Exchange relationships in building services maintenance activity : a test of transaction cost economics and the resource dependency view

The firm is faced with a decision concerning the nature of intra-organizational exchange relationships with internal human resources and the nature or inter-organizational exchange relationships with market firms. In both situations, the firm can develop an exchange that ranges from a discrete exchange to a relational exchange. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource Dependency View (RDV) represent alternative efficiency-based explanations fo the nature of the exchange relationship. The aim of the paper is to test these two theories in respect of air conditioning maintenance in retail centres. Multiple sources of information are genereated from case studies of Australian retail centres to test these theories in respoect of internalized operations management (concerning strategic aspects of air conditioning maintenance) and externalized planned routine air conditioning maintenance. The analysis of the data centres on pattern matching. It is concluded that the data supports TCE - on the basis of a development in TCE's contractual schema. Further research is suggested towards taking a pluralistic stance and developing a combined efficiency and power hypothesis - upon which Williamson has speculated. For practice, the conclusions also offer a timely cautionary note concerning the adoption of one approach in all exchange relationships.

Integrating the resource-based view and transaction cost economics in immigrant business performance

This paper presents a new integrated framework that integrates the resource-based view and transaction cost economics to explain the phenomenon of immigrant entrepreneurship. We extend the existing literature on immigrant entrepreneurship by identifying different types of ethnic network resources and demonstrating how these resources interact with transaction costs in the context of Chinese immigrants. Thus, our study contributes to the literature by providing a theoretical framework which identifies mechanisms immigrant entrepreneurs use to strategically deploy resources to minimize costs and maximize performance outcomes.

The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: family-based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias

We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.

Transaction Cost Analysis of PPP Risk Share

PPP (Public Private Partnerships) is a new operation mode of infrastructure projects, which usually undergo long periods and have various kinds of risks in technology, market, politics, policy, finance, society, natural conditions and cooperation. So the government and the private agency should establish the risk-sharing mechanism to ensure the successful implementation of the project. As an important branch of the new institutional economics, transaction cost economics and its analysis method have been proved to be beneficial to the proper allocation of risks between the two parts in PPP projects and the improvement of operation efficiency of PPP risk-sharing mechanism. This paper analyzed the transaction cost of the projects risk-sharing method and the both risk carriers. It pointed out that the risk-sharing method of PPP projects not only reflected the spirit of cooperation between public sector and private agency, but also minimized the total transaction cost of the risk sharing mechanism itself. Meanwhile, the risk takers had to strike a balance between the beforehand cost and the afterwards cost so as to control the cost of risk management. The paper finally suggested three ways which might be useful to reduce the transaction cost: to choose appropriate type of contract of PPP risk-sharing mechanism, to prevent information asymmetry and to establish mutual trust between the two participants.

Information sharing with key suppliers : a transaction cost theory perspective

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explain variations in discretionary information shared between buyers and key suppliers. The paper also aims to examine how the extent of information shared affects buyers’ performance in terms of resource usage, output, and flexibility. ----- ----- Design/methodology/approach: The data for the paper comprise 221 Finnish and Swedish non-service companies obtained through a mail survey. The hypothesized relationships were tested using partial least squares modelling with reflective and formative constructs.----- ----- Findings: The results of the study suggest that (environmental and demand) uncertainty and interdependency can to some degree explain the extent of information shared between a buyer and key supplier. Furthermore, information sharing improves buyers’ performance with respect to resource usage, output, and flexibility.----- ----- Research limitations/implications: A limitation to the paper relates to the data, which only included buyers.Abetter approach would have been to collect data from both, buyers and key suppliers. Practical implications – Companies face a wide range of supply chain solutions that enable and encourage collaboration across organizations. This paper suggests a more selective and balanced approach toward adopting the solutions offered as the benefits are contingent on a number of factors such as uncertainty. Also, the risks of information sharing are far too high for a one size fits all approach.----- ----- Originality/value: The paper illustrates the applicability of transaction cost theory to the contemporary era of e-commerce. With this finding, transaction cost economics can provide a valuable lens with which to view and interpret interorganizational information sharing, a topic that has received much attention in the recent years.

Economists' perceptions versus managers' decisions:an experiment in transaction cost analysis

Are the perceptions of professional economists on transaction costs consistent with make-or-buy decisions made within firms? The answer may have important implications for transaction cost research. Data on firms' outsourcing during the new product development process are taken from a largescale survey of UK, German and Irish manufacturing plants, and we test the consistency of these outsourcing decisions with the predictions derived from the transaction cost perceptions of a panel of economists. Little consistency is evident between actual outsourcing patterns and the predictions of the (Williamsonian) transactions cost model derived from the panel of economists. There is, however, evidence of a systematic pattern to the differences, suggesting that a competence or resource-based approach may be relevant to understanding firm outsourcing, and that firms are adopting a strategic approach to managing their external relationships. © Cambridge Political Economy Society 2005; all rights reserved.

Transaction cost analysis

Transaction cost theory is one of the most widely used theories in marketing, management, and economics. The focus of the theory is on explaining how firms organize transactions. The rules by which transactions are organized is called governance. A wide variety of strategic decisions of firms, such as outsourcing, the mode of organizing exports, the use of crowdsourcing, or partner selection efforts, can be analyzed and understood using transaction cost theory. The basic argument of transaction cost theory is that firms economize on costs by choosing a form of governance that minimizes production and transaction costs. We discuss the origins and uses of the theory, critical variables, assumptions, and limitations.

Modelling the intention to adopt cloud computing services : a transaction cost theory perspective

This paper uses transaction cost theory to study cloud computing adoption. A model is developed and tested with data from an Australian survey. According to the results, perceived vendor opportunism and perceived legislative uncertainty around cloud computing were significantly associated with perceived cloud computing security risk. There was also a significant negative relationship between perceived cloud computing security risk and the intention to adopt cloud services. This study also reports on adoption rates of cloud computing in terms of applications, as well as the types of services used.

Networks and RegionalCompetitiveness: Towards a Transaction Cost Approach of Small-Scale Cooperation

A preoccupation with competition often dominates the study of governance. A focus on competition often unnecessarily precludes the possibility that regional institutions can suspend competition in certain areas and facilitate cooperation among potential rivals, thereby potentially contributing to their mutual success. In many ways companies cooperating through these types of networks have a greater degree of flexibility than firms which are forced to rely solely on hierarchies or markets for solutions to their problems. In order to fully understand how such networks work, this article first parses out differences in definitions of networks in order to understand how the type of network mentioned above actually differs from other uses of this term. Then it develops a theory of governance that goes beyond hierarchies and markets by demonstrating how this type of network can lead to reductions in transaction costs. This claim is illustrated on hand from examples of alternative forms of organization in Germany and Italy.

Information asymmetry and transaction costs in a cross-cultural business transaction

The intent of this paper is to provide a practitioners insight into the present and foreseeable future of problem of transaction cost economics related to culture and business etiquette that may increase the of complexity of business communication. We will also explore whether it impacts participant's mindsets regarding opportunistic or passive aggressive behavior. We will study the role of culture, ethics, information asymmetry, and legal systems regarding their importance towards the business contracts and lack of knowledge in local environments. We will make connections to contract theory strategies and objectives and recommend business practices. Furthermore, economic theory explores the role of the impossibility of the perfect contract. Historical and present day operational factors are examined for the determination of forward-looking contract law indications worldwide. This paper is intended provide a practitioners view with a global perspective of a multinational, mid-sized and small corporations giving consideration in a non-partisan and non-nationalistic view, yet examines the individual characteristics of the operational necessities and obligations of any corporation. The study will be general, yet cite specific articles to each argument and give adequate consideration to the intricacies of the global asymmetry of information. This paper defends that corporations of any kind and size should be aware of the risk of international business etiquette and cultural barriers that might jeopardize the savings you could obtain from engaging international suppliers.

Fuzzy rule-based system for evaluation of uncertainty transaction in cassava chain

A fuzzy ruled-based system was developed in this study and resulted in an index indicating the level of uncertainty related to commercial transactions between cassava growers and their dealers. The fuzzy system was developed based on Transaction Cost Economics approach. The fuzzy system was developed from input variables regarding information sharing between grower and dealer on “Demand/purchase Forecasting”, “Production Forecasting” and “Production Innovation”. The output variable is the level of uncertainty regarding the transaction between seller and buyer agent, which may serve as a system for detecting inefficiencies. Evidences from 27 cassava growers registered in the Regional Development Offices of Tupa and Assis, São Paulo, Brazil, and 48 of their dealers supported the development of the system. The mathematical model indicated that 55% of the growers present a Very High level of uncertainty, 33% present Medium or High. The others present Low or Very Low level of uncertainty. From the model, simulations of external interferences can be implemented in order to improve the degree of uncertainty and, thus, lower transaction costs.