Multi-level knowledge transfer in software development outsourcing projects : the agency theory view

In recent years, software development outsourcing has become even more complex. Outsourcing partner have begun‘re- outsourcing’ components of their projects to other outsourcing companies to minimize cost and gain efficiencies, creating a multi-level hierarchy of outsourcing. This research in progress paper presents preliminary findings of a study designed to understand knowledge transfer effectiveness of multi-level software development outsourcing projects. We conceptualize the SD-outsourcing entities using the Agency Theory. This study conceptualizes, operationalises and validates the concept of Knowledge Transfer as a three-phase multidimensional formative index of 1) Domain knowledge, 2) Communication behaviors, and 3) Clarity of requirements. Data analysis identified substantial, significant differences between the Principal and the Agent on two of the three constructs. Using Agency Theory, supported by preliminary findings, the paper also provides prescriptive guidelines of reducing the friction between the Principal and the Agent in multi-level software outsourcing.

Angel Investing in Finland: An Analysis Based on Agency Theory and the Incomplete Contracting Theory

Wealthy individuals - business angels who invest a share of their net worth in entrepreneurial ventures - form an essential part of an informal venture capital market that can secure funding for entrepreneurial ventures. In Finland, business angels represent an untapped pool of capital that can contribute to fostering entrepreneurial development. In addition, business angels can bridge knowledge gaps in new business ventures by means of making their human capital available. This study has two objectives. The first is to gain an understanding of the characteristics and investment behaviour of Finnish business angels. The strongest focus here is on the due diligence procedures and their involvement post investment. The second objective is to assess whether agency theory and the incomplete contacting theory are useful theoretical lenses in the arena of business angels. To achieve the second objective, this study investigates i) how risk is mitigated in the investment process, ii) how uncertainty influences the comprehensiveness of due diligence as well as iii) how control is allocated post investment. Research hypotheses are derived from assumptions underlying agency theory and the incomplete contacting theory. The data for this study comprise interviews with 53 business angels. In terms of sample size this is the largest on Finnish business angels. The research hypotheses in this study are tested using regression analysis. This study suggests that the Finnish informal venture capital market appears to be comprised of a limited number of business angels whose style of investing much resembles their formal counterparts’. Much focus is placed on managing risks prior to making the investment by strong selectiveness and by a relatively comprehensive due diligence. The involvement is rarely on a day-to-day basis and many business angels seem to see board membership as a more suitable alternative than involvement in the operations of an entrepreneurial venture. The uncertainty involved does not seem to drive an increase in due diligence. On the contrary, it would appear that due diligence is more rigorous in safer later stage investments and when the business angels have considerable previous experience as investors. Finnish business angels’ involvement post investment is best explained by their degree of ownership in the entrepreneurial venture. It seems that when investors feel they are sufficiently rewarded, in terms of an adequate equity stake, they are willing to involve themselves actively in their investments. The lack of support for a relationship between increased uncertainty and the comprehensiveness of due diligence may partly be explained by an increasing trend towards portfolio diversification. This is triggered by a taxation system that favours investments through investment companies rather than direct investments. Many business angels appear to have substituted a specialization strategy that builds on reducing uncertainty for a diversification strategy that builds on reducing firm specific (idiosyncratic) risk by holding shares in ventures whose returns are not expected to exhibit a strong positive correlation.

Application of the agency theory for the analysis of performance-based mechanisms in road management

El WCTR es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte, y aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper develops a model based on agency theory to analyze road management systems (under the different contract forms available today) that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment of the agent. The base assumption is that of asymmetric information between the principal (Public Authorities) and the agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of this latter. It is assumed that the principal may only measure the agent?s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that may be verified by the authorities. In this model there is presumed to be a relation between the efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, though it is also considered that there may be dispersion between both variables that gives rise to a certain degree of randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal contract has been made on the basis of this model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis made, it is considered that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component and a payment in accordance with the performance level obtained. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should not overweight those indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results.

Agency theory problems behind the fall of shopping centers

The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerging markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Investor- Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.

Agency theory and the family business

The conceptual domain of agency theory is one of the dominant organisational theory perspectives applied in current family business research (Chrisman et al., 2010). According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs generally arise due to individuals’ selfinterest and decision making based on rational thinking and oriented toward own preferences. With more people involved in decision making, such as through the separation of ownership and management, agency costs occur due to different preferences and information asymmetries between the owner (principal) and the employed management (agent) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, agents take decisions based on their individual preferences (for example, short term, financial gains) instead of the owners’ preferences (for example, long term, sustainable development).

Behavioural agency theory and the family business

The behavioural agency theory was developed to provide a more comprehensive explanation and prediction of managerial risk taking, in response to some shortcomings of agency theory. In general, the theory offers explanations of why decision makers prefer some strategic choices to others. The use of behavioural agency theory in family business research has, however, been very limited. Family business scholars recently adapted this theory to construct the family business variant, the ‘socioemotional wealth’ construct, which offers better explanations for the risk taking and decision making behaviours of family firms. This chapter provides an overview of behavioural agency theory and the socioemotional wealth construct, explores how they have been used in family business research, and offers suggestions for how this theory can be used in further research to contribute to both the family business and the general management literature. Keywords: family business, behavioural agency theory, socioemotional wealth, family firm heterogeneity.

Achieving better stewardship of major infrastructure assets through configuration of governance arrangements utilising Stewardship Theory

Major infrastructure assets are often governed by a mix of public and private organizations, each fulfilling a specific and separate role i.e. policy, ownership, operation or maintenance. This mix of entities is a legacy of Public Choice Theory influenced NPM reforms of the late 20th century. The privatization of the public sector has resulted in agency theory based ‘self-interest’ relationships and governance arrangements for major infrastructure assets which emphasize economic efficiency but which do not do not advance non-economic public values and the collective Public Interest. The community is now requiring that governments fulfill their stewardship role of also satisfying non-economic public values such as sustainability and intergenerational responsibility. In the 21st century governance arrangements which minimize individual self-interest alone and look to also pursue the interests of other stakeholders have emerged. Relational contracts, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP’s) and hybrid mixes of organizations from the state, market and network modes (Keast et al 2006) provide options for governance which better meet the interests of contractors, government and the community there is emerging a body of research which extends the consideration of the immediate governance configuration to the metagovernance environment constituted by hierarchy, regulation, industry standards, trust, culture and values. Stewardship theory has reemerged as a valuable aid in the understanding of the features of governance configurations which establish relationships between principal and agent which maximize the agent acting in the interests of the principal, even to the detriment of the agent. This body of literature suggests that an improved stewardship outcome from infrastructure governance configurations can be achieved by the application of the emerging options as to the immediate governance configuration, and the surrounding metagovernance environment. Stewardship theory provides a framework for the design of the relationships within that total governance environment, focusing on the achievement of a better, complete stewardship outcome. This paper explores the directions future research might take in seeking to improve the understanding of the design of the governance of major, critical infrastructure assets.

Invisible ties : implicit contracting and its implications for the agency relationship in corporate governance research

Research that applies agency theory to boards of directors suffers from being quite narrow as it does not recognize the true legal relationships between directors, managers and shareholders. Instead, the board of directors is best conceptualized as the principal, management as agents and stockholders’ relationships as a mix of legal and implicit contracts. We propose a recast agency relationship and develop a contingency approach that proposes (1) how a corporation’s goals vary with a board’s implicit contracting and (2) a reconceptualization of the agency problem facing boards.

Agency problems of corporate philanthropy

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.