What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from multicultural European countries

Objectives. Considerable evidence suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, several researchers have argued that citizens' attitudes toward paying taxes, defined as tax morale, helps to explain the high degree of tax compliance. However, most studies have treated tax morale as a black box, without discussing which factors shape it. Additionally, the tax compliance literature provides little empirical research that investigates attitudes toward paying taxes in Europe. Methods. Thus, this article is unique in its examination of citizen tax morale within three multicultural European countries, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain, a choice that allows far more detailed examination of the impact of culture and institutions using data sets from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. Results. The results indicate the tendency that cultural and regional differences affect tax morale. Conclusion. The findings suggest that higher legitimacy for political institutions leads to higher tax morale.

On inequality tax evasion and progressive taxes

This paper proposes a simple variation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) construct and integrates it to a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. We study an overlapping generations framework i n which agents must initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, they then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that in comparison with the basic approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice drastically reduced the extent of evasion in the economy. This outcome is the result of an anomaly intrinsic to the basic Allingham and Sandmo version of the model, which makes the evade-or-not extension a more suitable approach to modelling the issue. We also find that the basic model, and the model with and ‘evade-or-not’ choice have strikingly different political economy implications, , which suggest fruitful avenues of empirical research.

The impact of taxes on optimal portfolio choice : an Australian study

Taxes are an important component of investing that is commonly overlooked in both the literature and in practice. For example, many understand that taxes will reduce an investment’s return, but less understood is the risk-sharing nature of taxes that also reduces the investment’s risk. This thesis examines how taxes affect the optimal asset allocation and asset location decision in an Australian environment. It advances the model of Horan & Al Zaman (2008), improving the method by which the present value of tax liabilities are calculated, by using an after-tax risk-free discount rate, and incorporating any new or reduced tax liabilities generated into its expected risk and return estimates. The asset allocation problem is examined for a range of different scenarios using Australian parameters, including different risk aversion levels, personal marginal tax rates, investment horizons, borrowing premiums, high or low inflation environments, and different starting cost bases. The findings support the Horan & Al Zaman (2008) conclusion that equities should be held in the taxable account. In fact, these findings are strengthened with most of the efficient frontier maximising equity holdings in the taxable account instead of only half. Furthermore, these findings transfer to the Australian case, where it is found that taxed Australian investors should always invest into equities first through the taxable account before investing in super. However, untaxed Australian investors should invest their equity first through superannuation. With borrowings allowed in the taxable account (no borrowing premium), Australian taxed investors should hold 100% of the superannuation account in the risk-free asset, while undertaking leverage in the taxable account to achieve the desired risk-return. Introducing a borrowing premium decreases the likelihood of holding 100% of super in the risk-free asset for taxable investors. The findings also suggest that the higher the marginal tax rate, the higher the borrowing premium in order to overcome this effect. Finally, as the investor’s marginal tax rate increases, the overall allocation to equities should increase due to the increased risk and return sharing caused by taxation, and in order to achieve the same risk/return level as the lower taxation level, the investor must take on more equity exposure. The investment horizon has a minimal impact on the optimal allocation decision in the absence of factors such as mean reversion and human capital.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

Taxes and decision rights in multinationals

We examine how a multinational's choice to centralize or decentralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in multinational enterprises (MNEs)—here, as a strategic precommitment device and a tax manipulation instrument—we show that centralization is more profitable when tax differentials are large. When tax differentials are small, decentralization can be performed in two different ways each providing the highest profits in a particular range of the tax differential. Hence, the paper emphasizes the organizational flexibility that MNEs have in pursuing tax optimization.

Which policy option can be more cost-effective in promoting the use of energy efficient appliances in Europe? A comparison of energy taxes, subsidies, tax credits and bans.

4 p.

Understanding Public Support for Externality-Correcting Taxes and Subsidies: A Lab Experiment

31 p.

Local air pollution and global climate change taxes: a distributional analysis

25 p.

Death or taxes? The political economy of sanitation expenditure in nineteenth-century Britain

This thesis consists of three papers studying the relationship between democratic reform, expenditure on sanitation public goods and mortality in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. During this period decisions over spending on critical public goods such as water supply and sewer systems were made by locally elected town councils, leading to extensive variation in the level of spending across the country. This dissertation uses new historical data to examine the political factors determining that variation, and the consequences for mortality rates.

The first substantive chapter describes the spread of government sanitation expenditure, and analyzes the factors that determined towns' willingness to invest. The results show the importance of towns' financial constraints, both in terms of the available tax base and access to borrowing, in limiting the level of expenditure. This suggests that greater involvement by Westminster could have been very effective in expediting sanitary investment. There is little evidence, however, that democratic reform was an important driver of greater expenditure.

Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of extending voting rights to the poor on government public goods spending. A simple model predicts that the rich and the poor will desire lower levels of public goods expenditure than the middle class, and so extensions of the right to vote to the poor will be associated with lower spending. This prediction is tested using plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of the franchise. The results strongly support the theoretical prediction: expenditure increased following relatively small extensions of the franchise, but fell once more than approximately 50% of the adult male population held the right to vote.

Chapter 4 tests whether the sanitary expenditure was effective in combating the high mortality rates following the Industrial Revolution. The results show that increases in urban expenditure on sanitation-water supply, sewer systems and streets-was extremely effective in reducing mortality from cholera and diarrhea.

Environmental taxes and the Double dividend hypothesis

In this End of Degree Dissertation I built a basic economic model, where two perfectly competitive markets interact, as a tool to understand, illustrate and evaluate environmentalfiscal reforms that have already been implemented or have been announced in many developed countries. Thus, in this dissertation I try to explain as simply as possible the theorical aspects of the “double dividend” hyphotesis and provide a numerical example with illustrative purpose.

How smokers may react to cigarette taxes and price increases in Brazil: data from a national survey

Background: Despite being the third largest tobacco producer in the world, Brazil has developed a comprehensive tobacco control policy that includes a broad restriction on both advertising and smoking in indoor public places, compulsory pictorial warning labels, and a menthol cigarette ban. However, tax and pricing policies have been developed slowly and only very recently were stronger measures implemented. This study investigated the expected responses of smokers to hypothetical price increases in Brazil.Methods: We analyzed smokers' responses to hypothetical future price increases according to sociodemographic characteristics and smoking conditions in a multistage sample of Brazilian current cigarette smokers aged >= 14 years (n = 500). Logistic regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between possible responses and different predictors.Results: in most subgroups investigated, smokers most frequently said they would react to a hypothetical price increase by taking up alternatives that might have a positive impact on health, i.e., they would try to stop smoking (52.3%) or smoke fewer cigarettes (46.8%). However, a considerable percentage responded that they would use alternatives that would reduce the effect of price increases, such as the same brand with lower cost (48.1%). After controlling for sex age group (14-19, 20-39, 40-59, and >= 60 years), schooling level (>= 9 versus <= 9 years), number of cigarettes per day (>20 versus <= 20), and stage of change for smoking cessation (precontemplation, contemplation, and preparation), lower levels of dependence were positively associated with the response I would try to stop smoking (odds ratio [OR], 2.19). Young age was associated with I would decrease the number of cigarettes (OR, 3.44). A low schooling level was strongly associated with all responses.Conclusions: Taxes and prices increases have great potential to stimulate cessation or reduction of cigarette consumption further among two important vulnerable populations of smokers in Brazil: young smokers and those of low educational level. the results from the present study also suggest that seeking illegal products may reduce the impact of increased taxes, but does not eliminate it.