A Consumer Surplus Estimate of Peace & Love festival in Borlänge : A Travel Cost Approach

This thesis uses zonal travel cost method (ZTCM) to estimate consumer surplus of Peace & Love festival in Borlänge, Sweden. The study defines counties as zones of origin of the visitors. Visiting rates from each zone are estimated based on survey data. The study is novel due to the fact that mostly TCM has been applied in the environmental and recreational sector, not for short term events, like P&L festival. The analysis shows that travel cost has a significantly negative effect on visiting rate as expected. Even though income has previously shown to be significant in similar studies, it turns out to be insignificant in this study. A point estimate for the total consumer surplus of P&L festival is 35.6 million Swedish kronor. However, this point estimate is associated with high uncertainty since a 95 % confidence interval for it is (17.9, 53.2). It is also important to note that the estimated value only represents one part of the total economic value, the other values of the festival's totaleconomic value have not been estimated in this thesis.

Mobile termination, network externalities, and consumer expectations

We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities. Externalities arise when firms discriminate between on- and off-net calls or when subscription demand is elastic. This literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases in termination charge in a neighborhood of termination cost. This creates a puzzle since in reality we see regulators worldwide pushing termination rates down while being opposed by network operators. We show that this puzzle is resolved when consumers' expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium (as defined by Katz and Shapiro, AER 1985), instead of being rationally responsive to non-equilibrium prices, as assumed until now.

Platform pricing and consumer foresight: The case of airports

Airports have become platforms that derive revenues from both aeronautical and commercial activities. The demand for these services is characterized by a one-way complementarity in that only air travelers can purchase retail goods at the airport terminals. We analyze a model of optimal airport behavior in which this one-way complementarity is subject to consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate in full the ex post retail surplus when purchasing a flight ticket. An airport sets landing fees, and, in addition, also chooses the retail market structure by selecting the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions’ revenues, from which it obtains the largest share of profits. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s choices: the optimal airport policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market, where consumers enjoy a large surplus. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, the airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight. Keywords: two-sided markets, platform pricing, one-way demand complementarity, consumer foresight. JEL classification: L1, L2, L93.

Energy efficiency standard and labeling program and consumer welfare : a case of the air conditioner market in China

Improving energy efficiency is an unarguable emergent issue in developing economies and an energy efficiency standard and labeling program is an ideal mechanism to achieve this target. However, there is concern regarding whether the consumers will choose the highly energy efficient appliances because of its high price in consequence of the high cost. This paper estimates how the consumer responds to introduction of the energy efficiency standard and labeling program in China. To quantify evaluation by consumers, we estimated their consumer surplus and the benefits of products based on the estimated parameters of demand function. We found the following points. First, evaluation of energy efficiency labeling by the consumer is not monotonically correlated with the number of grades. The highest efficiency label (Label 1) is not evaluated to be no less higher than labels 2 and 3, and is sometimes lower than the least energy efficient label (Label UI). This goes against the design of policy intervention. Second, several governmental policies affects in mixed directions: the subsidies for energy saving policies to the highest degree of the labels contribute to expanding consumer welfare as the program was designed. However, the replacement for new appliances policies decreased the welfare.

A actividade de observação turística de cetáceos no arquipélago dos Açores : contribuição para o seu desenvolvimento sustentável

Dissertação de Mestrado em Gestão e Conservação da Natureza.

Environmental and international tariffs in a mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets, in which the public firm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and its profit. We also analyse the effects of privatization. The model has two stages. In the first stage, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Per-unit royalty and fixed-fee licensing in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In the present paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results.

The ambivalence of two-part tariffs for bottleneck access

Two-part tariffs, when used at the retail level, increase efficiency by lowering the price of marginal units. The same potential for higher efficiency exists for two-part tariffs at wholesale level for a given market structure, but the fixed part of the wholesale tariff can negatively affect the latter. In a simulated competition model of next-generation telecommunications access networks that has been calibrated with engineering cost data, we show that the latter effects strongly outweigh the former. That is, substituting a cost-based linear wholesale access tariff with revenue-equivalent two-part tariffs reduces the number of access seekers and therefore leads to higher prices and lower welfare and consumer surplus.

Welfare analysis of regulating mobile termination rates in the UK with an application to the Orange/T-Mobile merger

We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; network-based price discrimination; and call externalities. Our results show that reducing mobile termination rates broadly in line with the recent European Commission Recommendation to either pure long-run incremental cost ; reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks; or Bill & Keep (i.e. zero termination rates), increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networks profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities, social welfare may increase by as much as £ 990 million to £ 4.5 billion per year, with Bill & Keep leading to the highest increase in welfare. We also apply the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and T-Mobile under different scenarios concerning MTRs, and predict that consumer surplus decreases strongly.

Evaluation of the welfare impact of regulating mobile termination rates in Portugal

Following the European Commission’s 2009 Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, the Portuguese regulatory authority (ANACOM) decided to reduce termination prices in mobile networks to their long-run incremental cost (LRIC). Nevertheless, no serious quantitative assessment of the potential effects of this decision was carried out. In this paper, we adapt and calibrate the Harbord and Hoernig (2014) model of the UK mobile telephony market to the Portuguese reality, and simulate the likely impact on consumer surplus, profits and welfare of four different regulatory approaches: pure LRIC, reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks, “bill & keep”, and asymmetric termination rates. Our results show that reducing MTRs does increase social welfare, profits and consumer surplus in the fixed market, but mobile subscribers are seriously harmed by this decision.

Endogenous integration and welfare in complementary goods markets

This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products. Integration entails bundling pricing. We find out that integration is privately profitable for a high enough degree of product differentiation, that profits of the non-integrated firms decrease, and that consumer surplus need not necessarily increase when firms integrate despite the fact that prices diminish. Thus, integration of a system is welfare-improving for a high enough degree of product differentiation combined with a minimum demand advantage relative to the competing system. Overall, and from a number of extensions undertaken, we conclude that bundling need not be anti-competitive and that integration should be permitted only under some circumstances.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Is bundling anticompetitive?

I analyze the implications of bundling on price competition in a market for complementary products. Using a model of imperfect competition with product differentiation, I identify the incentives to bundle for two types of demand functions and study how they change with the size of the bundle. With an inelastic demand, bundling creates an advantage over uncoordinated rivals who cannot improve by bundling. I show that this no longer holds with an elastic demand. The incentives to bundle are stronger and the market outcome is symmetric bundling, the most competitive one. Profits are lowest and consumer surplus is maximized.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Entry and market selection of firms: a laboratory study

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.