Effiziente, operative Torbelegung mittels kombinatorischer Auktionen

Das operative Torbelegungsproblem (TBP) z. B. an einem Distributions- oder Cross-dockingzentrum ist ein logistisches Problem, bei dem es gilt, an- und abfahrende Fahrzeuge zeitlich und räumlich so auf die Warenein- und -ausgangstore zu verteilen, dass eine mög-lichst kostengünstige Abfertigung ermöglicht wird. Bisherige Arbeiten, die sich mit dem TBP beschäftigen, lassen Aspekte der Kooperation außer Acht. Dieser Beitrag stellt ein Verfahren vor, durch das der Nachteil einseitig optimaler Torbelegungen überwunden werden kann. Dabei wird auf das Mittel der kombinatorischen Auktionen zurückgegriffen und das TBP als Allokationsproblem modelliert, bei dem Frachtführer um Bündel konsekutiver Einheitszeit-intervalle an den Toren konkurrieren. Mittels eines Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-Mechanismus wird einerseits die Anreizkompatibilität, andererseits die individuelle Rationalität des Auk-tionsverfahrens sichergestellt. Das Verfahren wurde in ILOG OPL Studio 3.6.1 implemen-tiert und die durch Testdaten gewonnenen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Laufzeiten gering genug sind, um das Verfahren für die operative (kurzfristige) Planung einzusetzen und so transportlogistische Prozesse für alle Beteiligten wirtschaftlicher zu gestalten.

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for decentralized supply chain formation

In this paper we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (Supply Chain Formation with Bayesian Incentive Compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

A Convex Optimization Framework for Almost Budget Balanced Allocation of a Divisible Good

We address the problem of allocating a single divisible good to a number of agents. The agents have concave valuation functions parameterized by a scalar type. The agents report only the type. The goal is to find allocatively efficient, strategy proof, nearly budget balanced mechanisms within the Groves class. Near budget balance is attained by returning as much of the received payments as rebates to agents. Two performance criteria are of interest: the maximum ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, and the expected budget surplus, within the class of linear rebate functions. The goal is to minimize them. Assuming that the valuation functions are known, we show that both problems reduce to convex optimization problems, where the convex constraint sets are characterized by a continuum of half-plane constraints parameterized by the vector of reported types. We then propose a randomized relaxation of these problems by sampling constraints. The relaxed problem is a linear programming problem (LP). We then identify the number of samples needed for ``near-feasibility'' of the relaxed constraint set. Under some conditions on the valuation function, we show that value of the approximate LP is close to the optimal value. Simulation results show significant improvements of our proposed method over the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism without rebates. In the special case of indivisible goods, the mechanisms in this paper fall back to those proposed by Moulin, by Guo and Conitzer, and by Gujar and Narahari, without any need for randomization. Extension of the proposed mechanisms to situations when the valuation functions are not known to the central planner are also discussed. Note to Practitioners-Our results will be useful in all resource allocation problems that involve gathering of information privately held by strategic users, where the utilities are any concave function of the allocations, and where the resource planner is not interested in maximizing revenue, but in efficient sharing of the resource. Such situations arise quite often in fair sharing of internet resources, fair sharing of funds across departments within the same parent organization, auctioning of public goods, etc. We study methods to achieve near budget balance by first collecting payments according to the celebrated VCG mechanism, and then returning as much of the collected money as rebates. Our focus on linear rebate functions allows for easy implementation. The resulting convex optimization problem is solved via relaxation to a randomized linear programming problem, for which several efficient solvers exist. This relaxation is enabled by constraint sampling. Keeping practitioners in mind, we identify the number of samples that assures a desired level of ``near-feasibility'' with the desired confidence level. Our methodology will occasionally require subsidy from outside the system. We however demonstrate via simulation that, if the mechanism is repeated several times over independent instances, then past surplus can support the subsidy requirements. We also extend our results to situations where the strategic users' utility functions are not known to the allocating entity, a common situation in the context of internet users and other problems.

Teoremas de envelope de Milgrom e Segal : uma aplicação a desenho de mecanismo

Este trabalho estuda a teoria de desenho de mecanismo. Desenho de mecanismo passou a fazer parte da teoria econômica à partir da década de 60. Seu desenvolvimento deve-se, em grande parte aos trabalhos de Vickrey, Clarke e Groves relacionados a problemas de incentivo. Esta dissertação apresenta os principais desenvolvimentos teóricos na área de desenho de mecanismo, destacando a importância dos conhecidos teoremas de envelope para estes problemas. É apresentada também uma nova versão do teorema de envelope desenvolvida por Milgrom e Segal que pode amplamente ser empregada em problemas de desenho de mecanismos. Essa nova versão do teorema de envelope de Milgron e Segal permite relaxar algumas hipóteses restritivas da teoria de desenho de mecanismos, permitindo obter novos resultados e explorar aqueles já estabelecidos, principalmente em problemas relacionados a desenhos de leilões.

Grant Chapman, Clarke Chapman, and Frank Chapman Jr., Palmetto Grove, Covina, California, ca. 1915

Left to right: Grant Chapman, Clarke Chapman, and Frank Chapman Jr., sons of Frank Marion and Wilhelmina Zillen Chapman, on a porch at Palmetto Grove, Covina, California, ca. 1915.

Investigation into Travel of Transit Oriented Development Residents’ of Kelvin Grove Urban Village

Travel surveys were conducted for collecting data related to residents’ travel at Kelvin Grove Urban Village (KGUV). Currently, KGUV has residents living in the affordable apartments, apartments, townhouses and student accommodation. As a part of data collection process, travel surveys were undertaken for residents living in apartments, affordable apartments and student accommodation. This document contains the questionnaire form used to collect the demographic and travel data related to residents at KGUV. A mail back survey technique was used to collect data for residents living in affordable apartment and apartments, and an intercept surveys was conducted for residents living in student accommodation.

Investigation into travel of transit oriented development : school students’ travel survey of Kelvin Grove Urban Village

Travel surveys were conducted for collecting data related to school students’ travel at Kelvin Grove Urban Village (KGUV). Currently, KGUV has school students studying at grade 10 to 12. As a part of data collection process, travel surveys were undertaken for school students studying. This document contains the questionnaire form used to collect the demographic and travel data related to school students at KGUV. The surveys forms were hand delivered to the school and the responses were collected back via reply paid envelop provided with the questionnaire form.

User characteristics of transit oriented developments : the case of Kelvin Grove Urban Village

Transit oriented developments are high density mixed use developments located within short and easily walkable distance of a major transit centre. These developments are often hypothesised as a means of enticing a mode shift from the private car to sustainable transport modes such as, walking, cycling and public transport. However, it is important to gather evidence to test this hypothesis by determining the travel characteristics of transit oriented developments users. For this purpose, travel surveys were conducted for an urban transit oriented development currently under development. This chapter presents the findings from the preliminary data analysis of the travel surveys. Kelvin Grove Urban Village, a mixed use development located in Brisbane, Australia, has been selected as the case for the transit oriented developments study. Travel data for all groups of transit oriented development users ranging from students to shoppers, and residents to employees were collected. Different survey instruments were used for different transit oriented development users to optimise their response rates, and the performance of these survey instruments are stated herein. The travel characteristics of transit oriented development users are reported in this chapter by explaining mode share, trip length distribution, and time of day of trip. The results of the travel survey reveal that Kelvin Grove Urban Village users use more sustainable modes of transport as compared to other Brisbane residents.

Mathematical model of counter flow v-grove solar air collector

Double-pass counter flow v-grove collector is considered one of the most efficient solar air-collectors. In this design of the collector, the inlet air initially flows at the top part of the collector and changes direction once it reaches the end of the collector and flows below the collector to the outlet. A mathematical model is developed for this type of collector and simulation is carried out using MATLAB programme. The simulation results were verified with three distinguished research results and it was found that the simulation has the ability to predict the performance of the air collector accurately as proven by the comparison of experimental data with simulation. The difference between the predicted and experimental results is, at maximum, approximately 7% which is within the acceptable limit considering some uncertainties in the input parameter values to allow comparison. A parametric study was performed and it was found that solar radiation, inlet air temperature, flow rate and length has a significant effect on the efficiency of the air collector. Additionally, the results are compared with single flow V-groove collector.

Mathematical modelling of counter flow v-grove solar air collector

Double-pass counter flow v-grove collector is considered one of the most efficient solar air-collectors. In this design of the collector, the inlet air initially flows at the top part of the collector and changes direction once it reaches the end of the collector and flows below the collector to the outlet. A mathematical model is developed for this type of collector and simulation is carried out using MATLAB programme. The simulation results were verified with three distinguished research results and it was found that the simulation has the ability to predict the performance of the air collector accurately as proven by the comparison of experimental data with simulation. The difference between the predicted and experimental results is, at maximum, approximately 7% which is within the acceptable limit considering some uncertainties in the input parameter values to allow comparison. A parametric study was performed and it was found that solar radiation, inlet air temperature, flow rate and length have a significant effect on the efficiency of the air collector. Additionally, the results are compared with single flow V-groove collector.

Public space design of knowledge and innovation spaces: Learnings from Kelvin Grove Urban Village, Brisbane

The era of knowledge-based urban development has led to an unprecedented increase in mobility of people and the subsequent growth in new typologies of agglomerated enclaves of knowledge such as knowledge and innovation spaces. Within this context, a new role has been assigned to contemporary public spaces to attract and retain the mobile knowledge workforce by creating a sense of place. This paper investigates place making in the globalized knowledge economy, which develops a sense of permanence spatio-temporally to knowledge workers displaying a set of particular characteristics and simultaneously is process-dependent getting developed by the internal and external flows and contributing substantially in the development of the broader context it stands in relation with. The paper reviews the literature and highlights observations from Kelvin Grove Urban Village, located in Australia’s new world city Brisbane, to understand the application of urban design as a vehicle to create and sustain place making in knowledge and innovation spaces. This research seeks to analyze the modified permeable typology of public spaces that makes knowledge and innovation spaces more viable and adaptive as per the changing needs of the contemporary globalized knowledge society.

Banana Grove

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Orange Grove Planting

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