Problemy z pojęciem wiedzy w ramach epistemicznej koncepcji znaczenia Michaela Dummetta

According to epistemic theory of meaning the meaning is not understanding-transcendent – understanding is a kind of knowledge and the meaning is the content of this knowledge. The main problem of such a theory is to provide an adequate characteristic of the notion of knowledge. Dummett claims that understanding cannot be reduced neither to purely practical abilities, nor to explicit theoretical knowledge. In his opinion the most important part of the knowledge that constitutes understanding is a kind of implicit knowledge, something halfway between practical ability and theoretical knowledge. Unfortunately is not so simple to provide sufficiently clear characteristics of it. Moreover, because of implicitness of this knowledge, there is problem with manifestation of possession of such knowledge. Understanding should be related to the practice of making assertions. In the article I try to argue for soundness of thesis that important part of knowledge that constitutes understanding is a kind of procedural knowledge. This type of knowledge (called “knowledge-how”) cannot be reduced to propositional or conceptual knowledge (“knowledge-that”). Procedural knowledge has manifestation in activities doing in accordance with some set of the rules, but possession of this knowledge does not require explicit knowledge-that of the rules. Procedural knowledge is also located in the middle of the spectrum – between reflex actions and theoretical knowledge.

Zasada racji dostatecznej w kontekście semantycznej kontrowersji realizm–antyrealizm

"Principle of sufficient reason in the context of the realism-antirealism semantic controversy". The topic of this article is the cognitive and semantic status of Michael Dummett’s principle C. According to the principle, if a statement is true, there must be something in virtue of which it is true. The author suggests the interpretation of principle C in terms of the sufficient reason principle as a contemporary, weaker and semantic counterpart of the classical version of the principle. Considerations include such problems as: the distinction between the reason-consequence relationship and cause-effect relationship; the reductionism and justificationism in the context of the realism-antirealism semantic controversy; the reversibility of reason-consequence relationship and the question of a search for ultimate reasons. The author also distinguishes three forms of the sufficient reason principle: metaphysical, ontological and propositional.

Spór o wspólnotę w perspektywie badań nad miastem postindustrialnym

Wydział Nauk Społecznych: Instytut Kulturoznawstwa

Polskie nazwiska mieszkańców Drohobycza końca XVIII i początku XIX wieku na tle wschodniosłowiańskim

Wydział Neofilologii: Instytut Filologii Rosyjskiej. Zakład Ukrainistyki