Wage determination in the Spanish industry

In this paper we estimate wage equations for the Spanish industryusing time series data on 85 industrial sectors, which allows us todistinguish between aggregate and sector specific effects in wagedetermination. Industry wages respond mainly to economy wide labourmarket conditions and to a much lesser extent to sector specificproductivity gains. The size of the insider effect has not remainedstable through the sample period. The estimated equations show a strongtransitory effect of unemployment on wages, which is in accordancewith the non--stationarity of the Spanish unemployment rate. Thishysteresis effect seems well accounted for by the sharp rise in theproportion of long term unemployment.

The role of profits in wage determination: evidence from US manufacturing

We estimate the effect of firms' profitability on wage determination for the American economy. Two standard bargaining models are used to illustrate the problems caused by the endogeneity of profits-per-worker in a real wage equation. The profit-sharing parameter can be identified with instruments which shift demando Using information from the input-output table, we create demand-shift variables for 63 4-digit sectors of the US manufacturing sector. The LV. estimates show that profit-sharing is a relevant and widespread phenomenon. The elasticity of wages with respect to profits-per-worker is seven times as large as OLS estimates here and in previous papers. Sensitivity analysis of the profit-sharing parameter controlling for the extent of unionization and product market concentration reinforces our results.

Shop collective bargaining: a study of wage determination in the men's garment industry

by Francis Joseph Haas.

Wage determination under trade unions /

Includes bibliographical references.

Who Ultimately Bears the Burden of Greater Non-Wage Labour costs?

We investigate the effect of a rise in non-wage labour costs (NWLC) on real anufacturing labour costs in OECD countries, taking into account the degree of coordination in the wage bargaining process. We find that, in countries in which wage bargaining is not highly coordinated, 55% of an increase in NWLC appears to be shifted to workers in the long run, whereas in countries operating under a highly coordinated bargaining regime, full shifting occurs. Overall, our results suggest that high NWLC can be associated with a high equilibrium unemployment rate, but only in those OECD countries that do not have highly coordinated wage bargaining.

On the quantitative importance of wage bargaining models

Four general equilibrium search models are compared quantitatively. Thebaseline framework is a calibrated macroeconomic model of the US economydesigned for a welfare analysis of unemployment insurance policy. Theother models make three simple and natural specification changes,regarding tax incidence, monopsony power in wage determination, and therelevant threat point. These specification changes have a major impacton the equilibrium and on the welfare implications of unemploymentinsurance, partly because search externalities magnify the effects ofwage changes. The optimal level of unemployment insurance dependsstrongly on whether raising benefits has a larger impact on searcheffort or on hiring expenditure.

Strike outcomes and wage settlements in Spain

This paper analyzes collective bargaining using Spanish firm level data. Centralto the analysis are the joint determination of wage and strike outcomes in adynamic framework and the possibility of segregate wage equation for strike andnon-strike outcomes. Conditional to strikes taking place, we confirm a negativerelationship between strike duration and wage changes in a dynamic context.Furthermore, we find selection in wage equations induced by the strike outcome.In this sense, the possibility of wage determination processes being differentin strike and non-strike samples is not rejected by the data. In particular,wage dynamics are of opposite sing in both strike and non-strike equations.Finally, we find evidence of a 0.33 percentage points wage change strike premium.

Essays on Wage and Price Formation in Sweden

Study IReal Wage Determination in the Swedish Engineering Industry This study uses the monopoly union model to examine the determination of real wages and in particular the effects of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) on real wages in the engineering industry. Quarterly data for the period 1970:1 to 1996:4 are used in a cointegration framework, utilising the Johansen's maximum likelihood procedure. On a basis of the Johansen (trace) test results, vector error correction (VEC) models are created in order to model the determination of real wages in the engineering industry. The estimation results support the presence of a long-run wage-raising effect to rises in the labour productivity, in the tax wedge, in the alternative real consumer wage and in real UI benefits. The estimation results also support the presence of a long-run wage-raising effect due to positive changes in the participation rates regarding ALMPs, relief jobs and labour market training. This could be interpreted as meaning that the possibility of being a participant in an ALMP increases the utility for workers of not being employed in the industry, which in turn could increase real wages in the industry in the long run. Finally, the estimation results show evidence of a long-run wage-reducing effect due to positive changes in the unemployment rate. Study IIIntersectoral Wage Linkages in Sweden The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the wage-setting in certain sectors of the Swedish economy affects the wage-setting in other sectors. The theoretical background is the Scandinavian model of inflation, which states that the wage-setting in the sectors exposed to international competition affects the wage-setting in the sheltered sectors of the economy. The Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration approach is applied to quarterly data on Swedish sector wages for the period 1980:1–2002:2. Different vector error correction (VEC) models are created, based on assumptions as to which sectors are exposed to international competition and which are not. The adaptability of wages between sectors is then tested by imposing restrictions on the estimated VEC models. Finally, Granger causality tests are performed in the different restricted/unrestricted VEC models to test for sector wage leadership. The empirical results indicate considerable adaptability in wages as between manufacturing, construction, the wholesale and retail trade, the central government sector and the municipalities and county councils sector. This is consistent with the assumptions of the Scandinavian model. Further, the empirical results indicate a low level of adaptability in wages as between the financial sector and manufacturing, and between the financial sector and the two public sectors. The Granger causality tests provide strong evidence for the presence of intersectoral wage causality, but no evidence of a wage-leading role in line with the assumptions of the Scandinavian model for any of the sectors. Study IIIWage and Price Determination in the Private Sector in Sweden The purpose of this study is to analyse wage and price determination in the private sector in Sweden during the period 1980–2003. The theoretical background is a variant of the “Imperfect competition model of inflation”, which assumes imperfect competition in the labour and product markets. According to the model wages and prices are determined as a result of a “battle of mark-ups” between trade unions and firms. The Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration approach is applied to quarterly Swedish data on consumer prices, import prices, private-sector nominal wages, private-sector labour productivity and the total unemployment rate for the period 1980:1–2003:3. The chosen cointegration rank of the estimated vector error correction (VEC) model is two. Thus, two cointegration relations are assumed: one for private-sector nominal wage determination and one for consumer price determination. The estimation results indicate that an increase of consumer prices by one per cent lifts private-sector nominal wages by 0.8 per cent. Furthermore, an increase of private-sector nominal wages by one per cent increases consumer prices by one per cent. An increase of one percentage point in the total unemployment rate reduces private-sector nominal wages by about 4.5 per cent. The long-run effects of private-sector labour productivity and import prices on consumer prices are about –1.2 and 0.3 per cent, respectively. The Rehnberg agreement during 1991–92 and the monetary policy shift in 1993 affected the determination of private-sector nominal wages, private-sector labour productivity, import prices and the total unemployment rate. The “offensive” devaluation of the Swedish krona by 16 per cent in 1982:4, and the start of a floating Swedish krona and the substantial depreciation of the krona at this time affected the determination of import prices.

Wage spillovers, inter-regional effects and the impact of inward investment

This paper evaluates the extent of inter-industry and inter-regional wage spillovers across the UK. An extensive body of literature exists suggesting that wages elsewhere affect wage determination and levels of satisfaction, but this paper extends the analysis of wage determination to examine the effects of inward investment in the process. Thus far the specific effect of foreign wages on domestic wage determination has not been evaluated. We employ industry- and regional-level panel data for the UK, and contrast results from alternative approaches to space-time modelling. Each supports the notion that such wage spillovers do occur, though assumptions made concerning the modelling of spatial interaction are important. Further, such wage spillovers are more widespread for skilled than for unskilled workers and also lower in areas of high unemployment. © 2006 Regional Studies Association.

Assessing the role of social networks on migrant labor market outcomes: Evidence from a representative immigrant survey

What role do social networks play in determining migrant labor market outcomes? We examine this question using data from a random sample of 1500 immigrants living in Ireland. We propose a theoretical model formally predicting that immigrants with more contacts have additional access to job offers, and are therefore better able to become employed and choose higher paid jobs. Our empirical analysis confirms these findings, while focusing more generally on the relationship between migrants’ social networks and a variety of labor market outcomes (namely wages, employment, occupational choice and job security), contrary to the literature. We find evidence that having one more contact in the network is associated with an increase of 11pp in the probability of being employed and with an increase of about 100 euros in the average salary. However, our data is not suggestive of a network size effect on occupational choice and job security. Our findings are robust to sample selection and other endogeneity concerns.

Assessing the role of social networks on migrant labor market outcomes: Evidence from a representative immigrant survey

What role do social networks play in determining migrant labor market outcomes? We examine this question using data from a random sample of 1500 immigrants living in Ireland. We propose a theoretical model formally predicting that immigrants with more contacts have additional access to job offers, and are therefore better able to become employed and choose higher paid jobs. Our empirical analysis confirms these findings, while focusing more generally on the relationship between migrants’ social networks and a variety of labor market outcomes (namely wages, employment, occupational choice and job security), contrary to the literature. We find evidence that having one more contact in the network is associated with an increase of 11pp in the probability of being employed and with an increase of about 100 euros in the average salary. However, our data is not suggestive of a network size effect on occupational choice and job security. Our findings are robust to sample selection and other endogeneity concerns.

Unionism and Peer-Referencing

This study assesses the 'fair-wage-effort' hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.

Efecto de la competencia en la escogencia de estándares educativos

En la literatura económica no se ha estudiado como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afecta específicamente la escogencia de estándares educativos y el valor de matrícula. Usando un modelo teórico analizo como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afectan la escogencia de estándares académicos, comparando la solución en competencia con la solución eficiente y la solución de monopolio. Los individuos son heterogéneos y se diferencian en su habilidad, las instituciones educativas compiten estableciendo en una primera etapa el estándar educativo, y en una segunda etapa el valor de matrícula. Una vez definidos los estándares y los valores de matrícula, estos son información pública, permitiendo a los individuos escoger entre ingresar o no a una institución educativa o a que institución educativa ingresar de acuerdo a la habilidad innata y al costo asociado al esfuerzo. En los resultados se muestra que el bienestar social aumenta cuando en la economía existe más de una institución educativa con estándares diferentes, y la solución de mercado, en monopolio o en competencia, obliga a los estudiantes a ejercer un mayor esfuerzo para alcanzar el título. Independiente a la relación de costos, el valor de matrícula es siempre mayor para la institución con estándar educativo más alto, y mayor en la solución de mercado. Cuando el costo unitario de la institución con estándar más alto es mayor o igual al costo de la institución con menor estándar, los estándares educativos escogidos por el planificador son mayores y el esfuerzo requerido por los individuos es menor respecto a la solución de mercado.