolução do conflito Palestino-Israelense: a oclusão das particularidades

Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais (UNESP - UNICAMP - PUC-SP) - FFC

Conflicting Role Conceptions: In Search of the European Union's Added Value for its Southern Neighbors. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Paper 04/2014

Many scholars have analyzed the role of the European Union (EU) in its southern neighborhood by looking at the EU’s policy documents and strategies. As such, it is often argued that the EU is at best a useful partner in democratic reform and at worst an unsuccessful ‘normative power’. However, very few studies have analyzed the EU’s role from the recipients’ point of view: the southern neighboring countries themselves. This paper adopts an ‘outside-in approach’ and explores what the southern neighborhood countries believe the EU should be or do. On the basis of a set of 15 interviews with diplomats from the region and an analysis of 50 newspaper articles from the region on the EU’s relations with its southern neighborhood, this paper seeks to reveal the EU’s real ’added value’ for its southern Mediterranean partners. To what extent does the EU’s own perceived role in its southern neighborhood match the role conception of those countries? Based on the three case studies of Algeria, Jordan and Egypt, the paper finds that there is a clear divergence in role conceptions between the EU and its southern partners. While the EU sees itself as a ‘force for good’ and promoter of norms and democracy in the southern Mediterranean region, the three countries primarily believe that the EU perceives itself foremost as a provider of security and stability in the region, while they primarily expect it to act as a reliable partner for economic cooperation.

Spotlight-Europe - March 2015: The EU neighbourhood in shambles. Some recommendations for a new European neighbourhood strategy

Executive Summary. An “arc of instability” stretching from the European Union’s (EU) eastern borders down to the Mediterranean basin has undermined its flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This policy was designed to deliver prosperity, stability and democracy to countries surrounding the EU. It has manifestly failed and needs to be radically rethought. Starting with a tabula rasa, the EU should abandon the very concept of a heterogeneous “neighbourhood” in the face of glaring differences among the 16 countries affected, not least because some are uninterested in reform; others may even be failed states. EU member states are themselves pursuing divergent interests and goals. A fundamental review of the ENP should lead to more differentiated, targeted measures to promote “transformational change” within neighbouring states ready to accept it. The EU should offer revised incentives such as participation within the proposed “energy union” or freer trade designed to aid local economic development. It should embrace a wider range of actors, including civil society, promote entrepreneurship and help reform countries’ police and military forces. The review should reassert common EU institutions in negotiating and working with neighbours and give them a central role in preventing and resolving conflicts as well as promoting democratic reform and economic stability. This revised ENP should help underpin the EU’s efforts to forge a genuine Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The EU and Azerbaijan: Game on for a more normative policy? CEPS Policy Brief No. 329, March 2015

The contradictory interests of the EU and Azerbaijan have brought negotiations on their contractual relations to a halt. The EU’s dependence on Azerbaijan’s rich energy resources has weakened the normative dimension of its policy towards Azerbaijan, rendering it incapable of countering rejection of democratic reform by Azerbaijan’s authorities. While the EU’s current approach seems to favour a more pragmatic focus on energy cooperation, this policy brief argues that a combination of normative obligations and pragmatic interests is required − implemented through leverage over Azerbaijan and a better coordination of this policy across the EU member states and institutions.

Reconfiguring the contours of statehood and the rights of the peoples of disappearing states

Many of the elements that have traditionally supported state level normative self-organization, most notably territory, are being actively undermined by rising sea levels, flooding, desertification, amongst other climate change effects. As more and more states come to be redefined as â disappearingâ , that is, states losing their territories to the natural environment through no specific fault of their own, a question arises as to how displaced communities will be assisted in their desire (and right) to continue to practice principles of self-determination and self-government? What is clear is that the international community can no longer continue with the fiction of a unified or unchanging model of the liberal democratic state. Instead, alternative ontological models of sovereign community are required, as is a re-imagining of how statehood might be re-constituted in the future in response to deepening ecological problems. The international community must now begin to address the immanent nature of threats posed to disappearing states and consider how a model of statehood that does not privilege territory as a fixed component of state identity could be operationalized. This paper considers how a democratic reform of statehood might proceed and resettlement agreements for displaced communities determined. The transition to an era of peaceful sovereign relations under deteriorating global climate conditions and growing natural resource scarcity, it argues, will require a significant extension of established traditions of democratic compromise, human rights solidarity and cosmopolitan justice.

A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere in the World? Police Reform, Political Transition and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland

This article provides an overview of the police reform process undertaken in Northern Ireland since 1999 as part of a broader program of conflict resolution. It considers the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Policing (ICP), which proposed a number of changes to policing structures and arrangements in Northern Ireland, and it assesses the degree to which these have been operationalized in the 8 years since the ICP published its report. It suggests that although the police reform process in Northern Ireland has been moderately successful and provides a number of international best practice lessons, the overall pace of change has been hindered by difficulties of implementation and, more fundamentally, by developments in the political sphere and civil society.