Analysis and Assessment of Conclusions in the White Book regarding Threats and Challenges in EU Common Security and Defence Policy

Among the many issues that were raised in the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (WBNSRP), there were also those related to the functioning of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Its importance for the security of Poland was indicated, as well as the need on the part of EU Member States to broaden collaboration in the sphere of security and defence. The key problems occurring in the context of CSDP were also emphasised and their causes indicated. The aim of the article is to present the factors responsible for the weakening of CSDP effectiveness, ones taken into account in the White Book, and subsequently to present a Framework for their analysis in the light of further scholarship.

Castles in the sand: Mali and the demise of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. CEPS Commentary, 28 January 2013

The threat posed by the crisis in Mali is direct, multidimensional and without regard to geographical proximity or historical and colonial heritage, writes Giovanni Faleg. France’s solitary intervention in Mali and the EU’s absence there raise two important questions for the future of the EU’s supposedly ‘Common’ Security and Defence Policy. The first has to do with the crisis itself; its nature and the threat posed by the terrorist groups and militias that are being countered by French armed forces. The second concerns the causes and implications of yet another example of the EU’s inability to take responsibility for security matters in its neighbourhood and beyond.

National Visions of EU Defence Policy - Common Denominators and Misunderstandings. CEPS Paperbacks. December 2013

The premise of this study is simple: before discussing what defence strategy the EU should adopt at Brussels-level, member states should clarify what they expect individually from the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Inspired by the confusion about EU defence policy in most European capitals, this authoritative study inverts the usual analytical approach applied to the debate on European strategy. Rather than initiating the enquiry from the perspective of common interests guiding CSDP, it analyses how seven prominent member states see CSDP as a tool to pursue their strictly national interests. Five researchers immersed themselves in the foreign policy worlds of Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Stockholm and Madrid, looking at CSDP through national lenses and away from the potentially distorting influence of ‘Brussels’ rhetoric.

Sitting on the fence: Swedish defence policy and the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 33, April 2013

Sweden finds itself in the midst of the most heated debates about defence policy and the direction of military reforms since the end of the Cold War, as Stockholm faces the challenge of finding a new military security formula. From the Swedish point of view, the post-Cold War strategic timeout in Europe is coming to an end. The international environment is reverting to a situation in which the use of force among states is no longer an improbable scenario. Stockholm cannot rule out the emergence of crises or conflicts in Northern Europe in the future, which could directly or indirectly affect Sweden. In this context, the transformations of Sweden’s defence policy over the past twenty years have become a problem. Sweden has moved from neutrality, i.e. non-involvement on any side of an armed interstate conflict, to non-alignment, whereby it stays outside military alliances and freely shapes its policies during wartime. It has joined the European Union and co-operates closely with NATO on foreign missions. Its ability to defend its own territory, however, has diminished.

Norway and the Bear. Norwegian defence policy- lessons for the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 38, January 2014

Norway is currently the only Western European state and ‘old’ NATO member that strongly relies on the traditional dimension of NATO's collective defence. It is also the only ally in Western Europe which perceives Russia as a threat to its military security, in the so-called High North. In order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the region, Norway has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Cooperation means improving collaboration with Russia in cross-border relations, in the petroleum sector and in the military sphere. The deterrent measures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collective defence alliance; increasing military cooperation with the United States; building up Norway’s own military capabilities; and developing military cooperation across Northern Europe. The primary objective of Oslo’s defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of crises and conflicts emerging in the High North which could prove too ‘big’ for Norway but too ‘small’ for NATO.

From a European to a common security and defence policy. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2010

The Lisbon Treaty has introduced significant changes in the field of EU security and defence. On the one hand, important institutional reforms, such as the creation of a renewed High Representative, have of course a great impact on this policy field. On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced specific innovations in the security and defence of the European Union. The mutual defence clause and the new mechanisms for flexible cooperation such as the permanent structured cooperation, are only some of the key innovations. Generally, the European Security and Defence Policy receives its own section in the Treaty on European Union and is rebranded as Common Security and Defence Policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty sets the objective for a common policy in this field. However, does this reform really provide for the means for the realization of such a common policy? Furthermore, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text? These are the main questions that the present paper attempts to address through the analysis of the new institutional setting of the post-Lisbon security and defence policy, as well as through the examination of the specific innovations in this area.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

The Governance Gap in European Security and Defence. CEPS Policy Brief No. 310, 19 December 2013

The true causes of the EU’s inertia as a security actor in its neighbourhood and beyond are not a lack of capability or even austerity measures, but the absence of a core group of states committed to driving integration forward, argues Giovanni Faleg. Member states are reluctant to set clear common strategic priorities and struggle to agree on a revision of the institutional rules. Their strategic cultures and interests differ significantly; they hold different visions of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and are unwilling to use the CSDP instruments at their disposal.

State Agent, Identity and the "New World Order" : Reconstructing Polish Defence Identity after the Cold War Era

National identity signifies and makes state s defence- and foreign policy behaviour meaningful. National consciousness is narrated into existence by narratives upon one s own exceptionalism and Otherness of the other nations. While national identity may be understood merely as a self-image of a nation, defence identity refers to the borders of Otherness and issues that have been considered as worth defending for. As national identities and all the world order models are human constructions, they may be changed by the human efforts as well; states and nations may deliberately promote communitarian or even cosmopolitan equality and tolerance without borders of Otherness. The main research question of the thesis is: How does Poland constitute herself as a nation and a state agent in the current world order and to what extent have contextual foreign and defence policy interactions changed the Polish defence identity during the post-Cold War era? The main empirical argument of the thesis is: Poland is a narrated idea of a Christian Catholic nation-state, which the Polish State, the Catholic Church of Poland, the Armed Forces of Poland as well as a majority of the Polish nation share. Polish defence identity has been almost impenetrable to contextual foreign and defence policy interactions during the post-Cold War era. While Christian religious ontology binds corporate Poland together, allowing her to survive any number of military and political catastrophes, it simultaneously brings her closer to the USA, raises tensions in the infidel EU-context, and restrains corporate Poland s pursuit of communitarian, or even cosmopolitan, global equality and tolerance. It is not the case that corporate Poland s foreign and defence policy orientation is instinctively Atlanticist by nature, as has been argued. Rather, it has been the State s rational project to overcome a habituated and reified fear of becoming geopolitically sandwiched between Russian and German Others by leaning on the USA; among the Polish nation, support for the USA has been declining since 2004. It is not corporate Poland either that has turned into a constructive European , as has been argued, but rather the Polish nation that has, at least partly, managed to emancipate itself from its habituation to a betrayal by Europe narrative, since it favours the EU as much as it favours NATO. It seems that in the Polish case a truly common European CFSP vis-à-vis Russia may offer a solution that will emancipate the Polish State from its habituated EU-sceptic role identity and corporate Poland from its narrated borders of Otherness towards Russia and Germany, but even then one cannot be sure whether any other perspective than the Polish one on a common stand towards Russia would satisfy the Poles themselves.

The Art of Adaptation : A study on the Europeanization of Finland's foreign and security policy

This study examines how Finnish foreign and security policy has been influenced by the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy. It points to a growing interplay and misfit between the external expectations originating from the European level and the domestic expectations and traditional ways-of-doing-things. It is concluded that the deepening European integration in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy has played a significant role in a number of transformations in the Finnish policies since 1995. New, more European, meanings have been attached to the key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy. Neutrality and traditional peacekeeping have been replaced by a minimalist reading of military non-alignment and participation in crisis management operations and EU battle groups. Traditional small state identity has been recast more and more as small member stateness . At the same time Finland has entered an era of post-consensus in national foreign and security policy. A key theoretical argument in the background of the study is that collective understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with domestic understandings, cause adaptation pressures on domestic-level processes and may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. This means that Europeanization is principally seen as identity reconstruction. Consequently, the theoretical framework of the study builds on the Europeanization research literature and constructivist IR theory on state identity. Foreign and security policy is defined as the practice in which state identity is reproduced, and the key foreign and security policy concepts are seen as the vehicles of identity production. It is concluded that for Finland, participation in the EU s foreign, security and defence policies represents not only a tool for responding to the changes in the international security environment but also a new means of self-identification. Concerning the Finnish attempts of projecting national interests on the European security policy agenda, it is concluded that they mainly relate to the compatibility of the potential development of EU s defence dimension with the Finnish military non-alignment. Although neutrality was cast aside in the official security policy when Finland joined the EU, the analysis shows that its impact has continued in the domestic political debate and in the mind-set of the decision-makers. The primary research material includes official Finnish foreign and security policy documentation and the related parliamentary debates from 1994 to 2007. This study serves also as a comprehensive empirical overview on Finland s reactions and contributions to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The EU’s comprehensive approach towards security: the Lisbon Treaty and “smart power”. EU Centre Singpore Policy Brief No. 6, May 2013

The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a comprehensive security actor. With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a reaction to the failure of the EU to act during the wars in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU has a wide range of instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management as well as post-crisis intervention at its disposal. Observers typically agree that “hard power” is no longer sufficient to address the complex security challenges of today’s world while the EU, often criticised for only utilising “soft power”, is now able to exercise “smart power”. Through a comprehensive approach, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can now use the various instruments at its disposal, such as diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities in a joined-up manner. This mix of tools and instruments is helping the EU to achieve the aim set out in its European Security Strategy: “a secure Europe in a better world”.