Agency problems of corporate philanthropy

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.

Agency problems and capital expenditure announcements

This article examines the market valuation of announcements of new capital expenditure. Prior research suggests that the firm's growth opportunities and cash flow position condition the market response. This study jointly examines the role of growth and cash flow, and the interaction between them. Using a new data set of Australian firms that avoids problems associated with expectations models, the results are remarkably strong and support a positive association between growth opportunities and the market valuation, in addition to supporting the role of free cash flow. The findings have implications for the relationship between general investment information and stock prices.

Effect of Agency Problems on RTC Hotel Appraisals

Agency problems that helped cause the banking crisis in the United States in the 1980s impacted hotel appraisals competed for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Lower appraised values would help make more bids acceptable, helping to sell more assets quickly. The results indicate appraised hotel values were much lower than sales prices in states with a high number of bank failures.

Problems of psychological and sociocultural adaptation among Russian speaking immigrants in New Zealand

The problems immigrants experience during the process of their psychological and sociocultural adaptation to the host culture have far-reaching effects in terms of mental health, employment and lost benefits for the whole society. General models of the acculturation process (Ward 1996) and acculturation strategies (Berry 2001) provide a basis for the analysis of those problems. The current study employed a qualitative, case-oriented design, based on the grounded theory method to analyse interviews with six Russian-speaking immigrants in New Zealand. The purpose of the study was to investigate, from a psychological perspective, the problems in adaptation as a result of migration and resettlement, and the factors that influence this process. Two distinct patterns were revealed, linked to acculturation strategies of integration and separation. All the participants experienced high levels of psychological distress in the initial stage of their resettlement, but those who later chose the integration strategy of acculturation were more successful and satisfied with their adaptation than those who chose the strategy of separation. Factors contributing to the process of adaptation were migration motivation, proportion of perceived gains and losses, and cultural identity. This study has implications for social policies in the areas of employment, education and mental health.

The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms

We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.

Does political economy reduce agency costs? Some evidence from dividend policies around the world

This study shows that firms in proportional-electoral countries pay out lower dividends and that the correlation between a firm's growth potential and dividend payout ratio is weaker in proportional-electoral countries. However, firms in proportional-electoral countries that cross-list in majoritarian system countries, tend to pay out higher dividends and the negative relation between growth potential and dividend payout tend to be stronger than their peers that do not cross-list. For a few countries that changed their electoral system towards a more proportional system, we observe a decrease in dividend payout ratio and a weaker relation between growth and dividends after the change. Overall these results indicate that a country's political system affects the severity of agency problems. Further, the effect of legal origin on dividend policy reverses once we include the political economy variables in the regressions. We also document that the electoral system not only affects the amount of dividends paid by a firm but also the form of payment.

The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance

This dissertation seeks to improve the usage of direct democracy in order to minimize agency cost. It first explains why insights from corporate governance can help to improve constitutional law and then identifies relevant insights from corporate governance that can make direct democracy more efficient. To accomplish this, the dissertation examines a number of questions. What are the key similarities in corporate and constitutional law? Do these similarities create agency problems that are similar enough for a comparative analysis to yield valuable insights? Once the utility of corporate governance insights is established, the dissertation answers two questions. Are initiatives necessary to minimize agency cost if referendums are already provided for? And, must the results of direct democracy be binding in order for agency cost to be minimized?

Principal agent problems evident in Chinese PPP infrastructure projects

The demand for infrastructure remains high in China. In order to meet this demand under conditions of limited government funding availability, local governments have increasingly sought private participation through ‘public, private partnerships’ (PPPs). While PPPs are recognised as a reliable mode for delivering infrastructure projects, agency problems are also known to interfere with their success. The nature of these agency problems, along with the types of partnership arrangements under which they occur, is the subject of this research. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with PPP consultants working on infrastructure projects in China. Results suggest that opportunistic behaviour is to be found both within the private sector and within the government sector. While the private sector is shown to take advantage of ‘information asymmetries,’ the government sector is shown to allocate project risks and responsibilities disproportionately in their favour. Results also indicate that PPP arrangements between local government and ‘state owned enterprises’ (SOEs) were less prone to agency abuse, while agency problems in PPP arrangements between local government and private firms were relatively greater.

Asset revaluations and earnings management: Evidence from Australian companies

This paper examines the association between asset revaluations and discretionary accruals (a proxy for earnings management) using a sample of the largest 300 Australian companies. The results from this study indicate that the revaluation of non-current assets is positively associated with discretionary accruals. This finding is consistent with the argument that revaluation of assets reflects higher agency problems in the form of increased earnings management. Additional findings are that discretionary accruals are higher for firms reporting their non-current assets at fair values appraised by directors, than those of firms that use external appraisers. As well, the choice of auditors and the strength of corporate governance can constrain the opportunistic behaviour of managers in the accounting choice to revalue non-current assets.

Corporate Governance in European Banks: Essays on Bank Ownership

Banks are important as they have a central role in the financial system, where funds are channelled either through financial intermediaries, such as banks, or through financial markets, hence promoting growth in any economy. Recently, we have been reminded of the drawbacks of the central role of banks. The current financial crisis, which started out as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US, has become a global financial crisis with substantial impact on the real economy in many countries. Some of the roots to the current financial crisis can be sought in the changing role of banks and in bank corporate governance. Moreover, the substantial revitalising measures taken have been justified by the central role of banks. Not only are banks important, they are also very special. The fact that banks are regulated in conjunction with greater opacity, make bank corporate governance different from corporate governance in non-bank companies. Surprisingly little is, however, known about bank corporate governance, in particularly, in a European setting. Hence, the objective of this doctoral thesis is to provide new insights in this research area by examining banks from 37 different European countries. Each of the three essays included in the doctoral thesis examines a particular aspect of bank corporate governance. In the first essay the interaction between the regulatory environment a bank operates in and its ownership structure is explored. Indicators of the severity of the moral hazard problem induced by the deposit insurance system and implicit too-big-to-fail government guarantee, particular features of deposit insurance systems as well as legal protection of shareholders, legal origin of a country and level of integration to the European community are used in the analysis. The empirical findings confirm previous findings on the link between legal protection of shareholders and ownership structure. Moreover, they show that differences in deposit insurance system features can explain some of the differences in ownership structure across European banks. In the second essay the impact of management and board ownership on the profitability of banks with different strategy is examined. The empirical findings suggest that the efficiency of these two particular corporate governance mechanisms varies with the characteristics of the agency problem faced by the bank. More specifically, management ownership is important in opaque non-traditional banks, whereas board ownership is important in traditional banks, where deposit insurance reduces the monitoring incentives of outsiders. The higher profitability does, however, go together with higher risk. In the third essay the profitability and risk of commercial, savings and cooperative banks are compared. The empirical findings suggest that distinct operational and ownership characteristics rather than only the mere fact that a bank is a commercial, savings or cooperative bank explain the profitability and risk differences. The main insight from the three essays is that a number of different aspects should be addressed simultaneously in order to give the complexity of bank corporate governance justice.

Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research

Revised 2006-06

Trust and efficiency

Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We model trust as mutual, reciprocal altruism between pairs of coworkers and show how it induces employees to work harder, relative to those at firms that use the standard tools. In addition, we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction, and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits. We conclude by discussing how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency-mitigation tools. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.