Regulating Digital Financial Services Agents in Developing Countries to Promote Financial Inclusion

Limited access to bank branches excludes over one billion people from accessing financial services in developing countries. Digital financial services offered by banks and mobile money providers through agents can solve this problem without the need for complex and costly physical banking infrastructures. Delivering digital financial services through agents requires a legal framework to regulate liability. This article analyses whether vicarious liability of the principal is a more efficient regulatory approach than personal liability of the agent. Agent liability in Kenya, Fiji, and Malawi is analysed to demonstrate that vicarious liability of the principal, coupled to an explicit agreement as to agent rewards and penalties, is the more efficient regulatory approach.

Does section 420A impose ‘strict liability’ upon controllers for acts or omissions of agents and experts?

This article addresses in depth the question of whether section 420A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) imposes ‘strict liability’ upon a controller for the failure of an agent or expert to take reasonable care. The weight of existing authority appears to suggest that controllers are liable under s 420A for the carelessness of their agents or expert advisers. However, a closer analysis of the text of the provision and relevant Australian and UK case law demonstrates that this aspect of the statutory construction of s 420A remains very much an open question. This article ultimately contends for a construction of s 420A which requires a controller to adequately supervise and scrutinise, but which does not render a blameless controller strictly liable for all careless acts and omissions of agents and expert advisers.

Lifting the joint venture veil : liability of related entities for misleading conduct of agents engaged by joint venture partners

At common law, a corporation may be liable vicariously for the conduct of its appointed agents, employees or directors. This generally requires the agent or employee to be acting in the course of his or her agency or employment and, in the case of representations, to have actual or implied authority to make the representations. The circumstances in which a corporation may be liable for the conduct of its agents, employees or directors is broadened under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) to where one of these parties engages in conduct “on behalf of” the corporation. As the decision in Bennett v Elysium Noosa Pty Ltd (in liq) demonstrates, this may extend to liability for the misleading conduct of a salesperson for the joint venture to parties who are not formal members of the joint venture, but where the joint venture activities are within the course of the entity’s “business, affairs or activities”.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

Agent Orange legislation and oversight [microform] : hearing before the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, second session, on S. 1692, the proposed "Agent Orange Disability Benefits Act of 1987"; S. 1787, the proposed "Veterans' Agent Orange Disabilities Act of 1987"; and Agent Orange oversight issues, May 12, 1988.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 89 S761-8