Allocation rules on networks

When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source to the agent. Given the supplies at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens. We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on consistent and resource monotonic rules in claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles and we extend fairness principles to allocation rules on networks. We require that for each pair of citizens in the network, the extension is robust with respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust with respect to the fairness principle. We give applications of the algorithm for three fairness principles: egalitarianism, proportionality and equal sacrifice.

Centralized allocation in multiple markets

We study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, the solution of the joint al-location in multiple markets is significantly narrower than in the single-market case. Our result also applies to dynamic allocation problems. Finally, we provide conditions under which the solution of the single-market allocation coincides with the multiple-market case, and we apply this result to the study of the school choice problem with sibling priorities.

Prices, property and markets in water allocation

Includes bibliography

Optimal water allocation in shortage situations as applied to an irrigation community.

This work studies the most beneficial way of allocating water in an irrigation community in water shortage situations. Therefore, it proposes that the irrigation surface area be divided into homogeneous zones, each with a beneficial relationship with respect to the water applied. The mathematical formula that enables one to obtain the optimal quota for the users or irrigation community as a whole has been found for individual relations of a quadratic or power type, and these have yielded different and complementary characteristics. Dimensionless variables have been used to display the results, and to compare with other alternative allocation rules such as the proportional rule, referencing the situation without water restrictions. As a result, for each water shortage situation, the water that is allocated to each user is obtained, together with the losses in individual income and the losses for the community as a whole. Furthermore, a proposal is put forth for establishing the marginal benefit from the water available, which could be of interest in enabling each community to analyze whether it is in its best interest to invest in increasing the resource, or to sell the resource to other users. Finally, an example is given to demonstrate how the method works and to show that, when the differences between the production schemes are considered, the differences in benefit reduction between the proportional allocation and the optimal allocation are also sizeable. Read More: http://ascelibrary.org/doi/abs/10.1061/(ASCE)IR.1943-4774.0000667

Tőkeallokáció nem likvid portfóliók esetén (Risk capital allocation in case of illiquid portfolios)

A kockázat jó mérése és elosztása elengedhetetlen a bankok, biztosítók, befektetési alapok és egyéb pénzügyi vállalkozások belső tőkeallokációjához vagy teljesítményértékeléséhez. A cikkben bemutatjuk, hogy a koherens kockázati mértékek axiómáit nem likvid portfóliók esetén is el lehet várni. Így mérve a kockázatot, ismertetünk a kockázatelosztásra vonatkozó két kooperatív játékelméleti cikket. Az első optimista, eszerint mindig létezik stabil, az alegységek minden koalíciója által elfogadható, általános módszer a kockázat (tőke) elosztására. A második cikk pesszimista, mert azt mondja ki, hogy ha a stabilitás mellett igazságosak is szeretnénk lenni, akkor egy lehetetlenségi tételbe ütközünk. / === / Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to fi nancial risk. We argue that the axioms of coherent measures of risk are valid for illiquid portfolios as well. Then, we present the results of two papers on allocating risk measured by a coherent measure of risk. Assume a bank has some divisions. According to the fi rst paper there is always a stable allocation of risk capital, which is not blocked by any coalition of the divisions, that is there is a core compatible allocation rule (we present some examples for risk allocation rules). The second paper considers two more natural requirements, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. Equal Treatment Property makes sure that similar divisions are treated symmetrically, that is if two divisions make the same marginal risk contribution to all the coalition of divisions not containing them, then the rule should allocate them the very same risk capital. Strong Monotonicity requires that if the risk environment changes in such a way that the marginal contribution of a division is not decreasing, then its allocated risk capital should not decrease either. However, if risk is evaluated by any coherent measure of risk, then there is no risk allocation rule satisfying Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity, we encounter an impossibility result.

Sequencing games without initial order

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequencing situations with equal processing times.

Challenges in lung transplantation.

Lung transplantation is an established therapy for end-stage pulmonary disorders in selected patients without significant comorbidities. The particular constraints associated with organ transplantation from deceased donors involve specific allocation rules in order to optimise the medical efficacy of the procedure. Comparison of different policies adopted by national transplant agencies reveals that an optimal and unique allocation system is an elusive goal, and that practical, geographical and logistic parameters must be taken into account. A solution to attenuate the imbalance between the number of lung transplant candidates and the limited availability of organs is to consider marginal donors. In particular, assessment and restoration of gas exchange capacity ex vivo in explanted lungs is a new and promising approach that some lung transplant programmes have started to apply in clinical practice. Chronic lung allograft dysfunction, and especially bronchiolitis obliterans, remains the major medium- and long-term problem in lung transplantation with a major impact on survival. Although there is to date no cure for established bronchiolitis obliterans, new preventive strategies have the potential to limit the burden of this feared complication. Unfortunately, randomised prospective studies are infrequent in the field of lung transplantation, and data obtained from larger studies involving kidney or liver recipients are not always relevant for this purpose.

A Theory of Representative Behavior in the Dictator Game

In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.

Profitability Analysis of Service Contracts of Devices

The objective of this study has been to make a profitability analysis of service contracts for a company in Finland. The purpose has been to see how profitable the contracts are and if there possibly were some things to change or develop in the contracts. Allocation rules of cost accounting, service costs both profitability and management of services have been considered in the theory part. All the service contracts that have been valid at least three last accounting periods have been included in the study. All direct costs relating to the contracts have been collected and indirect costs have been assigned to the contracts. Profitability of the contracts has been calculated over three years. Results have been analyzed according to the key figures the company is controlling. Some suggestions for developments have been given at the end of the study. The study has shown differences between the contracts. Part of them has turned out to be like the profitability aims of the company and part less profitable. The study has shown that many factors have an effect on the profitability of the service contracts.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Le processus d’attribution rénale québécois défavorise-t-il les patients en attente d’une greffe combinée rein-pancréas?

Étude de cas / Case study

Risco operacional - modelos de alocação de capital aplicados aos bancos no Brasil

Nos últimos tempos, mensurar o Risco Operacional (RO) tornou-se o grande desafio para instituições financeiras no mundo todo, principalmente com a implementação das regras de alocação de capital regulatório do Novo Acordo de Capital da Basiléia (NACB). No Brasil, ao final de 2004, o Banco Central (BACEN) estabeleceu um cronograma de metas e disponibilizou uma equipe responsável pela adaptação e implementação dessas regras no sistema financeiro nacional. A Federação de Bancos Brasileiros (FEBRABAN) também divulgou recente pesquisa de gestão de RO envolvendo vários bancos. Todo esse processo trouxe uma vasta e crescente pesquisa e atividades voltadas para a modelagem de RO no Brasil. Em nosso trabalho, medimos o impacto geral nos banco brasileiros, motivado pelas novas regras de alocação de capital de RO envolvendo os modelos mais básicos do NACB. Também introduzimos um modelo avançado de mensuração de risco, chamado Loss Data Distribution (LDA), que alguns especialistas, provenientes do Risco de Mercado, convencionaram chamar de Value-at-Risk Operacional (VaR Operacional.). Ao final desse trabalho apresentamos um caso prático baseado na implementação do LDA ou VaR

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.