The Transportation Corps officer.

Mode of access: Internet.

Transportation planning--installation master plan.

"April 1990."

Suggestions for the speedy and secure conveyance of our reinforcements to Canada.

Contains two letters: The first letter was addressed to Viscount Melville and dated London 16th December, 1826; and the second letter for private distribution was addressed to Captain Sir W. Symonds, dated London, 21st April, 1838 under title: A second letter on the conveyance of troops to Canada / by Capt. Bowles.

Defense travel reengineering.

Mode of access: Internet.

Ensuring combat power gets to its place of business.

Mode of access: Internet.

Suggestions for the speedy and secure conveyance of our reinforcements to Canada /

Mode of access: Internet.

Transportation Corps, military science III.

Mode of access: Internet.

Military air transportation : twenty-eighth report by the Committee on Government Operations.

Mode of access: Internet.

Standard history of New Orleans, Louisiana; giving a description of the natural advantages, natural history ... settlement, Indians, Creoles, municipal and military history, mercantile and commercial interests, banking, transportation, struggles against high water, the press, educational ... etc.,

Mode of access: Internet.

Military Sea Transportation Service, Brooklyn, N.Y. : hearings ... Eighty-seventh Congress, first session pursuant to Senate Resolution 249, 86th Congress.

Hearings held January 5 through June 9, 1961.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Military Districts, England and Wales, United Kingdom, 1804 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: A complete representation of the coast of England, together with the interior, divided into counties and military districts : also the coast of France and Holland from the Texel to Brest ... to which is annexed eighteen plans of the ports of the enemy, the principal depôts of the flotilla intended for the invasion of England, by John Luffman, Geogr. It was published by J. Luffman in 1804. Scale [ca. 1:2,500,000]. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the 'British National Grid' coordinate system. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, administrative and military district boundaries, shoreline features including distances between selected ports, and more. Includes insets of foreign military installations and index to the military districts. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of originators, ground condition dates, scales, and map purposes.

The plan for joint use of military airfields /

Pursuant to Section 504 (D)(3) of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (Public law 97-248).

Engineer field manual : Parts I-VII. I. Reconnaissance. II. Bridges. III. Roads. IV. Railroads. V. Field fortification. VI. Animal transportation. VII. Tables, weights, measures and specific gravities. Prepared under the direction of the chief of engineers, U.S. Army.

War dept. doc. no. 355.

Preparation of freight for airlift transportation.

"December 1991."