Efecto de la competencia en la escogencia de estándares educativos


Autoria(s): Moreno Herrera, Laura Liliana
Contribuinte(s)

Maldonado, Darío

Data(s)

12/07/2012

Resumo

En la literatura económica no se ha estudiado como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afecta específicamente la escogencia de estándares educativos y el valor de matrícula. Usando un modelo teórico analizo como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afectan la escogencia de estándares académicos, comparando la solución en competencia con la solución eficiente y la solución de monopolio. Los individuos son heterogéneos y se diferencian en su habilidad, las instituciones educativas compiten estableciendo en una primera etapa el estándar educativo, y en una segunda etapa el valor de matrícula. Una vez definidos los estándares y los valores de matrícula, estos son información pública, permitiendo a los individuos escoger entre ingresar o no a una institución educativa o a que institución educativa ingresar de acuerdo a la habilidad innata y al costo asociado al esfuerzo. En los resultados se muestra que el bienestar social aumenta cuando en la economía existe más de una institución educativa con estándares diferentes, y la solución de mercado, en monopolio o en competencia, obliga a los estudiantes a ejercer un mayor esfuerzo para alcanzar el título. Independiente a la relación de costos, el valor de matrícula es siempre mayor para la institución con estándar educativo más alto, y mayor en la solución de mercado. Cuando el costo unitario de la institución con estándar más alto es mayor o igual al costo de la institución con menor estándar, los estándares educativos escogidos por el planificador son mayores y el esfuerzo requerido por los individuos es menor respecto a la solución de mercado.

The literature has not studied how competence between schools affect grading standards and tuition fees. I use a theoretical model to analyze grading standards and tuition fees when schools compete. Also I compare this solution to the monopoly solution and the efficient solution. This model has 2 main assumptions: 1. Exists heterogeneity across individuals, it means differences in innate ability; and 2. Schools compete simultaneously in a two-stage model. First, by selecting grading standards and later, selecting tuition fees to maximize their profits. Considering this, social welfare increases with competence when schools compete and each of them has a different grading standards. In addition, students do lower effort under the efficient solution model. According to the competence model, tuition fees are higher when grading standard is higher, even when lower grading standard school are costly.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/3821

Idioma(s)

spa

Publicador

Facultad de Economía

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Fonte

reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR

instname:Universidad del Rosario

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TMEC 0003 2012

Palavras-Chave #ECONOMIA - INVESTIGACIONES #EDUCACION SUPERIOR #PLANIFICACION ESTRATEGICA #Schools competence #Education #Grading standard
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis

info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion