Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.

Vers l’émergence d’une justice on-line

Le réseau Internet s’avère être un outil important pour les juristes. Il rend possible la constitution d’une base de données juridiques, la création de revues de droit, la mise sur pied de forums de discussion sur les questions de droit, la diffusion d’ouvrages, etc. Le réseau Internet facilite les recherches en droit, car grâce aux bases des données, les juristes peuvent facilement accéder notamment aux textes légaux et réglementaires, à la jurisprudence et aux textes de doctrine. Cependant, Internet peut également servir à résoudre les conflits qui surviennent dans les rapports entre les internautes ou entre les internautes et les opérateurs du réseau Internet. La cyberjustice existe déjà, à petite échelle. L’on peut se permettre de mentionner le Centre de médiation et d’arbitrage de l’OMPI, le Virtual Magistrate, l’Online Ombuds Office, le CyberTribunal et le Règlement Uniforme de l’ICANN. S’il faut saluer les efforts qui ont abouti à l’existence de ces instances de cyberjustice, il convient pourtant de reconnaître leurs limites. En effet, ces diverses formes de cyberjustice ont un caractère privé et demeurent incapables d’assurer la répression des infractions. Ensuite, elles ne tiennent pas compte du déséquilibre des rapports entre télétravailleurs et employeurs, puisqu’elles reconnaissent à ces deux groupes des droits équivalents quant au choix de la juridiction et des règles applicables. Enfin, en l’état actuel de la cyberjustice, le sens de la justice est sacrifié à la célérité. Certains droits reconnus aux parties — celui de jouir d’un double degré de juridiction en particulier — sont ignorés. Ces faits montrent bien la nécessité de concevoir des modèles d’institutions plus appropriés en vue de l’instauration d’un certain ordre dans le réseau Internet. C’est dans cette optique que la présente étude offre quelques modèles de juridictions virtuelles, dont une juridiction virtuelle répressive.

Rights of the Prisoner: An Evolving Jurisprudence

Imprisonment is the most common method of punishment resorted to by almost all legal systems.The new theories of crime causation propounded in the latter half of the nineteenth century gave rise to the feeling that the prisons could be used as appropriate institutions for reforming the offenders. It called for individualisation of punishment.As a result of international movements for humanisation of prisons the judiciary' in tine common law countries started taking active interest in prisoner's treatment.Various studies reveal that much has been done in America to improve the lot of prisoners and to treat them as human beings.The courts there have gone to the extent of saying that there is no iron curtain between a prisoner and the constitution. Most of the rights available to citizens except those which they cannot enjoy due to the conditions of incarceration have also been granted to prisoner.In India also the judiciary has come forward to protect the rights of the prisoners.Maneka Gandhi is a turning point in prisoner's rights.The repeated intervention of courts in prison administration project the view that prisoners have been denied the basic human rights.The High Courts and the Supreme Court of India have been gradually exercising jurisdiction ixl assuming prison justice, including improving the quality of food and amenities, payment of wages and appropriate standards of medical care. Access to courts must be made easier to the aggrieved prisoners.The government should come forward along with some public spirited citizens and voluntary organisations to form a "discharged prisoner“ aid society. The society should exploit opportunities for rehabilitation of prisoners after their release.Most of the prison buildings in the State of Kerala are ill-equipped, ill furnished and without proper ventilation or sanitation and with insufficient water supply arrangements.In India prisoners and prisons today are governed by the old central legislations like Prisons Act l894 Prisoners Act 1900 and the Transfer of Prisoners Act 1950.

Los tratados bilaterales de inversión y el arbitraje internacional: ¿en dirección al mejor funcionamiento de las instituciones domésticas? (Tema Central)

Los tratados bilaterales sobre promoción y protección recíproca de inversiones (TBIs) tienen dos grandes objetivos: uno concreto e inmediato, el otro vago y mediato. Primero, estos acuerdos brindan garantías al inversor extranjero respecto del tratamiento que el Estado receptor otorgará a sus proyectos. Segundo, la firma de estos tratados pretende atraer más inversión extranjera a los países signatarios. El esquema de los TBIs, por lo tanto, se sustenta en la creencia de que los flujos de capitales extranjeros son afectados por la incapacidad institucional de los potenciales estados receptores. Estos tratados servirían para remediar esta falencia. Desde una perspectiva de política económica, no obstante, los beneficios para los países receptores son motivo de grandes discusiones. El presente trabajo busca ampliar este debate, analizando en qué medida los TBIs ayudan a los estados receptores a desarrollar las instituciones adecuadas para sus democracias y sus economías de mercado.

Does ownership always matter? Evidence from the Indian banking industry

Existing empirical evidence on the ownership-performance issue is weighted towards the property rights hypothesis that private enterprises are superior to public enterprises. However, very few studies examine a developing country in which the strong link between the market for corporate control and the efficiency of private enterprises assumed by the property rights hypothesis may not be satisfied. Our study of the Indian banking industry confirms our expectation that, in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, there may not be significant differences in the performance of private and public enterprises. Our analysis highlights the importance of creating appropriate institutions prior to pursuing privatization in developing countries.

Elements of divinity; or, A concise and comprehensive view of Bible theology; comprising the doctrines, evidences, morals, and institutions of Christianity; with appropriate questions appended to each chapter.

Mode of access: Internet.

What factors of satisfaction and motivation are affecting the development of the academic career in Portuguese higher education institutions?

An important constituent group and a key resource of higher education institutions (HEIs) is the faculty or academic staff. The centrality of the faculty role makes it a primary sculptor of institutional culture and has implications for the quality of the institution and therefore has a major role in achieving the objectives of the institution. Demand for academic staff in higher education has been increasing and may be expected to continue to increase. Moreover the performance of academic staff as teachers and researchers determines much of the student satisfaction and has an impact on student learning. There are many factors that serve to undermine the commitment of academics to their institutions and careers. Job satisfaction is important in revitalizing staff motivation and in keeping their enthusiasm alive. Well motivated academic staff can, with appropriate support, build a national and international reputation for themselves and the institution in the professional areas, in research and in publishing. This paper aims to identify the issues and their impacts on academic staff job satisfaction and motivation within Portuguese higher education institutions reporting an ongoing study financed by the European Union through the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology.

Refinement in hybridised institutions

Hybrid logics, which add to the modal description of transition structures the ability to refer to specific states, offer a generic framework to approach the specification and design of reconfigurable systems, i.e., systems with reconfiguration mechanisms governing the dynamic evolution of their execution configurations in response to both external stimuli or internal performance measures. A formal representation of such systems is through transition structures whose states correspond to the different configurations they may adopt. Therefore, each node is endowed with, for example, an algebra, or a first-order structure, to precisely characterise the semantics of the services provided in the corresponding configuration. This paper characterises equivalence and refinement for these sorts of models in a way which is independent of (or parametric on) whatever logic (propositional, equational, fuzzy, etc) is found appropriate to describe the local configurations. A Hennessy–Milner like theorem is proved for hybridised logics.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships.

Évaluation d'une structure gériatrique entre l'ambulatoire et l'hospitalier [Geriatric institutions, between ambulatory and hospital care: patients' description and performance assessment].

Introduction : Décrire les patients d'une structure gériatrique offrant des hospitalisations de courte durée, dans un contexte ambulatoire, pour des situations gériatriques courantes dans le canton de Genève (Suisse). Mesurer les performances de cette structure en termes de qualité des soins et de coûts. Méthodes : Des données relatives au profil des 100 premiers patients ont été collectées (huit mois), ainsi qu'aux prestations, aux ressources et aux effets (réadmissions, décès, satisfaction, complications) de manière à mesurer différents indicateurs de qualité et de coûts. Les valeurs observées ont été systématiquement comparées aux valeurs attendues, calculées à partir du profil des patients. Résultats : Des critères d'admission ont été fixés pour exclure les situations dans lesquelles d'autres structures offrent des soins mieux adaptés. La spécificité de cette structure intermédiaire a été d'assurer une continuité des soins et d'organiser d'emblée le retour à domicile par des prestations de liaison ambulatoire. La faible occurrence des réadmissions potentiellement évitables, une bonne satisfaction des patients, l'absence de décès prématurés et le faible nombre de complications suggèrent que les soins médicaux et infirmiers ont été délivrés avec une bonne qualité. Le coût s'est révélé nettement plus économique que des séjours hospitaliers après ajustement pour la lourdeur des cas. Conclusion : L'expérience-pilote a démontré la faisabilité et l'utilité d'une unité d'hébergement et d'hospitalisation de court séjour en toute sécurité. Le suivi du patient par le médecin traitant assure une continuité des soins et évite la perte d'information lors des transitions ainsi que les examens non pertinents. INTRODUCTION: To describe patients admitted to a geriatric institution, providing short-term hospitalizations in the context of ambulatory care in the canton of Geneva. To measure the performances of this structure in terms of quality ofcare and costs. METHOD: Data related to the clinical,functioning and participation profiles of the first 100 patients were collected. Data related to effects (readmission, deaths, satisfaction, complications), services and resources were also documented over an 8-month period to measure various quality and costindicators. Observed values were systematically compared to expected values, adjusted for case mix. RESULTS: Explicit criteria were proposed to focus on the suitable patients, excluding situations in which other structures were considered to be more appropriate. The specificity of this intermediate structure was to immediately organize, upon discharge, outpatient services at home. The low rate of potentially avoidable readmissions, the high patient satisfaction scores, the absence of premature death and the low number of iatrogenic complications suggest that medical and nursing care delivered reflect a good quality of services. The cost was significantly lower than expected, after adjusting for case mix. CONCLUSION: The pilot experience showed that a short-stay hospitalization unit was feasible with acceptable security conditions. The attending physician's knowledge of the patients allowed this system tofocus on essential issues without proposing inappropriate services.

Organizing for sustainable procurement: theories, institutions and practice

That construction procurement needs to be re-organized to make it more sustainable implies that there is a problem with the current situation. Starting from this assumption, an overview of construction procurement sets the scene for a discussion of some recent developments relating to organizational frameworks for sustainable construction procurement. Emergent theories dealing with sustainable procurement are considered. There is a plethora of standards and guidance documents for organizing sustainable procurement, originating from a variety of organizations involved. These considerations form the context for approaches being used in practice to achieve sustainable procurement. The Chapter concludes with reflections on why current approaches are insufficient. It seems difficult to persuade clients to spend less money over the life cycle of their buildings. Future directions needed to translate sustainable procurement from rhetoric to reality include the development of suitable incentives and appropriate organizational structures.

Generating inclusive and sustainable growth: the role of policy and multilevel fiscal institutions

Incluye bibliografía

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions

This paper focuses on the link between economic rights and institutions. Simple analysis of data is used to demonstrate countries' human development effort in advancing economics rights of the citizens. A country's human development effort is evaluated on the basis of the well-being of the poorest members of the society. An analysis of data reveals that there is a wide variation in countries' pro-poor stance. While it is accepted that positive rights are pro-poor, this paper argues that so too are negative economic rights and in fact the two are complements rather than substitutes. Classifying countries into human development income deficit and human development effort deficit, it is demonstrated that a large number of countries could achieve higher welfare levels for the poor if they improved on bother positive and negative economic rights. The paper attempts to explain variations in the observed commitment to economic rights by focusing on pro-poor institutions. The basic thesis advanced in the paper is that pro-poor policies are more likely to be implemented and sustained in those institutions where power is sufficiently diffused such that even the poor have leverage over policy outcomes. The paper focuses on how institutions impact on power diffusion and therefore the adoption of pro-poor growth and policies. The failure of countries to adopt pro-poor growth and policies is attributed to institutional failures manifested in concentration of power. The policy recommendations emanating from the analysis focus on institutional reforms to enhance power diffusion. These policies include enlarging the political space through democratization, strengthening institutions and capacity to fight corruption and improve transparency, and bringing the government closer to the people through appropriate design and implementation of decentralization schemes. Some recent examples of improvements in economic rights following power diffusion are provided.

The MISLEM Project : developing meta-level quality indicators for establishing a systematic linkage between educational institutions and the labour market:education, employment and graduate employability: project manual

The MISLEM Project comprised representatives from Higher and Vocational Education in four partner countries, Austria, Romania, Slovenia and the UK. In addition to this, representatives from a major UK graduate employment agency and the Austria Quality Assurance Agency were also involved. At the inaugural meeting of the Project, partner teams discussed and agreed upon appropriate methodological processes with which to carry the Project forward.