Civilianizing Civil Conflict: Civilian Defense Militias and the Logic of Violence in Intra-State Conflict

This article examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. We define civilian defense forces as a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identification. This leads to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase in rebel violence against civilians and overall intensification of conflict. A statistical analysis of government and rebel violence against civilians from 1981 to 2005, and a qualitative assessment of a civilian defense force operating in Iraq from 2005 to 2009, offer strong support for our theoretical claims. These findings provide further insight into pro-government militias and their effects on violence. They also have wider ethical implications for the use of civilian collaborators during civil war.

The environmental impact of civil conflict : the deforestation effect of paramilitary expansion in Colombia

Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urab´a, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation.

Beyond divide and rule : weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.

Civil conflict and voting behavior : evidence from Colombia

¿Cuáles son los efectos de la guerra sobre el comportamiento político? Colombia es un caso interesante en el que el conflicto y las elecciones coexisten y los grupos armados ilegales intencionalmente afectan los resultados electorales. Sin embargo, los grupos usan diferentes estrategias para alterar estos resultados. Este artículo argumenta que los efectos diferenciales de la violencia sobre los resultados electorales son el resultado de estrategias deliberadas de los grupos ilegales, que a su turno, son consecuencia de las condiciones militares que difieren entre ellos. Usando datos panel de las elecciones al Senado de 1994 a 2006 y una aproximación por variables instrumentales para resolver posibles problemas de endogenidad, este artículo muestra que la violencia guerrillera disminuye la participación electoral, mientras que la violencia paramilitar no tiene ningún efecto sobre la participación pero reduce la competencia electoral y beneficia a nuevos partidos no-tradicionales. Esto es consistente con la hipótesis de que la estrategia de la guerrilla es sabotear las elecciones, mientras que los paramiltares establecen alianzas con ciertos candidatos.

Out of the Shadows: A one day investigation of the politics of architecture explored through the lens of post-conflict, Belfast

This booklet covers the itinerary and some of the findings of a day-long visit to Belfast on the 7th November 2014 by Peter Oborn; Vice President International of the Royal Institute of British Architects. His visit was in response to a motion submitted to the RIBA council (19.05.2014) calling for the suspension of the Israeli Association of United Architects from the International Union of Architects. Despite members of council speaking against the motion it was carried; 23 members voting for, 16 against, and 10 abstentions. Subsequently the RIBA came under considerable pressure to consider its position in such critical contexts. This visit to Belfast was part of a wider fact-finding mission and evidence taking. At its heart was the question: 'Is it appropriate for the institute (RIBA) to engage with communities facing civil conflict and/or natural disaster and, if so, how it can do so most effectively.' The visit was facilitated by Ruth Morrow, Professor of Architecture, School of Planning, Architecture & Civil Engineering, Queen's University Belfast, and Martin Hare, Royal Society of Ulster Architects (RSUA) president.

El análisis de las relaciones regionales de Sierra Leona en materia de seguridad bajo el marco de Mano River Union después de la guerra civil, 2002-2007

En 1973 se establece una asociación internacional entre Liberia y Sierra Leona llamada Mano River Union (MRU) con el objetivo de establecer una integración económica subregional, a la cual Guinea se integró en 1980. Tras el final de los conflictos civiles en la región, en el 2004 se lleva a cabo la Inauguración del Foro de Paz de Mano River Union, en el cual se establecieron nuevos parámetros para el funcionamiento del grupo subregional el cual está basado en identificar las amenazas comunes y actuar en conjunto frente a ellas. Dentro de las amenazas que tienen el potencial de debilitar la seguridad de la región y así mismo, debilitar las estructuras estatales, se establecen a los problemas de gobernanza, las amenazas fronterizas y los temas de refugiados como los más importantes a tratar.

Conflict-induced poverty: Evidence from Colombia

En Colombia, la pobreza y el conflicto están estrechamente relacionados. Este estudio usa medidas de disuasión del gobierno como instrumentos de varias variables específicas de conflicto para estimar el impacto del conflicto sobre la pobreza en Colombia. Usando datos del censo a nivel municipal para el año 2005, evalúo el efecto sobre la incidencia urbana y rural del recientemente-desarrollado Índice de Pobreza Multidimensional. Los resultados sugieren que el conflicto aumenta significativamente la pobreza rural. Esto es consistente con el hecho que la mayor parte del conflicto en Colombia ocurre en las áreas rurales. También evalúo el efecto rezagado del conflicto en la pobreza para concluir que éste dura por al menos tres años pero que decae en el tiempo. Finalmente, pruebo que mis resultados son robustos a una batería de especificaciones adicionales, incluyendo una versión modificada de mi variable dependiente y el uso de una base alternativa de conflicto.

Conflict and child labor: evidence from poor households in Colombia

Colombia suffers from one of the longest civil conflicts in the world, which is believed to have had several consequences on the country’s economic and development performance. This study uses measures of central government deterrence effort as instruments of conflict to estimate the impact of conflict on children’s time allocation to two different types of work: housework and work performed outside the household for poor families living in small municipalities in Colombia. I find that conflict significantly increases the amount of time children allocate to work. Both housework, for girls, and work outside the household, for boys, increase with Guerrilla attacks. However, the later effect is the opposite for Paramilitary attacks.