Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

Equilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quantity 1 q of its good; the other firm ( F2 ) observes 1 q and then chooses the quantity 2 q of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopoliesrequire the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision ofinformation chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. Thispaper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relativeto the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policyimplications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes ortoo low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneousduopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on theobservability assumption.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Separating sequential equilibrium in a Bayesian international duopoly

We consider two Cournot firms, one located in the home country and the other in the foreign country, producing substitute goods for consumption in a third country. We suppose that neither the home government nor the foreign firm know the costs of the home firm, while the foreign firm cost is common knowledge. We determine the separating sequential equilibrium outputs.

Bayesian nash equilibrium in ''linear'' cournot models with private information about costs

Calculating explicit closed form solutions of Cournot models where firms have private information about their costs is, in general, very cumbersome. Most authors consider therefore linear demands and constant marginal costs. However, within this framework, the nonnegativity constraint on prices (and quantities) has been ignored or not properly dealt with and the correct calculation of all Bayesian Nash equilibria is more complicated than expected. Moreover, multiple symmetric and interior Bayesianf equilibria may exist for an open set of parameters. The reason for this is that linear demand is not really linear, since there is a kink at zero price: the general ''linear'' inverse demand function is P (Q) = max{a - bQ, 0} rather than P (Q) = a - bQ.

Invariance under type morphisms: the bayesian Nash equilibrium

Ely and Peski (2006) and Friedenberg and Meier (2010) provide examples when changing the type space behind a game, taking a "bigger" type space, induces changes of Bayesian Nash Equilibria, in other words, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is not invariant under type morphisms. In this paper we introduce the notion of strong type morphism. Strong type morphisms are stronger than ordinary and conditional type morphisms (Ely and Peski, 2006), and we show that Bayesian Nash Equilibria are not invariant under strong type morphisms either. We present our results in a very simple, finite setting, and conclude that there is no chance to get reasonable assumptions for Bayesian Nash Equilibria to be invariant under any kind of reasonable type morphisms.

Disequilibrium Coefficient: A Bayesian Perspective

Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium (HWE) is an important genetic property that populations should have whenever they are not observing adverse situations as complete lack of panmixia, excess of mutations, excess of selection pressure, etc. HWE for decades has been evaluated; both frequentist and Bayesian methods are in use today. While historically the HWE formula was developed to examine the transmission of alleles in a population from one generation to the next, use of HWE concepts has expanded in human diseases studies to detect genotyping error and disease susceptibility (association); Ryckman and Williams (2008). Most analyses focus on trying to answer the question of whether a population is in HWE. They do not try to quantify how far from the equilibrium the population is. In this paper, we propose the use of a simple disequilibrium coefficient to a locus with two alleles. Based on the posterior density of this disequilibrium coefficient, we show how one can conduct a Bayesian analysis to verify how far from HWE a population is. There are other coefficients introduced in the literature and the advantage of the one introduced in this paper is the fact that, just like the standard correlation coefficients, its range is bounded and it is symmetric around zero (equilibrium) when comparing the positive and the negative values. To test the hypothesis of equilibrium, we use a simple Bayesian significance test, the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST); see Pereira, Stern andWechsler (2008) for a complete review. The disequilibrium coefficient proposed provides an easy and efficient way to make the analyses, especially if one uses Bayesian statistics. A routine in R programs (R Development Core Team, 2009) that implements the calculations is provided for the readers.

On Identification of Bayesian DSGE Models

In recent years there has been increasing concern about the identification of parameters in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Given the structure of DSGE models it may be difficult to determine whether a parameter is identified. For the researcher using Bayesian methods, a lack of identification may not be evident since the posterior of a parameter of interest may differ from its prior even if the parameter is unidentified. We show that this can even be the case even if the priors assumed on the structural parameters are independent. We suggest two Bayesian identification indicators that do not suffer from this difficulty and are relatively easy to compute. The first applies to DSGE models where the parameters can be partitioned into those that are known to be identified and the rest where it is not known whether they are identified. In such cases the marginal posterior of an unidentified parameter will equal the posterior expectation of the prior for that parameter conditional on the identified parameters. The second indicator is more generally applicable and considers the rate at which the posterior precision gets updated as the sample size (T) is increased. For identified parameters the posterior precision rises with T, whilst for an unidentified parameter its posterior precision may be updated but its rate of update will be slower than T. This result assumes that the identified parameters are pT-consistent, but similar differential rates of updates for identified and unidentified parameters can be established in the case of super consistent estimators. These results are illustrated by means of simple DSGE models.

Bayesian analysis of SEIR epidemic models

This thesis concerns the analysis of epidemic models. We adopt the Bayesian paradigm and develop suitable Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms. This is done by considering an Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, former Zaïre, 1995 as a case of SEIR epidemic models. We model the Ebola epidemic deterministically using ODEs and stochastically through SDEs to take into account a possible bias in each compartment. Since the model has unknown parameters, we use different methods to estimate them such as least squares, maximum likelihood and MCMC. The motivation behind choosing MCMC over other existing methods in this thesis is that it has the ability to tackle complicated nonlinear problems with large number of parameters. First, in a deterministic Ebola model, we compute the likelihood function by sum of square of residuals method and estimate parameters using the LSQ and MCMC methods. We sample parameters and then use them to calculate the basic reproduction number and to study the disease-free equilibrium. From the sampled chain from the posterior, we test the convergence diagnostic and confirm the viability of the model. The results show that the Ebola model fits the observed onset data with high precision, and all the unknown model parameters are well identified. Second, we convert the ODE model into a SDE Ebola model. We compute the likelihood function using extended Kalman filter (EKF) and estimate parameters again. The motivation of using the SDE formulation here is to consider the impact of modelling errors. Moreover, the EKF approach allows us to formulate a filtered likelihood for the parameters of such a stochastic model. We use the MCMC procedure to attain the posterior distributions of the parameters of the SDE Ebola model drift and diffusion parts. In this thesis, we analyse two cases: (1) the model error covariance matrix of the dynamic noise is close to zero , i.e. only small stochasticity added into the model. The results are then similar to the ones got from deterministic Ebola model, even if methods of computing the likelihood function are different (2) the model error covariance matrix is different from zero, i.e. a considerable stochasticity is introduced into the Ebola model. This accounts for the situation where we would know that the model is not exact. As a results, we obtain parameter posteriors with larger variances. Consequently, the model predictions then show larger uncertainties, in accordance with the assumption of an incomplete model.

Statistical Inference for Computable General Equilibrium Models with Application to a Model of the Moroccan Economy

We study the problem of measuring the uncertainty of CGE (or RBC)-type model simulations associated with parameter uncertainty. We describe two approaches for building confidence sets on model endogenous variables. The first one uses a standard Wald-type statistic. The second approach assumes that a confidence set (sampling or Bayesian) is available for the free parameters, from which confidence sets are derived by a projection technique. The latter has two advantages: first, confidence set validity is not affected by model nonlinearities; second, we can easily build simultaneous confidence intervals for an unlimited number of variables. We study conditions under which these confidence sets take the form of intervals and show they can be implemented using standard methods for solving CGE models. We present an application to a CGE model of the Moroccan economy to study the effects of policy-induced increases of transfers from Moroccan expatriates.

Methods to Estimate Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models

This paper employs the one-sector Real Business Cycle model as a testing ground for four different procedures to estimate Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. The procedures are: 1 ) Maximum Likelihood, with and without measurement errors and incorporating Bayesian priors, 2) Generalized Method of Moments, 3) Simulated Method of Moments, and 4) Indirect Inference. Monte Carlo analysis indicates that all procedures deliver reasonably good estimates under the null hypothesis. However, there are substantial differences in statistical and computational efficiency in the small samples currently available to estimate DSGE models. GMM and SMM appear to be more robust to misspecification than the alternative procedures. The implications of the stochastic singularity of DSGE models for each estimation method are fully discussed.

Bayesian estimation of co-integrating thresholds in the term structure of interest rates.

Threshold Error Correction Models are used to analyse the term structure of interest Rates. The paper develops and uses a generalisation of existing models that encompasses both the Band and Equilibrium threshold models of [Balke and Fomby ((1997) Threshold cointegration. Int Econ Rev 38(3):627–645)] and estimates this model using a Bayesian approach. Evidence is found for threshold effects in pairs of longer rates but not in pairs of short rates. The Band threshold model is supported in preference to the Equilibrium model.

Bayesian estimation and selection of nonlinear vector error correction models: The case of the sugar-ethanol-oil nexus in Brazil

Nonlinear adjustment toward long-run price equilibrium relationships in the sugar-ethanol-oil nexus in Brazil is examined. We develop generalized bivariate error correction models that allow for cointegration between sugar, ethanol, and oil prices, where dynamic adjustments are potentially nonlinear functions of the disequilibrium errors. A range of models are estimated using Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithms and compared using Bayesian model selection methods. The results suggest that the long-run drivers of Brazilian sugar prices are oil prices and that there are nonlinearities in the adjustment processes of sugar and ethanol prices to oil price but linear adjustment between ethanol and sugar prices.