Conceptualising a Chinese corporate governance framework : tensions between tradition, ideologies and modernity

Reflects on the challenges facing China's efforts to reform its corporate governance framework, and the extent to which the modernisation can be reconciled with the country's cultural traditions. Examines the development of China's legal and economic reforms since 1978, the debate which these have generated ad the shortcomings of the current corporate governance regime. Discusses how Confucian principles might be applied to issues of director's duties and corporate governance, and explains the benefits of such an approach.

Directors and officers insurance – Recent critical issues in Australia and New Zealand

Directors and Officers Liability Insurance (“D&O insurance”) has grown and evolved rapidly over the past 80 years to assume an important position in most corporations’ corporate governance and risk management strategies. This article focuses upon certain topical matters of particular concern to directors and officers including the availability of defence costs where a D&O policy is subject to a statutory charge; the commercial desirability of stand-alone “A-side” coverage, being the cover provided directly to directors and officers for loss resulting from claims made against them for wrongful acts; the impact of fraud and/or dishonesty upon D&O cover; and disclosure of the nature and extent of D&O cover to the directors and officers themselves and to third parties – in the latter case such access frequently being necessary to determine the economic viability of pursuing a proposed action against a company and its directors and officers.

Independent Directors and Corporate Governance

The paper examines the reliance placed in the United Kingdom and Australia on the concept of ‘independent directors’ as a mechanism to ensure better (less crisis prone) corporate governance. The article suggests that there is an over emphasis placed on some rather limited psychological evidence that independence in the boardroom produces more critical thinking and informed discussion thus leading to higher quality decision-making. The article offers others evidence, drawn from the material on the psychology of group formation and group discussion, which suggests that this confidence in ‘independence’ is misplaced. The article exposes a misunderstanding between independence as a character trait and independence as a structural concern which goes to the heart of the corporate governance discourse around the benefits of independence.

Corporate governance and the central factors influencing the roles of public and private sector board directors in the United Kingdom

DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS ONLY AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION AT ASTON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SERVICES WITH PRIOR ARRANGEMENT

Corporate governance and compliance : preventative measure or just another fad?

In the wake of recent corporate collapses, 'corporate governance' has received unprecedented levels of attention. It can be narrowly defined as how a company is directed and steered. The responsibility of steering a company is entrusted with the board of directors, who become the focus of governance mechanisms.Yet this is not as straightforward as it appears - Australia has experienced massive shifts in business regulations over the past two decades. One innovation in Australian business regulation is 'enforced self-regulation' which combines the benefits of voluntary self-regulation with the coercive power of the State, implemented via a compliance program. A possible hazard of compliance system is that management might treat this responsibility as a 'box ticking' exercise. Therefore effective governance and compliance entails more than setting up internal and regulatory mechanisms; the willingness of various stakeholders to collaborate is crucial. This suggests that managing relationships between stakeholders of an organization is the key to averting corporate collapses.

Corporate governance, accounting and finance: a review

We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Corporate governance and misappropriation

This study examines the occurrence of misappropriation-type fraud within Australian listed firms and the relation between the incidence of this type of fraud and a firm's governance strength. We measure governance strength using factors relating to traditional corporate governance, such as board composition, CEO duality, and audit committee composition, as well as factors relating to information technology governance. In our study, we use actual dollar amount of fraud reported by listed companies responding to the 2004 KPMG Fraud Survey as one of three different misappropriation measures and publicly available firm-specific data to measure the other variables in the model. Our study found that where the chief executive officer (CEO) also holds the position of chairperson of the board of directors, the likelihood of fraud increases. We also find that the greater the number of independent directors on the audit committee, the lower the level of fraud. Taken together, these results are particularly encouraging as they provide support for regulatory bodies such as the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), which place considerable emphasis on the importance of establishing good corporate governance practices. The study provides empirical evidence that employing good corporate governance reduces the risk of the misappropriation of assets.

Corporate governance as social responsibility : a meta-regulation approach to raise social responsibility of corporate governance in a weak economy

Corporate governance (CG) denotes the rules of business decision-making and directs the internal mechanism of companies to follow the output of the rules. It includes the customs, policies, laws and institutions as a set of processes that affects the way in which a corporation is directed, administered or controlled.