La faillite internationale: droit comparé, le système canadien et le système européen

La faillite internationale est une matière complexe qui a donné lieu à un long et vif débat doctrinal entre les tenants des systèmes de la territorialité et de l'universalité. Une faillite est internationale lorsqu'elle met en présence un débiteur possédant des biens ou des créanciers dans plus d'un pays. Puisque la matière de faillite est souvent très différente d'un pays à l'autre, l'application du système de la pluralité, retenue dans la plupart des pays, soulève plusieurs problèmes particulièrement en ce qui concerne la coordination entre les diverses faillites et le manque de protection des créanciers, notamment parce qu'elle accorde des effets limités à la reconnaissance des procédures de faillite étrangères. En effet, en présence de procédures de faillite concurrentes il s'agit de répondre aux questions suivantes: quelle est la juridiction compétente pour ouvrir et organiser la faillite? Quelle est la loi applicable? Dans quels États cette faillite va-t-elle produire des effets? Dans le présent mémoire, il s'agit d'établir une comparaison entre le système canadien et le système européen en matière de faillite internationale. Le législateur canadien a récemment envisagé de modifier sa législation sur la faillite pour permettre une meilleure coopération internationale en matière de faillite internationale. Le projet canadien C-55 reprend pour l'essentiel les dispositions contenues dans la loi-type de la commission des Nations-Unis pour le droit commercial international (CNUDCI) sur «l'insolvabilité internationale». Ainsi, il permet de faciliter réellement la reconnaissance des décisions de faillite étrangères, il accorde une plus grande portée aux effets de cette reconnaissance et il prévoit une coordination des procédures multiples en établissant une «hiérarchisation» des procédures de faillite relativement semblable au système européen. Cependant, le projet canadien atteint moins bien l'objectif d'universalité que le Règlement européen 1346/2000 au niveau du traitement égalitaire entre les créanciers locaux et les créanciers étrangers. Si la loi-type offre à tous les États une utilité pratique considérable pour les nombreux cas de coopération internationale, l'harmonisation de la faillite internationale dépendra de son adoption dans les différentes législations. Bien que plusieurs pays aient inséré ce modèle dans leur législation sur la faillite, il n'est pas encore possible, à l'heure actuelle, de parler d'un droit international de la faillite.

Dip financing of financially distressed companies in Brazil – the conditions provided by the brazilian bankruptcy law act as real incentives for dip lenders as in chapter 11 of the American bankruptcy code?

O objeto deste trabalho é a compreensão do financiamento de empresas em crise, mais especificamente, o financiamento concedido após o pedido de recuperação judicial, como forma de permitir que a empresa saia da situação de crise e retorne à condição de normalidade. Para tanto, nos apropriando do termo cunhado pela doutrina norte-americana, para fazer referência ao aporte de recursos em empresas em dificuldade, utilizaremos o termo DIP financing ou financiamento DIP. Para uma compreensão adequada do objeto, é necessário que entendamos a origem do DIP financing nos Estados Unidos e como é a regulação norte-americana sobre a matéria atualmente. O segundo passo será avaliar a possibilidade de aplicação da mesma estrutura de aporte de recursos no Brasil. Ao estudarmos a origem desse mecanismo nos Estados Unidos, veremos os problemas que surgiram ao longo dos anos e como foram superados jurisprudencialmente e doutrinariamente para que o financiamento DIP se consolidasse como uma das formas de aporte de capital em empresas em crise, culminando no desenvolvimento de uma verdadeira indústria de crédito às empresas em dificuldade. Uma análise dos problemas enfrentados pelo sistema falimentar americano nos levará a hipótese de que, a menos que sejam afirmados mecanismos que assegurem a quem concede o financiamento após o pedido de recuperação judicial, uma super prioridade no recebimento após a recuperação judicial, será possível o desenvolvimento de um mercado de DIP financing no Brasil.

La Reforma de la Ley Concursal Suiza en materia de reestructuraciones

Recientemente, el Parlamento Suizo ha adoptado la Ley de Reforma del derecho Suizo de reestructuración de empresas insolventes, en vigor desde el 1 de enero de 2014. La reforma, indirectamente desencadenada por la insolvencia del grupo "Swissair", responde a la tendencia internacional partidaria de procesos de reestructuración sencillos, discretos, eficientes y fácilmente accesibles, inspirándose parcialmente en soluciones aportadas por el "Chapter 11" del US Bankruptcy Code. En lo que se refiere al tratamiento de grupos de empresa, la reforma rechaza la introducción de la consolidación patrimonial sustantiva, pero abre, aunque tímidamente, la puerta a la cooperación y coordinación en lo procesal. La reforma no aborda cuestiones internacionales, lo cual es articularmente lamentable en vista de la no participación de Suiza en el correspondiente Reglamento europeo y de las restrictivas condiciones que el derecho Suizo impone a administradores de insolvencia extranjeros para acceder a bienes situados en Suiza.

The Probate Code, chapter XII-A, chapter 712A of the Complied Laws of 1948, as amended : Juveniles and juvenile division.

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Statutes and regulations : (32 Illinois Administrative Code, chapter II) /

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Classificação dos créditos sobre a insolvência – Os créditos subordinados

Dissertação de Mestrado em Solicitaria

Five essays on bankruptcy

Chapter 2 Bankruptcy Initiation In The New Era of Chapter 11 2.1 Abstract The bankruptcy act of 1978 placed corporate managers (as debtor in possession) in control of the bankruptcy process. Between 2000 and 2001 managers apparently lost this control to secured creditors. This study examines financial ratios of firms filing for bankruptcy between 1993 and 2004 and tests the hypothesis that the change from manager to creditor control created or exacerbated the managerial (and dominant creditor) incentive to delay bankruptcy filing. We find a clear deterioration in the financial conditions of firms filing after 2001. This is consistent with managers (or creditors who control them) delaying filing for bankruptcy. We also observe patterns of operating losses and liquidations that suggest adverse economic consequences from such delay. Chapter 3 Bankruptcy Resolution: Priority of Claims with the Secured Creditor in Control 3.1 Abstract We present new evidence on the violation of priority of claims in bankruptcy using a sample of 222 firms that tiled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the 1993-2004 period. Our study reveals a dramatic reduction in the violations of priority of claims compared to research on prior periods. These results are consistent with changes in both court practices and laws transferring power to the secured creditors over our sample period. We also find an increase in the time from the date of a bankruptcy filing to reaching plan confirmation where priority is not violated. Chapter 4 Bankruptcy Resolution: Speed, APR Violations and Delaware 4.1 Abstract We analyze speed of bankruptcy resolution on a sample of 294 US firms filing for bankruptcy in the 1993-2004 period. We find strong association between type of Chapter II filing and speed of bankruptcy resolution. We also find that violations to the absolute priority rule reduce the time from bankruptcy filing to plan confirmation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that creditors are willing to grant concessions in exchange for faster bankruptcy resolution. Furthermore, after controlling for the type of filing and violations to the absolute priority rule, we do not find any difference in the duration of the bankruptcy process for firms filing in Delaware, New York, or other bankruptcy districts. Chapter 5 Financial Distress and Corporate Control 5.1 Abstract We examine the replacement rates of directors and executives in 63 firms filing for bank ruptcy during the 1995-2002 period. We find that over 76% of directors and executives are replaced in the four year period from the year prior to the bankruptcy filing through three years after. These rates are higher than those found in prior research and is consistent with changes in bankruptcy procedures and practice (i.e. the increased secured creditors control over the process due to both DIP financing and changes in the Uniform Commercial Code) having a significant impact on the corporate governance of firms in financial distress. Chapter 6 Financial Statement Restatements: Decision to File for Bankruptcy 6.1 Abstract On a sample of 201 firms that restated their financial statements we analyze the process of regaining investor trust in a two year period after the restatement. We find that 20% of firms that restate their financial statements tile for bankruptcy or restructure out of court. Our results also indicate that the decisions to change auditor or management is correlated with a higher probability of failure. Increased media attention appears to partly explain the decision of firms to restructure their debt or tile for bankruptcy.

Competitiveness of Brazilian sugarcane ethanol compared to US corn ethanol

Corn ethanol produced in the US and sugarcane ethanol produced in Brazil are the world`s leading sources of biofuel. Current US biofuel policies create both incentives and constraints for the import of ethanol from Brazil and together with the cost competitiveness and greenhouse gas intensity of sugarcane ethanol compared to corn ethanol will determine the extent of these imports. This study analyzes the supply-side determinants of cost competitiveness and compares the greenhouse gas intensity of corn ethanol and sugarcane ethanol delivered to US ports. We find that while the cost of sugarcane ethanol production in Brazil is lower than that of corn ethanol in the US, the inclusion of transportation costs for the former and co-product credits for the latter changes their relative competitiveness. We also find that the relative cost of ethanol in the US and Brazil is highly sensitive to the prevailing exchange rate and prices of feedstocks. At an exchange rate of US$1=R$2.15 the cost of corn ethanol is 15% lower than the delivered cost of sugarcane ethanol at a US port. Sugarcane ethanol has lower GHG emissions than corn ethanol but a price of over $113 per ton of CO(2) is needed to affect competitiveness. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.