O treaty-making power na Constituição brasileira de 1988: uma análise comparativa do poder de celebrar tratados à luz da dinâmica das relações internacionais

O presente trabalho teve por objetivo estudar o modo pelo qual a Constituição brasileira de 1988 disciplina a competência dos poderes constituídos para a celebração de tratados. Buscou-se analisar, dessa forma, o relacionamento dos poderes Legislativo e Executivo no que tange ao procedimento de celebração de tratados internacionais.

Increasing popular participation in the treaty-making process : the legislative process of Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution of Thailand

Historically, the authority to conclude international treaties was exclusively exercised by administrative bodies (or the chief of state). However, recent studies pointed out that the present legislative bodies have come to play a more active role through ratification or the review of treaties in European and American countries. Harrington (2005) studied judicial reform in British dominions and criticized the past executive-dominant treaty-making process as a “democratic deficit” due to a fear that under this system the nation might be bound by international agreements for which a consensus had not been obtained. These studies indicated that people’s participation in the treaty-making process has increased on a global basis, but neither of them provides sufficient descriptive evidence regarding why and how such procedures were established. The present paper therefore attempts to solve these questions by analyzing the legislative and political process of the treaty-making procedure reform in Thailand’s 2007 constitution as a case study.

O "treaty-making power" das organizações internacionais / José H. Fischel de Andrade. --

Inclui notas explicativas e bibliográficas.

O Poder legislativo e os tratados internacionais : o treaty-making power na Constituição brasileira de 1988

Variação de título na Revista Nacional de Direito e Jurisprudência: O poder de celebrar tratados ("treaty-making power") na Constituição brasileira de 1988

Treaty-making power of the House of Representatives ...

From the Yale review, Aug. 1903.

The treaty-making power of the government and the Japanese question. Speech of Everis A. Hayes, of California, in the House of Representatives, Wednesday, January 23, 1907.

Mode of access: Internet.

Canadian federalism and treaty powers: existential communities, functional regimes and the Canadian constitution

La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ne contient aucune disposition expresse concernant un quelconque pouvoir pour les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux de conclure des traités internationaux - ce pouvoir étant réservé, à l'époque de l'adoption de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867, au pouvoir impérial britannique. Aussi, une seule disposition prévoyait les modalités de mise en oeuvre des traités impériaux au sein de la fédération canadienne et cette disposition est aujourd'hui caduque. Puisque l'autonomie du Canada face à l'Empire britannique ne s'est pas accompagnée d'une refonte en profondeur du texte de la constitution canadienne, rien n'a été expressément prévu concernant le droit des traités au sein de la fédération canadienne. Le droit constitutionnel touchant les traités internationaux est donc Ie fruit de la tradition du «constitutionnalisme organique» canadien. Cette thèse examine donc ce type de constitutionnalisme à travers le cas particulier du droit constitutionnel canadien relatif aux traités internationaux. Elle examine ce sujet tout en approfondissant les conséquences juridiques du principe constitutionnel du fédéralisme reconnu par la Cour suprême du Canada dans le Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, [1998] 2 R.C.S. 217. De manière plus spécifique, cette thèse analyse en détail l’affaire Canada (P.G.) c. Ontario (P. G.), [1937] A.C. 326 (arrêt des conventions de travail) ou le Conseil prive a conclu que si l'exécutif fédéral peut signer et ratifier des traités au nom de l'État canadien, la mise en oeuvre de ces traités devra se faire - lorsqu'une modification législative est nécessaire à cet effet - par le palier législatif compétent sur la matière visée par l'obligation internationale. Le Conseil Prive ne spécifia toutefois pas dans cet arrêt qui a compétence pour conclure des traités relatifs aux matières de compétence provinciale. Cette thèse s'attaque donc à cette question. Elle défend la position selon laquelle aucun principe ou règle de droit constitutionnel canadien ou de droit international n'exige que l'exécutif fédéral ait un pouvoir plénier et exclusif sur la conclusion des traités. Elle souligne de plus que de très importants motifs de politique publique fondes notamment sur les impératifs d'expertise, de fonctionnalité institutionnelle et de démocratie militent à l’encontre d'un tel pouvoir fédéral plénier et exclusif. L'agencement institutionnel des différentes communautés existentielles présentes au Canada exige une telle décentralisation. Cette thèse démontre de plus que les provinces canadiennes sont les seules à posséder un pouvoir constitutionnel de conclure des traités portant sur des domaines relevant de leurs champs de compétence - pouvoir dont elles peuvent cependant déléguer l'exercice au gouvernement fédéral. Enfin, cette thèse analyse de manière systématique et approfondie les arguments invoques au soutien d'un renversement des principes établis par l'arrêt des conventions de travail en ce qui concerne la mise en oeuvre législative des traités relatifs à des matières provinciales et elle démontre leur absence de fondement juridique. Elle démontre par ailleurs que, compte tenu de l'ensemble des règles et principes constitutionnels qui sous-tendent et complètent le sens de cette décision, renverser l’arrêt des conventions de travail aurait pour effet concret de transformer l'ensemble de la fédération canadienne en état quasi unitaire car le Parlement pourrait alors envahir de manière permanente et exclusive l'ensemble des champs de compétence provinciaux. Cette conséquence est assurément interdite par le principe du fédéralisme constitutionnellement enchâssé.

Who Is in Love with Multilateralism? Treaty Commitment in the Post-Cold War Era

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral treaties have again become a central vehicle for international cooperation. In this article, we study states’ commitment to 76 multilateral treaties concluded between 1990 and 2005. The article offers a systematic account of present-day multilateral treaty-making efforts and asks what explains variation in states’ participation as witnessed in the act of treaty ratification.We test existing explanations and provide a novel argument that accounts for the strong participation of new European democracies in multilateral treaties. We find that regime type and being part of the European Union (EU) strongly affect treaty ratification. New EU democracies, in particular, are much more likely to ratify multilateral treaties than are other new democracies.

Statement by Herbert Brownell, Jr., attorney general of the United States before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 1 (83d Cong.) a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements, and S. J. Res. 43 (83d Cong.) a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the legal effect of certain treaties.

Mode of access: Internet.

Europeanization in parliament and in the press

Europeanization challenges national democratic systems. As part and parcel of the broader internationalization of politics, Europeanization is associated with a shift from policymaking within majoritarian, elected representative bodies towards technocratic decisions among non-majoritarian and non-elected bodies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2008, Lavenex 2013). It is thus said to weaken the influence of citizens and parliaments on the making of policies and to undermine democratic collective identity (Lavenex 2013, Schimmelfennig 2010). The weakening of national parliaments has been referred to as “de-parliamentarisation” (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008) and has nurtured a broader debate regarding the democratic deficit in the EU. While not being a member of the EU, Switzerland has not remained unaffected by these changes. As discussed in the contribution by Fischer and Sciarini, state executive actors take the lead in Switzerland's European policy. They are responsible for the conduct of international negotiations, they own the treaty making power, and it is up to them to decide whether they wish to launch a negotiation with the EU. In addition, the strong take-it or leave-it character of Europeanized acts limits the room for manoeuver of the parliamentary body also in the ratification phase. Among the public, the rejection of the treaty on the European constitution has definitely closed the era of “permissive consensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2009). However, the process of European unification remains far remote from the European public. In Switzerland, the strongly administrative character of international legislation hinders public discussion (Vögeli 2007). In such a context, the media may serve as cue for the public: By delivering information about the extent and nature of Europeanized policymaking, the media enable citizens to form their own opinions and to hold their representatives accountable. In this sense media coverage may not only be considered an indicator of the information delivered to the public, but it may also enhance the democratic legitimacy of Europeanized policymaking (for a similar argument, see Tresch and Jochum 2005). While the previous contributions to this debate have examined the Europeanization of Swiss (primary and secondary) legislation, we take a closer look at two additional domestic arenas that are both supposed to be under pressure due to Europeanization: The parliament and the media. To that end, we rely on data gathered in a research project that two of us carried out in the context of the NCCR Democracy.1 While this project was primarily interested in the mediatization of decision-making processes in Switzerland, it also investigated the conditional role played by internationalization/Europeanization. For our present purposes, we shall exploit the two data-sets that were developed as part of a study of the political agenda-setting power of the media (Sciarini and Tresch 2012, 2013, Tresch et al. 2013): A data-set on issue attention in parliamentary interventions (initiatives, motions, postulates,2 interpellations and questions) and a data-set on issue attention in articles from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ). The data covers the years 1995 to 2003 and the coding of issues followed the classification system developed in the “Policy Agendas Project” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: World Trade Forum

The negotiation of a patchy but burgeoning network of international investment agreements and the increasing use to which they are put is generating a growing body of jurisprudence which, while still evolving, requires closer analytical scrutiny. Drawing on many of the most distinguished voices in investment law and policy, and offering novel, multidisciplinary perspectives on the rapidly evolving landscape shaping international investment activity and treaty-making, this book explores the most important economic, legal and policy challenges in contemporary international investment law and policy. It also examines the systemic implications flowing from frenetic recent judicial activism in investment matters and advances several innovative propositions for how best to promote greater overall coherence in rule-design, treaty use and policy making and thus offer a better balance between the rights and obligations of international investors and host states.

Mixed Blessing? EP Oversight of the ESDP and the Constitutional Treaty

As commonly held, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) suffers from a “double democratic deficit”: the EP has a marginal role in the ESDP-making process and the national parliaments remain unable to account for their own government. Therefore pressure coming from these two institutions had been exercised during the Convention on the Future of Europe to improve the democratic oversight on this rapidly evolving policy. This paper investigates the innovations included in the Constitutional Treaty, focusing specifically on the new role granted to the EP. It shows that even though this text does not substantially modify the inter-institutional balance of powers in the ESDP area, the EP may take advantage of some of its articles to become an actor in the ESDP-control process in the ‘living constitution.

Citizen participation and the Lisbon Treaty : A legal perspective

How to "bring the [European] Union closer to its citizens" is a vexed and vital problem of European integration. Article 11 TEU on participatory democracy, recently introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, is meant to be part of the solution. The EU Economic and Social Committee has gone so far as to define this provision "a milestone on the road to a people's Europe that is real and feasible". This appears to be an overly optimistic assessment - partly because art. 11 relies heavily on the involvement of civil society organisations, which political science literature suggests is conceptually and/or practically irrelevant to citizen involvement; partly because it largely formalizes participatory practices that have been in existence for years without cognizable effects on citizen participation; and partly because even its most innovative element - the European citizens' initiative (ECI) - does not bring significant changes to the Union's constitutional arrangements in terms of redistributing decision-making power. In addition to that, secondary legislation places significant hurdles on the submission of ECIs and might prevent or delay their becoming a standard democratic practice. This is not to say that art. 11 TEU has no potential at all. Its insertion in the Treaty might provide impetus to rethink and develop past participatory practices, such as horizontal civil dialogue. Moreover, the effects of "popular input" in the form of ECIs on EU institutional dynamics is as yet unknown - and perhaps not negligible, to judge from the keen interest that the European Parliament and other bodies have demonstrated in "appropriating" it as a political asset. Finally, art. 11 raises the stakes of the Union's democratic challenge and might pressure EU institutions to make full use of its potential. Or, if eventually proved inadequate, art. 11 might constitute a constitutional experiment on the way to meaningful forms of direct democracy at EU level.

The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.