Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.

Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

We study the decision of two rms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and, if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger, there is a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We nd that a horizontal agreement always arises. The insiders' merger/RJV choice involves a trade-o : While merger o ers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a pro t-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater brand similarity and contract enforceability (\quality") both favour RJV, while greater R&D complementarity favours merger. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

A Logic Framework of Normative-based Contract Management

We explore of the feasibility of the computationally oriented institutional agency framework proposed by Governatori and Rotolo testing it against an industrial strength scenario. In particular we show how to encode in defeasible logic the dispute resolution policy described in Article 67 of FIDIC.

It's all in the contract: Rethinking feminist critiques of contract

This article examines contemporary feminist arguments about contract. It does not aim to advance new arguments for or against contract but to call into question the dominant feminist position which is that contract has to be cast aside and/or that alternative approaches to contract have to be developed in order to advance the position of women. In a reworking of Elizabeth Kingdom's anti-essentialist approach to rights, Sullivan argues that a feminist but non-essentialist approach to contract is both possible and desirable. Sullivan explores a number of concrete situations in the Australian context where contract approaches have been deployed in law and public policy and demonstrates that contract may be detrimental or advantageous to the position of women. Sullivan argues, therefore, for a strategic and critical feminist approach to the utilisation of the language and practice of contract.

An integrated system to support electricity tariff contract definition

This paper presents an integrated system that helps both retail companies and electricity consumers on the definition of the best retail contracts and tariffs. This integrated system is composed by a Decision Support System (DSS) based on a Consumer Characterization Framework (CCF). The CCF is based on data mining techniques, applied to obtain useful knowledge about electricity consumers from large amounts of consumption data. This knowledge is acquired following an innovative and systematic approach able to identify different consumers’ classes, represented by a load profile, and its characterization using decision trees. The framework generates inputs to use in the knowledge base and in the database of the DSS. The rule sets derived from the decision trees are integrated in the knowledge base of the DSS. The load profiles together with the information about contracts and electricity prices form the database of the DSS. This DSS is able to perform the classification of different consumers, present its load profile and test different electricity tariffs and contracts. The final outputs of the DSS are a comparative economic analysis between different contracts and advice about the most economic contract to each consumer class. The presentation of the DSS is completed with an application example using a real data base of consumers from the Portuguese distribution company.

No right to perform a contract?

Thesis submitted in Trinity Term 2001 for the degree of Master of Philosophy, Worcester College, Oxford

Contract law

Livro editado para celebrar dos 10 anos da Faculdade de Direito da UNL

Contract-program evaluation: Impact of the DRG classification system on hospitals' outputs

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Psychological contract in non-governmental organizations

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics