On international cost-sharing of pharmaceutical R&D

Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the (fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance or the fund raising costs for most of drug reimbursement. By incorporating these new elements, we aim at providing some building blocks towards an economic theory incorporating Ramsey pricing and insurance coverage. We show how coinsurance affects the optimal prices to pay for the R&D investment. We also show that under certain conditions, there is no strategic incentive by governments to set coinsurance rates in order to shift the financial burden of R&D. This will have important implications to the application of Ramsey pricing principles to pharmaceutical products across countries.

Conflicting claims problem associated with cost sharing of a network

A minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problem analyzes the way to efficiently connect individuals to a source when they are located at different places. Once the efficient tree is obtained, the question on how allocating the total cost among the involved agents defines, in a natural way, a confliicting claims situation. For instance, we may consider the endowment as the total cost of the network, whereas for each individual her claim is the maximum amount she will be allocated, that is, her connection cost to the source. Obviously, we have a confliicting claims problem, so we can apply claims rules in order to obtain an allocation of the total cost. Nevertheless, the allocation obtained by using claims rules might not satisfy some appealing properties (in particular, it does not belong to the core of the associated cooperative game). We will define other natural claims problems that appear if we analyze the maximum and minimum amount that an individual should pay in order to support the minimum cost tree. Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree problem, Claims problem, Core JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Ordinal Cost Sharing.

We ask how the three known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions - the value, the proportional, and the serial mechanisms - should be extended to arbitrary problem. We propose the Ordinality axiom, which requires that cost shares be invariante under all transactions preserving the nature of a cost sharing problem.

An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method

We o¤er an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.

Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new cost-sharing model in Brazil

By the turn of the twenty-first century, UNDP had embraced a new form of funding based on ‘cost-sharing’, with this source accounting for 51 per cent of the organisation’s total expenditure worldwide in 2000. Unlike the traditional donor - recipient relationship so common with development projects, the new cost-sharing modality has created a situation whereby UNDP local offices become ‘subcontractors’ and agencies of the recipient countries become ‘clients’. This paper explores this transition in the context of Brazil, focusing on how the new modality may have compromised UNDP’s ability to promote Sustainable Human Development, as established in its mandate. The great enthusiasm for this modality within the UN system and its potential application to other developing countries increase the importance of a systematic assessment of its impact and developmental consequences.

Cost-sharing of agricultural technology transfer in Nigeria: perceptions of farmers and extension professionals

Cost-sharing, which involves government-farmer partnership in the funding of agricultural extension service, is one of the reforms aimed at achieving sustainable funding for extension systems. This study examined the perceptions of farmers and extension professionals on this reform agenda in Nigeria. The study was carried out in six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. A multi-stage random sampling technique was applied in the selection of respondents. A sample size of 268 farmers and 272 Agricultural Development Programme (ADP) extension professionals participated in the study. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used in analysing the data generated from this research. The results show that majority of farmers (80.6%) and extension professionals (85.7%) had favourable perceptions towards cost-sharing. Furthermore, the overall difference in their perceptions was not significant (t =0.03). The study concludes that the strong favourable perception held by the respondents is a pointer towards acceptance of the reform. It therefore recommends that government, extension administrators and policymakers should design and formulate effective strategies and regulations for the introduction and use of cost-sharing as an alternative approach to financing agricultural technology transfer in Nigeria.

Cost Sharing under Uncertainty: An Algorithmic Approach to Cooperative Interval-Valued Games

Recently, Branzei, Dimitrov, and Tijs (2003) introduced cooperative interval-valued games. Among other insights, the notion of an interval core has been coined and proposed as a solution concept for interval-valued games. In this paper we will present a general mathematical programming algorithm which can be applied to find an element in the interval core. As an example, we discuss lot sizing with uncertain demand to provide an application for interval-valued games and to demonstrate how interval core elements can be computed. Also, we reveal that pitfalls exist if interval core elements are computed in a straightforward manner by considering the interval borders separately.

THE EFFECTS OF COST-SHARING ON USE OF SERVICES AND CONSUMER CHARACTERISTICS IN A STATE'S CRIPPLED CHILDREN'S DIVISION

The present study analyzed some of the effects of imposing a cost-sharing requirement on users of a state's health service program. The study population consisted of people who were in diagnosed medical need and included, but was not limited to, people in financial need.^ The purpose of the study was to determine if the cost-sharing requirement had any detrimental effects on the service population. Changes in the characteristics of service consumers and in utilization patterns were analyzed using time-series techniques and pre-post policy comparisons.^ The study hypotheses stated that the distribution of service provided, diagnoses serviced, and consumer income levels would change following the cost-sharing policy.^ Analysis of data revealed that neither the characteristics of service users (income, race, sex, etc.) nor services provided by the program changed significantly following the policy. The results were explainable in part by the fact that all of the program participants were in diagnosed medical need. Therefore, their use of "discretionary" or "less necessary" services was limited.^ The study's findings supported the work of Joseph Newhouse, Charles Phelps, and others who have contended that necessary service use would not be detrimentally affected by reasonable cost-sharing provisions. These contentions raise the prospect of incorporating cost-sharing into programs such as Medicaid, which, at this writing, do not demand any consumer payment for services.^ The study concluded with a discussion of the cost-containment problem in health services. The efficacy of cost-sharing was considered relative to other financing and reimbursement strategies such as HMO's, self-funding, and reimbursement for less costly services and places of service. ^

Heterogeneous firms and cost sharing in China's marketplaces

This study extends Melitz's model with heterogeneous firms by introducing shared fixed costs in a marketplace. It aims to explain heterogeneous firms' choice between traditional marketplaces and modern distribution channels on the basis of their productivities. The results reveal that the co-existence of a traditional marketplace and modern distribution channels improves social welfare. In addition, a deregulation policy for firm entry outside a marketplace and accumulation of human capital are factors that contribute to improve the social welfare.

Planning and cost sharing policy options for water and related land programs.

Some parts are composed chiefly of statistical tables.

International cost-sharing arrangements.

Mode of access: Internet.