Photographing Vladimir Putin: Masculinity, Nationalism and Visuality in Russian Political Culture

This article introduces the study of photographs of politicians as an object of geopolitical analysis. It does this through exploring the holiday photographs of Vladimir Putin released by the Kremlin in 2007, 2009, and 2010. Putin's biography provides a backdrop to a detailed analysis of the geopolitical representations contained in the photographs of him. In the same fashion as other images, the photographs seek to provide a contemporary view of events and, at the same time, serve as a medium through which particular political scripts are narrated. The photographs also help to reproduce (and question) hegemonic discourses about public forms of masculinity in Russia. This article is intended to contribute to the debate on how visual images can help make sense of the geopolitical world

Análisis de la política exterior rusa hacia los Estados del Cáucaso en el gobierno de Vladimir Putin (1999-2008) : construcción de una hegemonía en la región

La llegada de Vladimir Putin a la presidencia de la Federación Rusa permitió configurar el poder de esta nación en la región del cáucaso dandole prioridad a sus intereses sobre este territorio en materia de seguridad de sus fronteras y los historicos intereses económicos de Rusia sobre esta región.

Análisis de la Política Exterior rusa enmarcada en el concepto de “Espacio Post-soviético”, a la luz de la teoría de Realismo Clásico de Hans Morgenthau durante los dos periodos de Vladimir Putin, 2000 A 2008

La Política Exterior rusa ha tenido un giro sustancial con la llegada de Vladimir Putin en el año 2000. En consecuencia, esto se ve reflejado en las acciones tomadas por el Kremlin con las revoluciones de Ucrania (Revolución Naranja) y Georgia (Revolución de las Rosas). La apuesta de los dos mandatos de Putin era claramente influenciar su zona geográficamente más cercana, es decir el "Espacio Post-soviético".

La controversa figura di Vladimir Putin

L'elaborato tratta del presidente russo Vladimir Putin, di come è salito al potere e della sua vita.

A summary of the politico-economic changes taking place during Vladimir Putin's first term in office; Chechnya and Russia: The significance of the Chechen problem for contemporary Russia. OSW Study 11/2003

Putin's first term in office: The most significant achievement of Vladimir Putin's team over the three years of his term of office is the realisation of legislative changes, which may constitute a base for further - more detailed - political and economic reforms. This is, to a certain degree, a return to the economic tasks set out by a team of reformists in the early 1990s, which were impossible to realise at the time due to conflicts between the Kremlin and legislative powers. Chechnya and Russia: The purpose of this analysis is to examine the significance of the Chechen issue for contemporary Russia. Part I discusses the history of the conflict from 1991 to date and the impact of developments in the republic on Russia as a whole. Part II is an attempt to indicate the areas of Russian reality that are most deeply affected by the Chechen problem.

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot. The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia; Putin after re-election: The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term. OSW Study 16/2004

North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.

Misrepresenting Russia : Western perceptions of the Putin years, 1999-2008

L’ascension de Vladimir Poutine à la présidence de la Russie fut un point tournant dans l’histoire de la Russie et de ses relations avec l’occident. Lorsqu’il est comparé aux politiques plus pro-occidentales de son prédécesseur, Boris Eltsine, le nouveau nationalisme russe de Poutine changea la relation de la Russie avec l’Occident. Ce texte utilise des articles publiés dans quatre journaux influents de l’Occident—le Washington Post, le New York Times, le Guardian et l’Independent—pour montrer comment l’Occident percevait la Russie entre 1999 et 2008. Poutine fut longuement critiqué pour avoir transformé la « démocratie », instauré par l’Occident dans les années postsoviétiques, en autocratie qui reflétait plus le contexte politico-social traditionnel russe. La Russie refusa de se soumettre aux intérêts de l’Occident. Les médias populaires occidentaux, reflétant les intérêts de leurs gouvernements respectifs, ont rondement critiqué la nouvelle direction de la Russie. L’obligation perçue par les médias occidentaux de promouvoir la « démocratie » autour du globe les a menés à condamner Poutine et la Russie, ce qui créa un sentiment de « russophobie ».

The Putin doctrine: The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. OSW Commentary No. 131, 28.03.2014

The statements made in recent weeks by Russian officials, and especially President Vladimir Putin, in connection with Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine, may suggest that the emergence of a certain doctrine of Russian foreign and security policy is at hand, especially in relation to the post-Soviet area. Most of the arguments at the core of this doctrine are not new, but recently they have been formulated more openly and in more radical terms. Those arguments concern the role of Russia as the defender of Russian-speaking communities abroad and the guarantor of their rights, as well as specifically understood good neighbourly relations (meaning in fact limited sovereignty) as a precondition that must be met in order for Moscow to recognise the independence and territorial integrity of post-Soviet states. However, the new doctrine also includes arguments which have not been raised before, or have hitherto only been formulated on rare occasions, and which may indicate the future evolution of Russia’s policy. Specifically, this refers to Russia’s use of extralegal categories, such as national interest, truth and justice, to justify its policy, and its recognition of military force as a legitimate instrument to defend its compatriots abroad. This doctrine is effectively an outline of the conceptual foundation for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. It offers a justification for the efforts to restore the unity of the ‘Russian nation’ (or more broadly, the Russian-speaking community), within a bloc pursuing close integration (the Eurasian Economic Union), or even within a single state encompassing at least parts of that area. As such, it poses a challenge for the West, which Moscow sees as the main opponent of Russia’s plans to build a new order in Europe (Eurasia) that would undermine the post-Cold War order.

Greater Europe. Putin's vision of European (dis)integration. OSW Study 46/2013

On several occasions since 2001 Vladimir Putin has raised the concept of ‘Greater Europe’, a partly-integrated common space comprising mainly Russia and the European Union. This concept has never been recast into a detailed political programme. While it has been championed as‘a Europe without dividing lines’, the concept would in practice permanently split Europe into two geopolitical blocs – the Western bloc of the European Union, with Germany in the dominant role, and the Eastern bloc, consisting of the emerging Eurasian Union, with Russia in a hegemonic position. In recent years Russia has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at implementing some elements of the concept. However, most of these have failed to become reality. In this context, we should expect Russia’s policy to focus on implementing its priority project of Eurasian integration, based on the structures of the Customs Union/the Eurasian Union. The Greater Europe project, on the other hand, will be postponed until the time when, as Moscow believes, a weakened EU will be ready to accept Russian proposals.

Late Putin. The end of growth, the end of stability. OSW POINT OF VIEW #55, 2015-10-05

Since Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin as President in May 2012, the Russian system of power has become increasingly authoritarian, and has evolved towards a model of extremely personalised rule that derives its legitimacy from aggressive decisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use of force, and interferes increasingly assertively in the spheres of politics, history, ideology or even public morals. Putin’s power now rests on charismatic legitimacy to a much greater extent than it did during his first two presidential terms; currently the President is presented not only as an effective leader, but also as the sole guarantor of Russia’s stability and integrity. After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic model based on revenue from energy resources has exhausted its potential, and the country has no new model that could ensure continued growth for the economy. The Putinist system of power is starting to show symptoms of agony – it has been unable to generate new development projects, and has been compensating for its ongoing degradation by escalating repression and the use of force. However, this is not equivalent to its imminent collapse.

Venäjän politiikka ja perustuslaki : Tutkimus Venäjän perustuslakikäsitteistön kehityksestä 1900-luvulla

Constitutional politics in Russia, a conceptual history study of the constitutional rhetoric in the 20th century In April 2006 the Russian Constitution had its 100th anniversary. Following its late start, five constitutions have been adopted. The great number of constitutions is partly explained in my work by the fact that Russia s political system has changed many times, from one state system to another. From a monarchical state power, it changed first, with the October revolution, into the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, and after that, in 1924, into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In 1991, the Russian Federation was established. The great number of constitutions can also be explained by the fact that in a one-party system, constitutional concepts became one of the most important instruments for introducing political programmes. When the political unity of the state was not only restricted by the Constitution, but also by the party ideology, the political debates concerning constitutional concepts were the key discussions for all the reformative pursuits of Soviet politics. It can be said that, in the Soviet Union, almost all political discourses dealt with constitutional concepts. In the context of restricted unity, the constitutional concepts were the most important tools to argue and create a basis for a new presentation and new political programmes. Thus, the basic feature of the Soviet political discourses has been a continuous competition regarding the constitutional concepts. By defining the constitutional concepts, a new, the political elites wanted especially to redefine, their own way, the traditional meanings of the October 1917 Revolution, and to differentiate them from those of the preceding period of power. From a methodological point of view, I argue that the Russian constitutional concepts make a conceptual historical approach very suitable, and change the focus on history. This approach studies history in contemporary contexts which follow after each other, and whose texts are the main research target. The picture of history is created through the interpretation of the original sources of contemporary contexts. Focusing on the dynamic and traditional characteristic of Russian constitutional concepts, I refer to a certain kind of value and the task of these concepts to justify and define the political and societal unity in every situation. This is done by combining the pursued future orientation of constitutional unity with the new acts of preservation of the traditional principles of the revolution. The different time layers of the constitutional concepts, the past, the present and the future, are the key aspects of storytelling in justifying the continuity and redefining the constitutional unity for the sake of reform. These aspects of constitutional concepts, in addition to all the other functions, have been the main elements of the argumentative structure of acting against opponents.