Procedimentos e dinâmicas inerentes ao processo dos concursos públicos e à realização de "empreitadas de obras públicas, em Portugal"

Trabalho de relatório de Estágio de natureza científica para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Civil na Área de Especialização em Edificações

Evaluation of Paver Vibrator Frequency Monitoring and Concrete Consolidation, HR-1068, 1999

Identification of ways to enhance consistency and proper entrained air content in hardened concrete pavement has long been a goal of state highway agencies and the Federal Highway Administration. The work performed in this study was done under FHWA Work Order No: DTFH71-97-PTP-IA-47 and referred to as Project HR-1068 by the Iowa DOT. The results of this study indicate that the monitoring devices do provide both the contractor and contracting authority and are a good way of controlling the consistent rate of vibration to achieve a quality concrete pavement product. The devices allow the contractor to monitor vibrator operation effectively and consistently. The equipment proved to be reliable under all weather and paver operating conditions. This type of equipment adds one more way of improving the consistency and quality of the concrete pavement.

Julkiset hankinnat: Case Helsingin seurakuntayhtymä

Tutkimuksen pääideana on tutkia miten julkisia hankintoja koskeva lainsäädäntö näkyy seurakuntayhtymän hankinnoissa. Julkisia hankintoja tutkitaan lakitekstien ja alan kirjallisuuden pohjalta sekä Helsingin seurakuntayhtymän työntekijän haastattelun pohjalta. Tutkielmassa käydään läpi muun muassa hankintalain mukaiset julkisten hankintojen pääperiaatteet ja hankintamenettelyt. Lisäksi työssä käydään läpi lyhyesti julkisten hankintojen hankintaprosessi. Työn loppuosa käsittelee Helsingin seurakuntayhtymää.

Mathematical relationships between scoring parameters in capped tendering

Mathematical relationships between Scoring Parameters can be used in Economic Scoring Formulas (ESF) in tendering to distribute the score among bidders in the economic part of a proposal. Each contracting authority must set an ESF when publishing tender specifications and the strategy of each bidder will differ depending on the ESF selected and the weight of the overall proposal scoring. This paper introduces the various mathematical relationships and density distributions that describe and inter-relate not only the main Scoring Parameters but the main Forecasting Parameters in any capped tender (those whose price is upper-limited). Forecasting Parameters, as variables that can be known in advance before the deadline of a tender is reached, together with Scoring Parameters constitute the basis of a future Bid Tender Forecasting Model.

On competitive bidding: scoring and position probability graphs

Iso-score curves graph (iSCG) and mathematical relationships between Scoring Parameters (SP) and Forecasting Parameters (FP) can be used in Economic Scoring Formulas (ESF) used in tendering to distribute the score among bidders in the economic part of a proposal. Each contracting authority must set an ESF when publishing tender specifications and the strategy of each bidder will differ depending on the ESF selected and the weight of the overall proposal scoring. The various mathematical relationships and density distributions that describe the main SPs and FPs, and the representation of tendering data by means of iSCGs, enable the generation of two new types of graphs that can be very useful for bidders who want to be more competitive: the scoring and position probability graphs.

Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering

Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph.

Cost efficiency in primary care contracting: A stochastic frontier cost function approach

The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier costfunction and an inefficiency effects model in the analysis of the primaryhealth care services purchased by the public authority and supplied by 180providers in 1996 in Catalonia. The evidence from our sample does not supportthe premise that contracting out has helped improve purchasing costefficiency in primary care. Inefficient purchasing cost was observed in thecomponent of this purchasing cost explicitly included in the contract betweenpurchaser and provider. There are no observable incentives for thecontracted-out primary health care teams to minimise prescription costs, whichare not explicitly included in the present contracting system.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

E-contracting with price configuration for Web services and QoS

The large amount of information in electronic contracts hampers their establishment due to high complexity. An approach inspired in Software Product Line (PL) and based on feature modelling was proposed to make this process more systematic through information reuse and structuring. By assessing the feature-based approach in relation to a proposed set of requirements, it was showed that the approach does not allow the price of services and of Quality of Services (QoS) attributes to be considered in the negotiation and included in the electronic contract. Thus, this paper also presents an extension of such approach in which prices and price types associated to Web services and QoS levels are applied. An extended toolkit prototype is also presented as well as an experiment example of the proposed approach.

Education in Human Rights: Reflections on Power, Violence and Authority in the School

This article explores human rights and education based on an intervention experience conducted in three schools located in Sao Paulo City, which had as its main goal a substantial reduction in violence (2004-2005). The guideline was that education should be considered a basic human right, taking into consideration the power and authority relations that exist within this institution. What are the problems that we face, nowadays, to consider education as a human right, in the difficult Brazilian history? Is it possible to think about some kind of democratic authority within the school, when our vision of authority is linked to despotic leaders, or even when there is no space for any authority? How does this discussion associate with the violence in our daily life in school? These are some of the questions included in the debate proposed by this article.