Distributed optimization and games over networks: a system theoretical perspective

Several decision and control tasks involve networks of cyber-physical systems that need to be coordinated and controlled according to a fully-distributed paradigm involving only local communications without any central unit. This thesis focuses on distributed optimization and games over networks from a system theoretical perspective. In the addressed frameworks, we consider agents communicating only with neighbors and running distributed algorithms with optimization-oriented goals. The distinctive feature of this thesis is to interpret these algorithms as dynamical systems and, thus, to resort to powerful system theoretical tools for both their analysis and design. We first address the so-called consensus optimization setup. In this context, we provide an original system theoretical analysis of the well-known Gradient Tracking algorithm in the general case of nonconvex objective functions. Then, inspired by this method, we provide and study a series of extensions to improve the performance and to deal with more challenging settings like, e.g., the derivative-free framework or the online one. Subsequently, we tackle the recently emerged framework named distributed aggregative optimization. For this setup, we develop and analyze novel schemes to handle (i) online instances of the problem, (ii) ``personalized'' optimization frameworks, and (iii) feedback optimization settings. Finally, we adopt a system theoretical approach to address aggregative games over networks both in the presence or absence of linear coupling constraints among the decision variables of the players. In this context, we design and inspect novel fully-distributed algorithms, based on tracking mechanisms, that outperform state-of-the-art methods in finding the Nash equilibrium of the game.

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.

Jogos dos povos indigenas : trajetórias e interlocuções = Indigenous peoples games : trajectory and interlocutions

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Female soccer in the Beijing olympic games

Gender relations put men and women in different areas of the hierarchy, for instance in the case of soccer. This work analyzed the news articles from the Beijing 2008 section of the Newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo to identify the space attributed to news articles about female and male soccer, and to qualitatively evaluate what is said to its readers. The result shows that the percentage of words addressing women was higher compared to other surveys and the area for pictures was similar for both genders, however this only happened on account of the influence of the event. The news allowed for an analysis of women in soccer: the entities that perpetuate the hierarchical difference between the genders when they don`t support them; the raising of issues regarding aesthetics which explains why these athletes are not erotized by the media as is the case in other modalities; as soccer is considered to be a male area the media demanded better results from the men.

Girls and tea ladies: involvement of Australian female athletes and administrators in the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games

This article focuses on the 1956 Olympic Games in order to consider and ascertain the role and place of women in Australian society, generally, and, more specifically, in Australian 'sport' as both athletes and sporting administrators.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games

Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional the payoff of a player with a quota greater than one. This is done for the many-to-many matching model with additively separable utilities, for which the stability concept is defined. It is then proved, via linear programming, that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and it may be strictly bigger than the set of dual solutions and strictly smaller than the core. The present paper defines a general concept of stability and shows that this concept is a natural solution concept, stronger than the core concept, for a much more general coalitional game than a matching game. Instead of mutual agreements inside partnerships, the players are allowed to make collective agreements inside coalitions of any size and to distribute his labor among them. A collective agreement determines the level of labor at which the coalition operates and the division, among its members, of the income generated by the coalition. An allocation specifies a set of collective agreements for each player.

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students` strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.

Binary games with many players

We examine a problem with n players each facing the same binary choice. One choice is superior to the other. The simple assumption of competition - that an individual's payoff falls with a rise in the number of players making the same choice, guarantees the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium (involving mixed strategies). As n increases, there are two opposing effects. First, events in the middle of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as many others - become more likely, but the payoffs in these events fall. In opposition, events in the tails of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as few others - become less likely, but the payoffs in these events remain high. We provide a sufficient condition (strong competition) under which an increase in the number of players leads to a reduction in the equilibrium probability that the superior choice is made.