Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Common currency and economic integration in Mercosur

A América Latina tem uma longa história de tentativas de alcançar uma integração regional, embora seu sucesso tenha sido modesto. Este trabalho procura mostrar que isso essencialmente ocorre não tanto pelas práticas protecionistas nos vários países, mas devido à falta de uma moeda comum, ou, pelo menos, de uma taxa de câmbio rigorosamente administrada. Os autores analisaram o critério da área ótima de moeda que mostra ser prudente aumentar a integração econômica antes de tentar implementar a coordenação das taxas de câmbio. Entretanto, nós mostramos que no Mercosul já existem as condições mínimas para começar a trabalhar nessa direção. A diminuição da instabilidade cambial pode encorajar a entrada de investimentos e o comércio nas economias latino-americanas. Os autores também desenvolveram um exercício simplificado para entender como poderia ser viável alcançar estabilidade da taxa de câmbio em nos dois maiores países da região (Brasil e Argentina) e avançar na adoção de uma moeda comum.

Framing Banking Union in the Euro Area: Some empirical evidence. CEPS Working Document No. 389, 3 February 2014

Evidence shows that financial integration in the euro area is retrenching at a quicker pace than outside the union. Home bias persists: Governments compete on funding costs by supporting ‘their’ banks with massive state aids, which distorts the playing field and feeds the risk-aversion loop. This situation intensifies friction in credit markets, thus hampering the transmission of monetary policies and, potentially, economic growth. This paper discusses the theoretical foundations of a banking union in a common currency area and the legal and economic aspects of EU responses. As a result, two remedies are proposed to deal with moral hazard in a common currency area: a common (unlimited) financial backstop to a privately funded recapitalisation/resolution fund and a blanket prohibition on state aids.

Cross-country insurance mechanisms in currency unions. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/04, 27 March 2014

Countries in a monetary union can adjust to shocks either through internal or external mechanisms. We quantitatively assess for the European Union a number of relevant mechanisms suggested by Mundell’s optimal currency area theory, and compare them to the United States. For this purpose, we update a number of empirical analyses in the economic literature that identify (1) the size of asymmetries across countries and (2) the magnitude of insurance mechanisms relative to similar mechanisms and compare results for the European Monetary Union (EMU) with those obtained for the US. To study the level of synchronization between EMU countries we follow Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007). To measure the effect of an employment shock on employment levels, unemployment rates and participation rates we perform an analysis based on Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatas (1995). We measure consumption smoothing through capital markets, fiscal transfers and savings, using the approach by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Afonso and Furceri (2007). To analyze risk sharing through a common safety net for banks we perform a rudimentary simulation analysis. |

Eurokriisi ja euroalueen rakenteelliset ongelmat

Maailmanlaajuinen finanssikriisi on vaikuttanut merkittävällä tavalla euroalueen toimintaan ja tuonut esiin ongelmia sen rakenteessa. Tutkielman tavoitteena oli tunnistaa eurokriisiin johtaneita tekijöitä ja euroalueen keskeisiä rakenteellisia ongelmia. Teoriakehys muodostui optimaalisen valuutta-alueen teoriasta, jota täydennettiin velkaantumiseen, pankkikriiseihin ja vaihtotaseiden epätasapainotiloihin liittyvällä teorialla. Tutkimuksessa hyödynnettiin laaja-alaisesti olemassa olevaa teoreettista ja empiiristä kirjallisuutta sekä eri tietokannoista saatavaa makrodataa. Tulokset kertovat rahoitusmarkkinoiden keskeisestä roolista epätasapainotilojen kehittymisessä sekä rahaunionin puutteellisista mukautumismekanismeista. Institutionaalisen rakenteen osalta euroalueen keskeisiä ongelmia ovat olleet tehokkaan pankkivalvonnan puute sekä viime hetken lainoittajan puuttuminen valtionvelkakirjamarkkinoilla.

Competitividade e restrição externa na Zona do Euro

The recent debt crisis in Greece, Ireland and Portugal has exposed the fragility existing in the Eurozone for promoting development and economic convergence between the countries that have adopted the currency. Way beyond the fear of insolvency, what is observed is a growing disparity of the most-developed countries in comparison to the less-developed ones, with perverse consequences for the last ones. Once the nominal exchange rates are fixed, the divergent movements in relative prices and wages between the countries have led to totally distinct paths for the real exchange rates. Worsening the scenario, one can observe the incompleteness of the political union, the monetarist focus of the ECB and the lack of labor mobility between the countries, what distances from the argument stated by the theory and puts in jeopardize the future of the Monetary Union.

Explaining the Transition Between Exchange Rate Regimes

This paper studies the transition between exchange rate regimes using a Markov chain model with time-varying transition probabilities. The probabilities are parameterized as nonlinear functions of variables suggested by the currency crisis and optimal currency area literature. Results using annual data indicate that inflation, and to a lesser extent, output growth and trade openness help explain the exchange rate regime transition dynamics.

Les répercussions du plan Marshall sur les comportements économiques du Canada durant la période de l'après-guerre

La période de l’après-guerre posa d’importants défis commerciaux à l’économie canadienne. Les années entre 1945 et 1950 furent effectivement marquées par la rupture de son système commercial traditionnel et la recherche d’une stratégie alternative. Le pays dut composer avec un déficit commercial croissant à l’égard des États-Unis, ainsi qu’une chute de ses exportations à destination du Royaume-Uni, ruiné par les années de guerre. Ce déséquilibre commercial qui menaçait d’épuiser les réserves canadiennes de dollars américains reflétait l’écart entre les capacités productives des deux rives de l’Atlantique. Le programme de reconstruction des économies européennes, ou plan Marshall, fut accueilli avec enthousiasme à Ottawa puisqu’il devait non seulement rétablir les marchés du Vieux Continent, mais également faciliter la mise en place d’un réseau multilatéral d’échanges et la libéralisation du commerce international. Les tensions de la guerre froide limitèrent toutefois l’ouverture de ces marchés aux marchandises canadiennes, puisque l’endiguement du communisme commanda une consolidation européenne qui privilégia le démantèlement des entraves aux échanges intra-européens, aux dépens du commerce transatlantique. Les préoccupations de Washington en matière de sécurité collective devaient néanmoins laisser place à une stratégie alternative pour le Canada, en poussant la coopération économique des deux pays, dans le but d’optimiser une production de défense destinée aux pays membres de l’OTAN, dont la demande était soutenue par l’aide Marshall. L’incorporation du Canada dans ce dispositif de défense élargie à la communauté atlantique permit ainsi d’assurer un accès privilégié à ses marchandises sur le marché américain, et par conséquent de progresser vers l’équilibre commercial.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

Regional integration and the issue of choosing an appropriate exchange-rate regime in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Regional integration in Latin America and dynamic gains from macroeconomic cooperation

Includes bibliography

Trade and Business Cycle Correlations in Asia-Pacific

Recent empirical studies challenge the traditional theory of optimum currency areas by arguing that a monetary union enhances trade and business cycle co-movements among its member countries sufficiently as to obviate the need for national monetary policy. This paper examines the empirical relationship between trade and business cycle correlations among thirteen Asia-Pacific countries, paying particular attention to the structural characteristics of their economies and other issues not explored fully in the literature. According to our result, although trade is relevant to the business cycles of individual countries, the main determinant of their international correlations is not the geographical structure of their trade but what they produce and export --more specifically the extent to which their output and exports are concentrated on electronic products.

The fiscal compact - Europe's "hard core" based on German economic conditions. OSW Commentary No. 71, 2012-03-07

On 2 March, the leaders of 25 EU member states signed the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. It will introduce new fiscal constraints and officially vest new competences in the eurozone countries. Thus, their right to coordinate economic policy among them will be sanctioned. So far, the Lisbon Treaty has only provided for organisation of informal Eurogroup meetings, to be attended by representatives of the European Commission. The principles introduced by the compact, if the eurozone countries are really determined to observe its provisions, will create a new way of managing the single currency. Within the next few years, the most indebted countries will have to carry out radical reforms to boost their competitiveness and adjust it to German standards. During this period the Federal Republic of Germany will most probably decide to offer higher loan guarantees to relieve these countries’ budgets. The compact’s political consequences are also of great significance, especially considering how the treaty was finalised. The eurozone states have in fact accepted that the direction for changes will be devised by France and Germany, and the role of European institutions such as the Commission or the Parliament may weaken. From the perspective of eurozone candidate countries, the introduction of the fiscal compact means expanding the scope of conditions they must meet to become members of the single currency area. In the future, a country, in order to adopt the single currency, will have to meet the structural deficit criterion, and also most probably carry out economic reforms such as unifying its fiscal system. These goals will be achieved across the eurozone gradually, in the subsequent stages of the economic governance reform.