Do Children still need to Escape Childhood? A Reassessment of John Holt and his Vision for Children's Rights

The work of children’s liberationists have been long been critiqued for pushing the parameters of rights discourse too far; specifically, by suggesting that there are no significant differences between children and adults, including their ability for self-determination. John Holt’s 1974 text Escape from Childhood is one such work which was deemed highly controversial for its time. This article uses Holt’s Escape from Childhood as an overarching framework against which to examine the current state of play on children’s rights as explicated through the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It suggests that whilst Holt has often been critiqued for being too radical, in the context of current children’s rights discourse Holt’s visioning is not as radical as it might first appear.

Children's rights and parenting beliefs : a study of attitudes, values and emotions

The conceptualization of childhood has changed over the centuries and appears to be undergoing further change in our post-modern culture. While the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child is designed to give children everywhere basic human rights while taking into consideration their special needs, no recent research has examined adult attitudes toward those rights. In an attempt to understand the attitudes adults hold regarding autonomy rights and to look for some factors that could predict those attitudes, the current study considers values, parenting style, emotions and the issue of parent status as possible predictor variables. A total of 90 participants took part in the research, which had both written and interview components. Results generally failed to establish a reliable set of predictors. However, some interesting information was obtained regarding the endorsement of children's autonomy rights and some general conclusions were reached about our view of children and their rights at the end of the twentieth century.

The sociology of childhood as scientific communication - Observations from a social systems perspective

This article begins by identifying a close relationship between the image of children generated by several sociologists working within the new sociology of childhood perspective and the claims and ambitions of the proponents of children's autonomy rights. The image of the child as a competent, self-controlled human agent are then subjected to observation from the perspective of Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory. The new sociology of childhood's constructivist approach is compared and contrasted with Niklas Luhmann's theory of 'operational constructivism'. The article applies tenets of Luhmann's theory, to the emergence of the new childhood sociologist's image of the child as a competent, self-controlled social agent, to the epistemological status of this image and, in particular, to claims that it derives from scientific endeavour. The article proceeds to identify two theoretical developments within sociology - sociology of identity and social agency - which have brought about fundamental changes in what may be considered 'sociological' and so 'scientific' and paved the way for sociological communications about what children,really are'. In conclusion, it argues that the merging of sociology with polemics, ideology, opinion and personal beliefs and, at the level of social systems, between science and politics represents in Luhmann's terms 'dedifferentiation'- a tendency he claims may have serious adverse consequences for modern society. This warning is applied to the scientific status of sociology - its claim to be able to produce 'facts' for society, upon which social systems, such as politics and law, may rely. Like the mass media, sociology may now be capable of producing only information, and not facts, about children.

ECJ Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence between Member States' Prerogatives and Citizens' Autonomy

This chapter provides an analysis of the European Court of Justice's Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence, focused on the potential of Member States to maintain any positive regulatory role in supporting citizens' autonomy on the one hand, and on the impact of the Court's case law on citizens' opportunities to actually enjoy human rights within societies (substantive autonomy). It first sketches the notion of autonomy which is proposed as base of fundamental rights protection and promotion within a social reality characterized by not democratically legitimated dominance based on wealth and economic power. It proceeds to contextualize ECJ case law on fundamental rights. This section starts with a quantitative appetizer, which will formalize some assumptions and test them on a total of 150 cases before the European judiciary. The paper then offers a more conceptual recount around fundamental rights to equality and non-discrimination on the one hand and around fundamental rights of workers to actively shape employment and labor relations on the other hand. In conclusion some suggestions are made of how ECJ fundamental rights doctrine could develop more positively in order to moderate diverging interests of different parts of the citizenry in protecting fundamental rights.

Law, Rights and Reproduction: Reproductive Autonomy in Ethical Rationalism

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can expect to hold over our procreative capacities. This creates a multi-dimensional problem for the law in terms of access to services which prevent conception, access to services which terminate a pregnancy and recompensing those whose choices to avoid procreating are frustrated. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. In order to evaluate these three issues in relation to reproductive autonomy, I set out to investigate how the Gewirthian theory of ethical rationalism can be used to understanding the intersection between law, rights, and autonomy. As such, I assert that it is because of agents’ ability to engage in practical reason that the concept of legal enterprise should be grounded in rationality. Therefore, any attempt to understand notions of autonomy must be based on the categorical imperative derived from the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). As a result, I claim that (a) a theory of legal rights must be framed around the indirect application of the PGC and (b) a model of autonomy must account for the limitations drawn by the rational exercise of reason. This requires support for institutional policies which genuinely uphold the rights of agents. In so doing, a greater level of respect for and protection of reproductive autonomy is possible. This exhibits the full conceptual metamorphosis of the PGC from a rational moral principle, through an ethical collective principle, a constitutional principle of legal reason, a basis for rights discourse, and to a model of autonomy. Consequently, the law must be reformed to reflect the rights of agents in these situations and develop an approach which demonstrates a meaningful respect of autonomy. I suggest that this requires rights of access to services, rights to reparation and duties on the State to empower productive agency.

Increasing underwater vehicle autonomy by reducing energy consumption

In this paper, we concern ourselves with finding a control strategy that minimizes energy consumption along a trajectory connecting two given configurations. We develop an algorithm, based on our previous work with the time optimal problem, which provides implementable control strategies that are energy efficient. We find an interesting correlation between the duration of these trajectories and the optimal duration. We present the algorithm, control strategy and experimental results from our test-bed vehicle.

On evaluation of robust autonomy for uninhabited vehicles and systems

This paper discusses a method to quantify robust autonomy of Uninhabited Vehicles and Systems (UVS) in aerospace, marine, or land applications. Based on mission-vehicle specific performance criteria, we define an system utility function that can be evaluated using simulation scenarios for an envelope of environmental conditions. The results of these evaluations are used to compute a figure of merit or measure for operational efectiveness (MOE). The procedure is then augmented to consider faults and the performance of mechanisms to handle these faulty operational modes. This leads to a measure of robust autonomy (MRA). The objective of the proposed figures of merit is to assist in decision making about vehicle performance and reliability at both vehicle development stage (using simulation models) and at certification stage (using hardware-in-the-loop testing). Performance indices based on dynamic and geometric tasks associated with vehicle manoeuvring problems are proposed, and an example of a two- dimensional y scenario is provided to illustrate the use of the proposed figures of merit.

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights : A comparative analysis of the conceptual relationship between democracy and rights in contemporary political theories

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.

Labour Law as Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of ‘Dignity’ by Freedland and Kountouris

In their recent book, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris present an ambitious study of the personal scope of (what they would not want to call) ‘employment’ law. The book does this within a broader argument that calls for the reconceptualization of labour law as a whole, and it is this broader argument on which I shall focus in this chapter. Their aim, in urging us to see labour law through the lens of ‘dignity’ is to bring labour law and human rights law into closer alignment than has sometimes been the case in the past. Increasingly, dignity is seen as providing a, sometimes the, foundation of human rights law, particularly in Europe. I shall suggest that whilst the aim of constructing a new set of foundations for labour law is a worthy and increasingly urgent task, the concepts on which Freedland and Kountouris seek to build their project pose significant difficulties. In particular, their espousal of ‘dignity’ presents problems that must be addressed if their reconceptualization is not to prove a blind alley.

The Intersection of Religious Autonomy and Religious Symbols: Setting the Stage

Two sets of issues in the area of law and religion have generated a large share of attention and controversy across a wide number of countries and jurisdictions in recent years. The first set of issues relates to the autonomy of churches and other religiously affiliated entities such as schools and social service organisations in their hiring and personnel decisions, involving the question of how far, if at all, such entities should be free from the influence and oversight of the state. The second set of issues involves the presence of religious symbols in the public sphere, such as in state schools or on public lands, involving the question of how far the state should be free from the influence of religion. Although these issues – freedom of religion from the state, and freedom of the state from religion – could be viewed as opposite sides of the same coin, they are almost always treated as separate lines of inquiry, and the implications of each for the other have not been the subject of much scrutiny. In this Introduction, we consider whether insights might be drawn from thinking about these issues both from a comparative law perspective and also from considering these two lines of cases together.

(Re)examining the relationship between children's subjective wellbeing and their perceptions of participation rights

In recent years wellbeing has been linked increasingly with children’s rights, often characterised as central to their realisation. Indeed it has been suggested that the two concepts are so intertwined that their pairing has become something of a mantra in the literature on childhood. This paper seeks to explore the nature of the relationship between wellbeing and participation rights, using a recently developed ‘rights-based’ measure of children’s participation in school and community, the Children’s Participation Rights Questionnaire (CPRQ), and an established measure of subjective wellbeing – KIDSCREEN-10. The data for the study came from the Kids’ Life and Times (KLT) which is an annual online survey of Primary 7 children carried out in Northern Ireland. In 2013 approximately 3,800 children (51% girls; 49% boys) from 212 schools participated in KLT. The findings showed a statistically significant positive correlation between children’s overall scores on the KIDSCREEN-10 subjective wellbeing measure and their perceptions that their participation rights are respected in school and community settings. Further, the results indicated that it is the social relations/autonomy questions on KIDSCREEN-10 which are most strongly related to children’s perceptions that their participation rights are respected. Exploration of the findings by gender showed that there were no significant differences in overall wellbeing; however girls had higher scores than boys on the social relations/autonomy domain of KIDSCREEN-10. Girls were also more positive than boys about their participation in school and community. In light of the findings from this study, it is suggested that what lies at the heart of the relationship between child wellbeing and children’s participation rights is the social/relational aspects of both participation and wellbeing.

You Can't Always Get What You Want: A Gewirthian Model of Rational Autonomy in Abortion

The law regulating the availability of abortion is problematic both legally and morally. It is dogmatic in its requirements of women and doctors and ignorant of would-be fathers. Practically, its usage is liberal - with s1(1)(a) Abortion Act 1967 treated as a ‘catch all’ ground - it allows abortion on demand. Yet this is not reflected in the ‘law’. Against this outdated legislation I propose a model of autonomy which seeks to tether our moral concerns with a new legal approach to abortion. I do so by maintaining that a legal conception of autonomy is derivable from the categorical imperative resulting from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency: Act in accordance with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. This model of Gewirthian Rational Autonomy, I suggest, provides a guide for both public and private notions of autonomy and how our autonomous interests can be balanced across social structures in order to legitimately empower choice. I claim, ultimately, that relevant rights in the context of abortion are derivable from this model.

Rights, Rationality and Reproduction: Balancing Interests in the Abortion Debate

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can or should expect to have over our procreative capacities. This creates a multidimensional problem for the law and family planning services in terms of access to services – whether to avoid conception or terminate a pregnancy – and the negligent provision of these services. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. Unsurprisingly, these matters also raise a moral dilemma for the law. Distinctively, discourse in this area is dominated by assertions of subjective moral value; in relation to life, to personal choice and to notions of the archetypal family. Against this, I stress that a model of objective morality can answer these challenging questions and resolve the inherent problems of legal regulation. Therefore, I argue that notions of autonomy must be based on a rational, action-based understanding of what it means to be a ‘moral agent’. I claim that from this we might support a legal standard, based on objective rational morality, which can frame our constitutional norms and our conception of justice in these contentious areas. This paper claims that the current regulation of abortion is outdated and requires radical reform. It proposes a scheme that would shift the choice towards the mother (and the father), remove the unnecessarily broad disability ground and involve doctors having a role of counsel (rather than gatekeeper).

State Policies, Territories and Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Ecuador (1983-2012)

This work seeks to reconstruct the dynamics of the agreements and disagreements between the State and the indigenous peoples in Ecuador, emphasising particularly on two key elements: first, the indigenous peoples participation and exercise of their political rights, in particular the right to self-government and autonomy within their jurisdictions; and secondly, indigenous peoples’ degree of direct influence on public policies’ formulation and implementation, specially those directly affecting their territories, including the exploitation of natural resources. In Ecuador, during this historical period, the state has gone through three major moments in its relationship with indigenous peoples: neo - indigenism associated to developmentalism (1980-1984); multiculturalism associated to neoliberalism (1984- 2006) as one of the dominant trends over the period; and the crisis of neoliberalism and the search for national diversity and interculturalism associated to post- neoliberalism (2007-2013). Each has had a particular connotation, as to the scope and methods to respond to indigenous demands. In this context, this research aims to answer the central question: how has the Ecuadorian State met the demands of the indigenous movement in the last three decades, and how has it ensured the validity of their gradually recognized rights? And how and to what extent by doing so, it contradicts and alters the existing economic model based on the extraction of primary resources?