Designing competitive international compensation programs

Over the past 25 years, expatriate managers have voiced increased disenchantment with their compensation packages whíle abroad. This paper takes a prescriptive approach, outlíning severa I elements of a successful human resources strategy and stressing key ingredients of effective international compensation programs. Particular ettention is given to the adherence of cultural values and distrlbutive justice when working across nations and cultures.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

Executive compensation and the performance of the firm

A sample of large industrial corporations is examined to determine whether there is a relationship between the levels of compensation received by the senior executives of those firms and the firms' economic performances. We find consistent evidence of such a relationship, with differences across firms in the total compensation of their three highest-paid officers being positively related to differences in both the common stock returns and operating profitability of the firms. The implication is that compensation packages are designed to reduce agency costs.

Management Compensation as a Value-Added Competitive Method for Casual Theme Restaurants

The primary purpose of this study is to propose that the management compensation package at Outback Steakhouse is a value-adding competitive method. Specifically the research focused on a survey of general manager's altitudes in regards to their intentions to seek out new employment and the effect of the compensation plan provided by Outback Steakhouse on the managers' intentions. This research will provide insight into the use of compensation packages and programs as proactive, value-adding competitive methods in retaining good quality managers it casual theme restaurants.

Can Compensation Committees Effectively Mitigate the CEO Horizon Problem? The Role of Co-opted Directors

Extant research finds inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem. One possibility is that compensation committees design CEO compensation in a way that discourages retiring CEOs from opportunistic earnings management and R&D reduction. However, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may not be as effective as those with fewer co-opted directors in mitigating the CEO horizon problem, because directors co-opted by the CEO tend to bias their decisions in favor of the CEO. I find that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are associated with higher CEO compensation packages. I document R&D reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors, and find that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged by compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors when deciding CEO compensation. I also examine the effect of boards of directors and compensation committee characteristics on CEO compensation and on mitigating the CEO horizon problem. I find that CEO compensation positively associates with CEO power, director independence, and the percentage of busy directors, and negatively associates with board of directors and committee size and director ownership. Moreover, I find that retiring CEOs are more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when CEOs have more power, and director tenure is longer; retiring CEOs in firms with large boards of directors and compensation committees are less likely to manage accruals.

Taming SIFIs

We model a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) that is too big(or too interconnected) to fail. Without credible regulation and strong supervision,the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessiverisk. We propose a solution to this problem, showing how insurance againstsystemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard. The solutioninvolves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and moreimportantly establishing a Systemic Risk Authority endowed with special resolutionpowers, including the control of bankers' compensation packages during crisisperiods.

Compensating wage differentials and voluntary job changes: Evidence from West Germany

Does the labor market place wage premia on jobs that involve physical strain,job, insecurity or bad regulation of hours? This paper derives bounds on themonetary returns to these job disamenities in the West German labor market.We show that in a market with dispersion in both job characteristics andwages, the average wage change of workers who switch jobs voluntarily and optfor consuming more (less) disamenities,provides an upper (lower) bound on themarket return to the disamenity. Using longitudinal information from workersin the German Socio Economic Panel, we estimate an upper bound of 5% and alower bound of 3.5% for the market return to work strain in a job.

On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract has on the executive s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Toimitusjohtajien palkitsemisjärjestelmät metsäteollisuusyhtiöissä - empiirinen tutkimus

Tutkielman ensisijaisena tavoitteena oli selvittää miten pörssinoteerattujen metsäteollisuuden alan yhtiöiden toimitusjohtajien palkitsemisjärjestelmät eroavat toisistaan. Tutkimuksessa keskityttiin erityisesti siihen, miten corporate governancen mukainen johtamisen valvonta vaikuttaa toimitusjohtajien palkitsemismenetelmiin. Tutkimuksen aineisto kerättiin internetistä. Corporate governancen näkökulmasta riittävän informaation ja läpinäkyvyyden suositukset nousivat keskeiselle sijalle aineistoa hankittaessa. Tutkimusmenetelminä oli vertaileva ja selittävä tutkimus. Tutkimustulosten mukaan toimitusjohtajien palkitsemisjärjestelmät voidaan jakaa karkeasti kahteen luokkaan: yhdysvaltalaisiin toimitusjohtajiin ja muiden maiden toimitusjohtajiin. Yhdysvalloissa osakkeiden, osakeoptioiden, eläkejärjestelyiden ja muiden pitkän tähtäimen kannustinten osuus on huomattavasti merkittävämpi kuin muissa maissa ja toimitusjohtajien palkan määrä huomattavasti korkeampi kuin muissa maissa. Tutkimustulosten mukaan eri maiden erilaiset corporate governance – järjestelmät synnyttävät näitä eroja, sillä erilaisissa valvontamalleissa

Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

Employment, growth and reforms in Jamaica

Includes bibliography

The structure of middle management remuneration packages: An application to Australian mine managers

This paper investigates the composition of remuneration packages for middle managers and relates the structure of remuneration contracts to firm-specific attributes. A statutorily defined position in a single industry is studied as an example of middle management. This allows us to control for differences in task complexity across managers and industry-induced factors that could determine differences in remuneration contracts. Higher-risk firms are expected to pay their mine managers a greater proportion of variable salaries and market and/or accounting-based compensation than low-risk firms. Results indicate that high-risk firms pay a higher proportion of variable salaries and more compensation based on market and/or accounting performance.