China's "Responsible Protection" concept : re-interpreting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and military intervention for humanitarian purposes

This article assesses the extent to which the recently formulated Chinese concept of “Responsible Protection” (RP) offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P’s third pillar following the controversy over military intervention in Libya. While RP draws heavily on previous proposals such as the original 2001 ICISS report and Brazil’s “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP), by amalgamating and re-packaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the initiative represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, some aspects of RP are framed too narrowly to provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military intervention for civilian protection purposes, and should therefore be clarified and refined. Nevertheless, the Chinese proposal remains significant because it offers important insights into Beijing’s current stance on R2P. More broadly, China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP initiatives illustrate the growing willingness of rising, non-Western powers to assert their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global governance.

Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty

The responsibility to protect ('R2P') principle articulates the obligations of the international community to prevent conflict occurring, to intervene in conflicts, and to assist in rebuilding after conflicts. The doctrine is about protecting civilians in armed conflicts from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This book examines interventions in East Timor, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Kosovo. The chapters explore and question UN debates with respect to the doctrine both before and after its adoption in 2005; contrasting state attitudes to international military intervention; and what takes place after intervention. It also discusses the ability of the Security Council to access reliable information and credible and transparent processes to enable it to make a determination on the occurrence of atrocities in a Member State. Questioning whether there is a need to find a closer operational link between the responsibilities to prevent and react and a normative link between R2P and principles of international law, the contributions examine the effectiveness of the framework of R2P for international decision-making in response to mass atrocity crimes and ask how an international system to deal with threats and mass atrocities can be developed in the absence of a central authority. This book will be valuable to those interested in international law, human rights, and security, peace and conflict studies

China and the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) : the implications of the Libyan intervention

The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China's traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China‟s relationship with R2P over the past ten years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China‟s decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of pragmatic considerations, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO's military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P‟s legitimacy, which has contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria and Yemen. In the short term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council‟s ability to respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.

China and the "Responsibility to Protect" : the implications of the Libyan intervention

The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China’s traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China’s relationship with R2P over the past ten years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China’s decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of political and factual circumstances, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO’s military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P’s legitimacy, which have contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria. In the short term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council’s ability to respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.

The BRICS and the responsibility to protect : lessons from the Libyan and Syrian crises

The emerging ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) principle presents a significant challenge to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) states’ traditional emphasis on a strict Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Despite formally endorsing R2P at the 2005 World Summit, each of the BRICS has, to varying degrees, retained misgivings about coercive measures under the doctrine’s third pillar. This paper examines how these rising powers engaged with R2P during the 2011–2012 Libyan and Syrian civilian protection crises. The central finding is that although all five states expressed similar concerns over NATO’s military campaign in Libya, they have been unable to maintain a common BRICS position on R2P in Syria. Instead, the BRICS have splintered into two sub-groups. The first, consisting of Russia and China, remains steadfastly opposed to any coercive measures against Syria. The second, comprising the democratic IBSA states (India, Brazil and South Africa) has displayed softer, more flexible stances towards proposed civilian protection measures in Syria, although these three states also remain cautious about the implementation of R2P’s coercive dimension. This paper identifies a number of factors which help to explain this split, arguing that the failure to maintain a cohesive BRICS position on R2P is unsurprising given the many internal differences and diverging national interests between the BRICS members. Overall, the BRICS’ ongoing resistance to intervention is unlikely to disappear quickly, indicating that further attempts to operationalize R2P’s third pillar may prove difficult.

The responsibility to protect and the Arab Spring : Libya as the exception, Syria as the norm?

On March 17 2011 the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 authorising the use of force for civilian protection purposes in Libya.1 This resolution was hailed by many supporters of the responsibility to protect (R2P) as a crucial step towards the consolidation of the concept’s normative standing.2 Gareth Evans described the intervention as ‘a textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly as it was supposed to’.3 For Lloyd Axworthy the Libya episode signalled a move towards a ‘more humane world’.4 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon declared that it ‘affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated by their own government.’5 At first glance, the Security Council’s rapid, decisive response to escalating violence in Libya might well have suggested a new willingness on the part of the international community to take collective action to avert intra-state humanitarian crises. However, a closer examination of the text of resolution 1973 and statements by Security Council member states reveals a less than complete endorsement of R2P. Disagreements between states over the scope of the mandate for the use of force in Libya quickly emerged. Long-standing fears among Russia, China and other non-Western states that R2P could be used as a pretext for regime change returned to the fore as the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s military action were called into question. This post-Libya backlash against R2P has been a central factor in the international community’s subsequent inability to agree on effective civilian protection measures in Syria. Much of the optimism that surrounded R2P in the immediate aftermath of resolution 1973 has given way to a sober realization that achieving international consensus on civilian protection measures will rarely be straightforward.

Capacity-building workshops on the responsibility to protect (R2P) and the protection of civilians (POC) in armed conflict - Summary Report

In June 2011, a research project team from the Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law (IEGL), Queensland University of Technology, the United Nations University, and the Australian Government’s Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (APCMCOE) held three Capacity-Building Workshops (the Workshops) on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Protection of Civilians (POC) in Armed Conflict in Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta. The research project is funded by the Australian Responsibility to Protect Fund, with support from APCMCOE. Developments in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire and the actions of the United Nations Security Council have given new significance to the relationship between R2P and POC, providing impetus to the relevance and application of the POC principle recognised in numerous Security Council resolutions, and the R2P principle, which was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 and, now, by the Security Council. The Workshops considered the relationship between R2P and POC. The project team presented the preliminary findings of their study and sought contributions and feedback from Workshop participants. Prior to the Workshops, members of the project team undertook interviews with UN offices and agencies, international organisations (IOs) and non-government organisations (NGOs) in Geneva and New York as part of the process of mapping the relationship between R2P and POC. Initial findings were considered at an Academic-Practitioner Workshop held at the University of Sydney in November 2010. In addition to an extensive literature review and a series of academic publications, the project team is preparing a practical guidance text (the Guide) on the relationship between R2P and POC to assist the United Nations, governments, regional bodies, IOs and NGOs in considering and applying appropriate protection strategies. It is intended that the Guide be presented to the United Nations Secretariat in New York in early 2012. The primary aim of the Workshops was to test the project’s initial findings among an audience of diplomats, military, police, civilian policy-makers, practitioners, researchers and experts from within the region. Through dialogue and discussion, the project team gathered feedback – comments, questions, critique and suggestions – to help shape the development of practical guidance about when, how and by whom R2P and POC might be implemented.

From The Hague to Geneva: The protection of civilians and refugees in the perspective of legal history, 1899-1951

The presentation proposed here shall focus on international (and as far as possible some cases of national) legal protection of civilians and refugees between the first Hague Convention of 1899 and the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Refugees in 1951. An analysis of international legal texts as well as, if possible, some exemplary national constitutions will form the core of the presentation, which will try to find out, to what extent not only the civilian population remaining close to front-line fighting, but also under occupation was supposed to be protected by legal norms, but also to what extent the issue of forcing civilian to leave their homes became part of the international legal discourse as well as of international legal norms.

The Forest Service and the Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-42 /

"August 1986."

Supreme Emergencies and the protection of non-combatants in war

Is it ever justifiable to target non-combatants deliberately? This article assesses Michael Walzer's claim that the deliberate targeting of non-combatants may be justifiable during 'supreme emergencies', a view that has received some support but that has elicited little debate. It argues that the supreme emergencies exception to the prohibition on targeting non-combatants is problematic for at least four reasons. First, its utilitarianism contradicts Walzer's wider ethics of war based on a conception of human rights. Second, the exception may undermine the principle of non-combatant immunity. Third, it is based on a historical fallacy. Finally, it is predicated on a strategic fallacy-the idea that killing noncombatants can win wars. The case for rejecting the exception, however, has been opposed by those who persuasively argue that it is wrong to tie leaders' hands when they confront supreme emergencies. The final part of the article addresses this question and suggests that the principle of proportionality may give political leaders room for manoeuvre in supreme emergencies without permitting them deliberately to target non-combatants.