Dynamic adaptation of stability periods for service level agreements

A QoS adaptation to dynamically changing system conditions that takes into consideration the user’s constraints on the stability of service provisioning is presented. The goal is to allow the system to make QoS adaptation decisions in response to fluctuations in task traffic flow, under the control of the user. We pay special attention to the case where monitoring the stability period and resource load variation of Service Level Agreements for different types of services is used to dynamically adapt future stability periods, according to a feedback control scheme. System’s adaptation behaviour can be configured according to a desired confidence level on future resource usage. The viability of the proposed approach is validated by preliminary experiments.

Free-trade agreements: challenges for global health

In this study new free-trade agreements are discussed, which are based on the breaking down of tariff and technical barriers and normally exclude most of the poorest countries in the world. Considering the current context of economic globalization and its health impacts, seven controversial points of these treaties and their possible implications for global public health are presented, mainly regarding health equity and other health determinants. Finally, this research proposes a greater social and health professionals participation in the formulation and discussion of these treaties, and a deeper insertion of Brazil in this important international agenda.

The simple economics of risk-sharing agreements between the NHS and the pharmaceutical industry

The Janssen-Cilag proposal for a risk-sharing agreement regarding bortezomib received a welcome signal from NICE. The Office of Fair Trading report included risk-sharing agreements as an available tool for the National Health Service. Nonetheless, recent discussions have somewhat neglected the economic fundamentals underlying risk-sharing agreements. We argue here that risk-sharing agreements, although attractive due to the principle of paying by results, also entail risks. Too many patients may be put under treatment even with a low success probability. Prices are likely to be adjusted upward, in anticipation of future risk-sharing agreements between the pharmaceutical company and the third-party payer. An available instrument is a verification cost per patient treated, which allows obtaining the first-best allocation of patients to the new treatment, under the risk sharing agreement. Overall, the welfare effects of risk-sharing agreements are ambiguous, and care must be taken with their use.

The impacts of free trade agreements on use of antidumping

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Policies to improve the lives of Slum Dwellers – from international agreements to local contexts. The Brazilian case-study

Last decades economic development induced massive international and regional migration flows directed to the urban spaces. The magnitude and swiftness of these processes determined that several cities’ authorities would fail to respond to the increasing demands of many social services. The right to an “adequate housing” emerged as a political concern, leading governments and institutions to develop housing programmes directed to improve the lives of slum dwellers. This paper presents a diachronic evolution of these specific housing policies in the paradigmatic case-study of Brazil, critically analysing the evolving roles played by the multiple levels of decision (from international institutions to local communities) in the development and implementation of such measures.

The making of international environmental agreements

We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements when cooperation means to commit to a minimum abatement level. Each country decides whether to ratify the agreement and this latter enters into force only if it is ratified by a number of countries at least equal to some ratification threshold. We analyze the role played by ratification threshold rules and provide conditions for international environmental agreements to enter into force. We show that a large typology of agreements can enter into force among the one constituted by the grand coalition.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

A General model of bilateral migration agreements

Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ.

Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

We study the decision of two rms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and, if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger, there is a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We nd that a horizontal agreement always arises. The insiders' merger/RJV choice involves a trade-o : While merger o ers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a pro t-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater brand similarity and contract enforceability (\quality") both favour RJV, while greater R&D complementarity favours merger. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible.

Good agreements between self and clinician-collected specimens for the detection of human papillomavirus in Brazilian patients

Women infected with human papillomavirus (HPV) are at a higher risk of developing cervical lesions. In the current study, self and clinician-collected vaginal and cervical samples from women were processed to detect HPV DNA using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) with PGMY09/11 primers. HPV genotypes were determined using type-specific PCR. HPV DNA detection showed good concordance between self and clinician-collected samples (84.6%; kappa = 0.72). HPV infection was found in 30% women and genotyping was more concordant among high-risk HPV (HR-HPV) than low-risk HPV (HR-HPV). HPV16 was the most frequently detected among the HR-HPV types. LR-HPV was detected at a higher frequency in self-collected; however, HR-HPV types were more frequently identified in clinician-collected samples than in self-collected samples. HPV infections of multiple types were detected in 20.5% of clinician-collected samples and 15.5% of self-collected samples. In this study, we demonstrated that the HPV DNA detection rate in self-collected samples has good agreement with that of clinician-collected samples. Self-collected sampling, as a primary prevention strategy in countries with few resources, could be effective for identifying cases of HR-HPV, being more acceptable. The use of this method would enhance the coverage of screening programs for cervical cancer.