Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Tasa Tobin: arena en las ruedas

El artículo trata de un impuesto concebido por James Tobin al que se ha llamado la tasa Tobin. La idea de esta tasa es brillante y bastaría una decidida voluntad política de llevarla a cabo para que fuese efectiva.

Tasa Tobin: arena en las ruedas

El artículo trata de un impuesto concebido por James Tobin al que se ha llamado la tasa Tobin. La idea de esta tasa es brillante y bastaría una decidida voluntad política de llevarla a cabo para que fuese efectiva.

Monetary Policy When Wages Are Downwardly Rigid: Friedman Meets Tobin

In a monetary economy with downwardly rigid wages, the central banker should target a low, but strictly positive, inflation rate.

Monetary dynamics in a general equilibrium version of the Baumol-Tobin model

I study the welfare cost of inflation and the effect on prices after a permanent increase in the interest rate. In the steady state, the real money demand is homogeneous of degree one in income and its interest-rate elasticity is approximately equal to −1/2. Consumers are indifferent between an economy with 10% p.a. inflation and one with zero inflation if their income is 1% higher in the first economy. A permanent increase in the interest rate makes the price level to drop initially and inflation to adjust slowly to its steady state level.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Meet your grandfather, a sketch-book of the Hagood-Tobin family.

"Three hundred copies."

Memoirs of Mr. John Tobin ...

Preface,--Memoirs of Mr. John Tobin.--Analysis, by John Tobin, of La gitanilla de Madrid, Comedia famosa de Don Antonio de Solis.--The tragedy, a fragment.--The Indians, a play.--Your's or mine, a comic opera.--The fisherman, an opera.

APLICACIÓN DEL MODELO TOBIN A LA ESTIMACIÓN DE LA OFERTA DE CRÉDITO AGROPECUARIO EN COSTA RICA

En este artículo se discuten los problemas de identificación que se enfrentan al estimar la función de oferta y la función de demanda de crédito, se justifica la estimación de las variables explicativas de ambas funciones y el análisis de los determinantes del acceso que podrían tener los productores agropecuarios de Costa Rica al crédito. En cada caso la metodología apropiada es discutida.Cinco diferentes tipos de dificultades surgen en el proceso de inferencia o análisis empírico que se estudiará aquí. Estas dificultades reflejan las características del mercado de préstamos, los defectos e insuficiencias de la recolección de datos y los defectos e insuficiencias de la estimación de modelos. Varias de estas dificultades podrían ocurrir simultáneamente, aunque este no es siempre el caso.

Stakeholders Theory and Theory of the Firm: a study on the hierarchy of objective-functions in Brazilian companies

Discussion opposing the Theory of the Firm to the Theory of Stakeholders are contemporaneous and polemical. One focal point of such debates refers to which objective-function companies, should choose, whether that of the shareholders or that of the stakeholders, and whether it is possible to opt for both simultaneously. Several empirical studies. have attempted-to test a possible correlation between both functions, and there has not been any consensus-so far. The objective of the present research is to examine a gap in such discussions: is there (or not) a subordination of the stakeholders` objective-function to that of the shareholders? The research is empirical,and analytical and employs quantitative methods. Hypotheses were tested and data analyzed by using non-parametrical (chi-square test) and parametrical procedures (frequency. correlation `coefficient). Secondary data was collected from he Economitica database and from the Brazilian Institute of Social and-Economic Analyses (IBASE) website, relative to public companies that have published their Social Balance Statements following the IBASE model from 1999 to 2006, whose sample amounted to 65 companies; In order to assess the objective-function of shareholders a proxy was created based on the following three indices: ROE (return on equity), EnterpriseValue and Tobin`s Q. In order to assess the objective-function of stakeholders a proxy was created by employing the following IBASE social balance indices: internal ones (ISI), external ones (ISE), and environmental ones (IAM). The results have shown no evidence of subordination of stakeholders` objective-function to that of the shareholders in analyzed companies, negating initial expectations and calling for deeper investigation of results. Its main conclusion, which states that the attempted subordination does not take place, is limited to the sample herein investigated and calls for ongoing research aiming at improvements which may lead to sample enlargement and, as a consequence, may make feasible the application of other statistical techniques which may yield a more thorough, analysis of the studied phenomehon.